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Dissertation Summary 
Living in an ethnically and culturally heterogeneous social setting has been fraught with 
problems, and therefore a prime subject for a variety of social science disciplines. Indeed, 
intergroup relations are a thriving research topic in psychology, anthropology, behavioural 
economics, sociology, et cetera. This dissertation will be adding to the discussion by 
addressing the dynamics of conflict between minorities and majorities. More precisely, it 
will tackle the question of majorities discriminating against minorities who live in their 
society by situating the question in the Structural Goal/Expectation Theory (sGET) 
approach. Rather than relying on identity or attitude biases, sGET pushes forward an 
evolutionarily inspired view of human intergroup behaviour in which, crucially, the 
incentive structures inherent to the situation and the interpersonal interaction between the 
actors can be directly linked to behaviour. Thus, it is argued in the thesis that group-level 
interdependence, what is to say the dependence of all group members on common resources 
they jointly manage, is a crucial component of minority discrimination. The dilemma 
embedded in common resource management, the freerider problem, provides the structures 
which can lead to minority discrimination becoming a default behavioural strategy. 
The dissertation is divided into five chapters, and a collection of supplementary materials. 
The first and final chapter are written solely for the dissertation, while the middle three 
chapters are manuscripts meant for individual publication as articles. At the time of 
submission, only Article 1 (Chapter 2) has been submitted for publication in its earlier and 
shorter form. It is currently under revision for the International Association for Cross-
Cultural Psychology proceedings booklet from the Nagoya conference in 2016, where the 
content has been initially presented.  
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
ix 
 
Because of the required format for this dissertation, the Article-Chapters will not follow one 
another textually. In addition, some of the content will overlap, since these chapters were 
written as standalone material. The introductory and concluding chapters are meant to 
provide a framework for them. 
Thus, Chapter 1 provides a general theoretical background to the central questions of the 
thesis, as they will be addressed in the empirical chapters. It starts with a detailed view of 
the various problems of coexistence encountered by minority and majority groups, as well 
as the self- and structure-based explanations for them. It goes on to argue for the 
Structural Goal/Expectation theory’s expansion and integration with evolutionary 
psychology, discussing its history, the strengths and short-comings of its theoretical 
framework, and the appropriate methods for researching it. This is then applied to the 
narrower question of minority and majority interaction in the face of the common resource 
management dilemma. 
Chapter 2, Article 1, will focus solely on theory building, extending it beyond the questions 
asked in the thesis itself. At the heart of this chapter is an argument for the integration of 
the more popular, self-based, and more complex, structure-based perspectives into an 
extended structural Goal/Expectation theory. After a discussion of the evolutionary function 
of human groups, and its impact on the development of a particularly human social psyche, 
a framework of investigation is suggested. This framework is based on four different types 
of interdependence which can occur between groups: interpersonal, group-level, intergroup, 
and socio-cultural interdependence. While three of these have in some fashion existed in 
literature previously, the concept of group-level interdependence and its impact on 
intergroup behaviour is a new theoretical proposition, and the topic of the empirical 
portions of the dissertation. 
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Chapter 3, Article 2, addresses the central question of the thesis – the interaction of 
minority and majority members given group-level interdependence. While often confounded 
in literature with independent groups of equal size, I argue that minorities and majorities 
are distinct groups of unequal size which are nevertheless interdependent on the group 
level. This means that they rely on each other for the generation, maintenance and 
redistribution of group resources, as well as methods of solving the dilemma engendered 
within. Two experimental studies conducted in the social sciences lab on a student and 
general population sample are presented. They show that if the knowledge of common 
resource management dilemma is engaged, majority groups will show a priori negative 
bias, meaning a deliberate detraction from minority members’ resources, while the minority 
will suspend intergroup bias. These findings cannot be explained with Social Identity 
Theory alone, but are predicted by sGET. 
Chapter 4, Article 3, repeats the experiments from Article 2 on groups of equal size. This 
exploratory study finds that group-level interdependence might in and of itself be enough to 
engage a priori negative bias or outgroup hate. The result is discussed with reference to the 
theoretical background presented in Chapter 2. 
Chapter 5, the discussion, begins with the summary of the empirical evidence presented in 
chapters 3 and 4. The limitations and future directions are discussed, as well as methods of 
applying the present findings to peace-making efforts and policy implementation. 
Supplementary Materials consists of an exhaustive description of the studies described in 
Chapters 3 and 4, as well as the materials used in them. While the software used in the 
various studies is only available upon communication with the author, screen caps 
representing what the participants had seen during the experiment are included. Finally, 
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there are some notes on the design, its development, and the decision-making process, 
meant to accompany the thesis as a whole. 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
Chapter 1. 
General Introduction: Living in Diversity is Living in Adversity? 
 
 
  
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
2 
 
Introduction 
With increasing geographical mobility, globalization of business processes, and 
stress on multiculturalism in the media and education, there can be no denying that the 
face of local, previously homogeneous communities is undergoing tremendous change. On 
the one hand, this is something to be celebrated. On the other, it is a frightening step into 
an unknown shared future, both for the newly formed minority communities, and the host 
country’s majority. It is therefore perhaps no wonder that a simple Google search reveals an 
ambiguous attitude towards increasing heterogeneity, as this snapshot from Debate.org 
shows (Figure 1). At the time of retrieval in August 2017, a meagre majority of the 
respondents, fifty-seven percent, indicated it would be good to live in a multicultural 
society. The rest answered a resounding no, giving various reasons, from ethnic tensions, 
trouble establishing the rule of law, to the loss of one’s own cultural identity.  
It is not only the general public or their political representatives that are engaging 
with this question. The effects of multiculturalism are debated in social sciences as well 
(Verkyuten, 2005; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2006). Defined by Fowers and Richardson 
(1996) as a “socio-intellectual movement that promotes the value of diversity as a core 
principle and insists that all cultural groups be treated with respect and as equals” (p.609), 
multiculturalism is almost inseparably entangled in ideology (Vermeulen & Slijper, 2003). 
Thus, the presence of different minority groups in a society can be constructed either as 
valuable intellectual and cultural capital to be shared and exploited, or as a threat to the 
majority’s dominance simultaneously hampering upward social mobility of the minority 
(Pratto & Lemieux, 2001). Surely, nothing is more worthy of attention than an issue which 
splits us so pointedly down the middle. 
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Figure 1. Snapshot from Debate.org in which users were asked their opinions of living in a 
multicultural society. Retrieved August 3rd, 2017. 
 
In Louvain, in 1996, former German chancellor Helmut Kohl stated that the policy 
of European integration is really a question of war and peace in the 21st century. His 
audience at the time may have interpreted this comment as an endorsement of EU 
expansion, and as a warning to the UK parties already buzzing against it (Helm, 1996). 
However, today, we may read it differently - as an insightful caveat for an audience twenty 
years into the future, struggling with within-state ethnic, religious, cultural and political 
faultlines. In the same speech, Kohl went on to warn of the dangers of nationalism, calling 
it war itself. We can suppose that the recent and bloody breakup of Yugoslavia was fresh in 
his mind at the time, and while a politician has license, even a duty, to dramatize, his 
statement was hardly an exaggeration. Today, Islamic fundamentalists' attacks on 
European cities are met with xenophobia and a noticeable rise of the political alt-right. 
This, in turn, is countered by left-wing activism, an extreme version of which led to the 
Welcome to Hell march turning violent during the G20 meeting in Hamburg just a few 
months ago (Polke-Majewski, 2017). Negotiating diversity between European states but 
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also the many ethnic groups living in them, their political perspectives, religious and 
cultural traditions - was and is a question sometimes answered with organized violence.  
Why do we have such troubles living together? What is it about group membership that 
creates boundaries, tensions, and competition? Trying to explain hostilities between 
minority and majority groups by relying on any singe theoretical perspective, or branch of 
social science, is sheer hubris. Modern investigation on intergroup conflict is, therefore, 
necessarily interdisciplinary.  
  In this work, I will describe my doctoral project on the topic of minority and 
majority conflict. The approach I chose to take is a recognizably multi-faceted one, 
integrating theories and findings from evolutionary, social, and cognitive psychology, as 
well as anthropology, archaeology, population genetics, and game theory. Minorities and 
majorities are here defined as groups of unequal size which nevertheless belong to a 
functionally interdependent superordinate group. I argue this definition better mimics the 
reality of ethnic, cultural, religious or political minorities living in a larger society, than do 
the more traditional independent ingroup and outgroup. Crucially, it acknowledges the 
differences in incentive structures for behaviour in independent as opposed to 
interdependent situations. While previous research has sometimes equated the two, I 
propose there is sufficient reason to suspect the psychological mechanisms for dealing with 
embedded minorities or looming majorities, as opposed to an autonomous outgroup, are 
separate and specific. 
 The central argument of the thesis is that minorities and majorities in modern 
societies often share the management of a common resource (Chapter 3). Put in a different 
way, they are interdependent on the group-level. That means they are jointly tasked with 
the generation, maintenance and redistribution of public goods which can range from fresh 
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water, clean air, or a tidy neighbourhood, to social welfare, public health insurance, or 
national security. Each of these engrains a social dilemma which we can describe in game 
theoretical terms, and which has been a staple conundrum all human societies had to solve 
(Dunbar, 1999; Hauert, De Monte, Hofbauer, & Sigmund, 2002; Olson, 1965; Parks, 
Joireman, & Van Lange, 2013). In this dissertation, I show that engaging the awareness of 
a common resource management dilemma between a minority and majority causes 
asymmetrical negative bias even in minimal situations. Put another way, when common 
resources have to be actively managed in a diverse group, the majority will deliberately 
detract from minority outcomes. At the same time, minority will reduce bias, exhibiting 
little or no significant derogation. The negative bias is here interpreted as deliberate 
difference maximization, or outgroup hate. Significantly, it occurs even though the 
individual decision-makers had no vested interest to commit intergroup bias. The effect is 
explained by the majority’s expectation that the minority will cheat on the common 
resource management dilemma. 
 While the issue of minorities and majorities is the central empirical question of the 
work, it is not its only contribution. In particular, the thesis seeks to showcase Structural 
Goal/Expectation theory (sGET; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; Yamagishi, 1986) as I have applied 
it to intergroup conflict. This theoretical contribution will be an important topic of 
discussion, since it challenges some more well-known and popular approaches to the issue, 
notably Social Identity Theory (Chapter 2). My hope is that the framework I have described 
here can be expanded, refined, and eventually integrated with other approaches into a 
practical theory of intergroup behaviour. 
With this in mind, I applied sGET to the question of common resource management 
more generally, asking what the consciousness of that sort of exchange within or between 
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groups does for intergroup bias (Chapter 4). I found that even in groups of equal size, 
knowledge of common resource management induces difference maximization. This holds 
true regardless of whether the groups share custody of the resource, or manage individual 
resources. In other words, people exhibited outgroup hate the moment they were made to 
think in terms of group-level interdependence, unless they were in the minority. This 
finding is discussed from an evolutionary perspective,  
In this introductory chapter of the thesis, I will give a brief theoretical overview of 
the issues inherent in living in diverse societies. Next, I will go into the theories of 
intergroup conflict, particularly when applied to minorities and majorities. Mainly, I will 
focus on Social Identity Theory, its many cognates, and Structural Goal/Expectation theory. 
I will go on to argue for the value of applying evolutionary theory to the issue, and briefly 
describe the theoretical approach I will be using in the rest of the text, its development and 
application. Finally, I will provide some notes on the methods used in the studies 
presented, how they were chosen and why they are appropriate for the research questions. 
The Trouble with Diversity 
 Ethnic and cultural diversity is hardly a new phenomenon, but one which is 
currently highlighted, most recently by waves of mass migration into Southern and 
Western Europe (Castles, Haas & Miller, 2013; Katseli, Lucas, & Xenogiani, 2006; Sievers, 
Fassman, & Bommes, 2014). Germany, where I am writing, is currently among the leaders 
in attracting migrants. It has experienced a fourteen-fold growth of populations with 
migration backgrounds between 1960 and 2003 (BAMF, 2006), and there is no sign of this 
stopping (Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung, 2016). The same trend is evident in 
the rest of Europe (Beck-Gernsheim, 2007; Carballo, Divino, & Zeric, 1998), the US (Lee & 
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Bean, 2004; Perez & Hirschman, 2009; US Census Bureau, 2009), in Australia and 
Southeast Asian Nations (Hugo, Wall, & Young, 2015), and elsewhere. 
As Kohl warned, increasing diversity has been marked by hostilities between groups 
(Brown & Zagefka, 2011; Farrell, 1993; Fuchs, 1995; Kessler et al., 2010; Kuepper, Wolf, & 
Zick, 2010; Nelan, 1993; Pereira, Vala, & Costa-Lopes, 2010; Takaki, 1989; Zagefka et al. 
2014), engendering policy challenges we have not even begun to tackle (Vertovec, 2007). In 
addition, media exposure has made these issues more salient (Castles, Haas, & Miller, 
2013) compounding the situation, and driving the entire political spectrum to the right 
(Davis, 2012). Merely reading about increasing diversity has led to greater expression of 
fear and anger directed at minority groups (Outten, Schmitt, Miller, & Garcia, 2012), and 
increased implicit and explicit outgroup negative bias (Craig & Richeson, 2014a). Givens 
and Luedtke (2003) demonstrated a link between media coverage and the restrictiveness of 
the government's immigration policies irrespective of political partisanship. Craig and 
Richeson (2014a, 2014b) went a step further. They experimentally manipulated the 
consciousness of increasing diversity by giving participants press releases projecting that 
European Americans will be outnumbered by Hispanic Americans in the US by 2042 (the 
so-called minority-majority racial1 shift). Their results show exposure to such information 
can drive the ethnic majority to greater support for political conservatism and anti-
immigrant policies, as well as more negative attitudes towards all ethnic minorities. They 
further showed the shift was explained by perceived threat to their own group status, in 
accordance to Integrated Threat Theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Building on these 
studies, Major, Blodorn and Blascovich (2016) took advantage of the 2016 US presidential 
elections to further prove the point. After administering Craig and Richeson’s 
                                                          
1In this text, I refrain from using “race” as a stand-in for ethnicity since there is only one human race 
alive at the moment, the Homo sapiens. 
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manipulation, Major and colleagues had the participants evaluate the presidential 
candidates. As predicted, the manipulation was enough to cause a more positive attitude 
towards Donald Trump, who ran on a highly anti-immigrant platform, and a more negative 
one towards the vocal socialist, Senator Bernie Sanders. The authors conclude increasing 
diversity and the fear attached to it, account in part for Trump’s eventual electoral success. 
Thus we can see that diversity almost invariably has a negative impact on the 
majority’s attitudes towards minorities, and therefore on their relations. Ethnic minorities, 
in particular, often occupy the lowest social niche and face the highest levels of 
discrimination and ostracism (Hagendoorn, 1995). It is little surprise, then, that the 
minority members have been found to dissociate from the society they are sharing with the 
majority (Abrams, 1994; Brewer & Weber, 1994; Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; 
Steele, 1997), and endorse multiculturalism at the expense of assimilation (Arends-Toth & 
Van de Vijver, 2003; Lambert & Taylor, 1990; Verkuyten, 2005). Andre and Dronkers 
(2017) use the European Social Survey to measure perceived discrimination of over 29,000 
adults with migrations backgrounds living in 27 EU countries. Despite the fact their 
sample, by merit of being drawn from the ESS database, consists of relatively well-
established migrants, who were able and willing to fill in a questionnaire in the host 
country’s language, minority members indicated they felt their social group was 
discriminated more frequently and severely than the majority group. The perceived ingroup 
discrimination was pronounced the more culturally distant the minority felt they were from 
the majority, in terms of language, religion, or ethnic characteristics. 
Perceived discrimination can lead to minority communities isolating themselves 
against the majority, but also to the opposite - outgroup favouritism, especially when the 
minorities perceive their group’s status is relatively lower than that of the majority (Blanz, 
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Mummendey & Otten, 1995a, 1995b; Ellemers, Barreto, & Spears, 1995). Thus, not only 
can the minority members reject the host society, but they can also reject their own 
community and culture. Unsurprisingly, this makes them fall victim to increased anxiety, 
depression, apathy, and psychosomatic symptoms, as well as overall lower reported 
wellbeing, more often than the majority (Dion, Dion, & Pak, 1992; Jasinskaja-Lahti, 
Liebking, Jaakkola, & Reuter, 2006; Jasinskaja-Lahti, Liebkind, & Pehoniemi, 2006; 
Moghaddam, Ditto, & Taylor, 1990; Pak, Dion, & Dion, 991; Sanchez & Fernandez, 1993; 
Sandhu & Asrabadi, 1994;). 
However, there are indications that the trouble with diversity has an even more 
general adverse effect, influencing society as a whole. Research into macroeconomics and 
societal wellbeing have found diversity, i.e. the presence of outgroups within the society, 
lowers social cohesion (Benabou, 1996; Durlauf, 1996; Putnam, 1995), decreases 
contributions to public goods such as education, public health, or city infrastructure 
(Alesina, Baqir, & Easterly, 1999; Alesina & LaFerrara, 2000), and promotes overuse of 
existing resources (Khwaja, 2002; Motalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005). Investigating reasons 
for Sub-Saharan Africa’s troubled economic development, Easterly and Levine (1997) found 
a strong negative correlation between ethnic diversity and indicators of public goods 
(percentage of paved roads, number of private telephones, years of schooling and efficiency 
of the electricity network). Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) performed a more direct test 
of the hypothesis that diversity negatively impacts the group’s engagement with public 
goods. They investigated spending on productive public goods (specifically, schools, roads, 
sewers, and trash management) in US cities, metropolitan areas and urban communities, 
and found that it is inversely related to ethnic fragmentation. The correlation remained 
even after controlling for other socioeconomic and demographic determinants. 
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More recently, Miguel (2004) compared contributions to local schools in bordering 
Kenya and Tanzania. The regions were chosen for their similar ethnic makeup, and levels 
of diversity. Overall, Tanzania had a higher degree of public good contribution. 
Significantly, in Tanzania ethnic diversity was not correlated to donations to local school 
funds, while in Kenya the relationship was significant and negative. Miguel puts the 
difference in results down to Tanzania’s aggressive policy of integration, which was based 
on the adoption of a superordinate national identity. This finding was later replicated in the 
similarly integrated Sierra Leone (Glennester, Miguel, & Rothernberg, 2013). Meanwhile, 
in Kenya, with no such integration policy in place, ethnic fragmentation led to lower giving 
to primary school funds, overall worse school facilities, and poorer water well maintenance. 
The finding has been interpreted as a result of ineffective sanctioning systems between 
ethnically diverse communities (Miguel & Gugerty, 2005). In other words, the mechanisms 
of solving the frieerider problem fail when they have to cross group borders. 
The same is evident using global data as well. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) 
demonstrated that religious and ethnic polarization have a significant detrimental impact 
on economic development, due to fewer, less generous investments into, and increased 
consumption of, public goods. In addition, they found that diversity in such conditions 
infrequently contributes to civil war. 
It is not only along the lines of nationality and ethnicity that we observe this effect. 
In business organizations, demographic heterogeneity has been related to conflict in teams 
and a reduction in productivity (Hambrick, Li, Xin, & Tsui, 2001; Jackson, Joshi, & 
Erhardt, 2003; Jehn, 1995; Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999; cf. Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 
1999; Watson, Kumar, & Michaelson, 1993; see Williams & O’Reilly, 1998; Webber & 
Donahue, 2001 for revision). Joint ventures encounter problems the more their factional 
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nature is stressed, and the more additional dimensions of diversity are uncovered between 
them (Li & Hambrick, 2005). In other words, when people are aware they represent their 
home company in a joint venture, thus creating a subgroup categorization in the team, the 
less coalitional and more competitive their behaviour is, damaging their ability to cooperate 
with team members from the other company, and reducing their overall performance. For 
example, Jehn and Bezrukova (2009) showed that activating the consciousness of the 
factional nature of a team decreases the team’s ability to achieve goals. While they do not 
put this finding in the context of group resource management, some similarities are 
evident, particularly how a lack of trust leads to lesser investment in group outcomes, lower 
satisfaction with the group membership, and an overall inability to perform well on tasks. 
Not only does diversity often cripple the society’s ability to generate, maintain and 
redistribute public goods crucial for its functioning, but it can lower support for the 
generation of any public resource at all. High immigration rates lower support for social 
welfare (Gilens, 1996, 2000; Soroka, Harrell & Iyengar, 2013; Luttmer, 2001; Mendelberg, 
2001; Schram, Soss, Fording & Houser, 2009; Soroka, Banting, & Johnson, 2006; cf. Peffley, 
Hurwitz, & Sinderman, 1997; Sinderman, Carmines, Layman, & Carter, 1996). 
In a recent paper, Brown-Iannuzzi, Dotsch, Cooley, and Payne (2017) demonstrated 
that, for a predominantly European American sample, support for welfare was lower if the 
respondents assumed the welfare would primarily benefit African Americans. Testing the 
relationship more directly, Soroka, Harrell and Iyengar (2013) administered a vignette 
study to representative samples in Canada, the UK, and the US. Ethnically diverse targets 
(European, African, East or South-East Asian) were introduced as potential recipients of 
welfare benefits, whereupon the participants were asked how much money the target 
should receive per month. The majority targets – i.e. the ethnically European targets, were 
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preferred over all other, minority targets. This goes to support the hypothesis that people 
have discriminatory community preferences in which they only care about (and are willing 
to contribute to) the welfare of ingroup members (Cutler, Elmendorf, & Zeckhauser, 1993). 
If the line of ingroup/outgroup is drawn at ethnicity rather than nationality, so is the 
willingness to support a public good, despite the fact it is supposed to be a national 
resource. 
Thus, diversity creates strife between groups living together, introducing 
discrimination, prejudice and ostracism into the community. Majorities seem to construct it 
as a threat to their groups’ status. In turn, this ostracizes minorities who then have little 
choice but to tighten their group boundaries and stick to themselves, shunning the larger 
community and making the rift deeper. Diversity thus further cripples the flow of social 
and economic capital in the superordinate group, and results in a loss of public goods upon 
which group members rely. In the long run, it inexorably leads to conflict; in the worst case, 
civil war. How can we begin to account for these findings? 
To answer this question, I will first address the issue from a Social Identity 
perspective, giving my critique of its propositions and logic in light of evolutionary 
psychology and game theory. Thereafter, I will introduce the Structural Goal/Expectation 
approach to the problem and argue for its greater applicability in resolving the issue. 
Criticism of Social Identity Theory 
Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel, 1978; 1979; Tajfel, Flament, Billig, & Bundy, 
1971; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) is probably the most influential theory of human intergroup 
behaviour, which has resulted in a large number of research papers and spurred the 
formation of the majority of other intergroup theories (Hogg, 2016). At its core, SIT 
proposes the basic human motivation to maintain a positive sense of self leads to intergroup 
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bias (preferential treatment of ingroup members at the expense of the outgroup) once the 
self is connected to group membership. Tajfel, Turner and colleagues begin with two simple 
propositions: humans need categories in order to make sense of the world, and humans are 
motivated to feel good about themselves.  
Categorization is certainly a basic and necessary mechanism of human cognition. 
Categories are established and juxtaposed in order to reduce cognitive cost and speed up 
decision making – an ability that often has to do with survival. When it comes to social 
categorization and group membership, a novel concept of social identity was proposed to 
explain why certain social categories are treated with contempt while others are preferred. 
Defined as the part of the self-concept derived from group-membership (Turner & Oakes, 
1986) and shared between group members (Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008), it is a link to the 
basic humans motivation to have a positive and consistent sense of self. The social identity 
is therefore constantly re-evaluated in reference to ingroup and outgroup outcomes. 
Depending on that evaluation, group members might be motivated to positively distinguish 
the ingroup (and therefore the ingroup identity) against a relevant outgroup by maximizing 
the difference between them. This means that humans should be motivated to exhibit 
favouritism of their own group (ingroup love), and discrimination of all other compatible 
groups (outgroup hate) across situations. In other words, according to SIT, our sense of self 
demands that we sacrifice for our ingroup, contribute and cooperate with group members, 
and adhere to the norms of fairness and reciprocity no matter the circumstances. At the 
same time, we should withdraw that sort of prosociality from outgroups, ostracising, 
discriminating against them or otherwise reducing their status and influence. 
Over the years, SIT has been extended and refined, inspiring a number of sister-
theories such as, Social Categorization Theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, & Reicher, 1987), 
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Subjective Uncertainty Reduction Theory (Hogg & Abrams, 1993), and Optimal 
Distinctiveness Theory (Brewer, 1991), to name a few. SIT’s influence is felt in the Terror 
Management Theory as applied to intergroup conflict, which proposes that ingroup 
favouritism is the result of a justification process of the individual’s worldview, and 
therefore self-esteem (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). While Integrated Threat Theory2 
(Stephan & Stephan, 2000), Social Dominance Orientation (Sidanius & Pratto, 1993; 1999), 
and System Justification Theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994) all add different twists to the story, 
they are at the core based on the same self-esteem maintenance hypothesis forwarded by 
SIT.  
In this dissertation, I will collectively refer to these theoretical perspectives under 
the umbrella term of self-based theories of intergroup bias. By this categorization, I mean 
not to lump them all together in content, assumptions or predictive power – for example, 
Brewer’s Optimal Distinctiveness Theory makes some largely different predictions from the 
more conservative versions of SIT, or anything from System Justification Theory literature. 
I merely mean to note that they all rely on the humanist perspective forwarded by Maslow 
and Roberts in the 1960s, and, as such, invoke the concept of the self as the ultimate 
platform of decision-making. In a sense, the self is here considered a level of selection. For 
this, and several other reasons, self-based theories of intergroup conflict suffer from a few 
fundamental flaws. I will give a critique of SIT proper, and note when its shortcomings spill 
over into all other self-based theories of intergroup conflict. 
                                                          
2 A note on Integrated Threat Theory: While many of the theory’s aspects are influenced by Social 
Identity Theory’s reliance on the self, it also takes a lot from Realistic Conflict Theory, thus 
straddling the two contrasting approaches - self- and structure-based. I choose to place it with self-
based theories of intergroup conflict, because self-esteem maintenance through social identity 
promotion is the theory’s proposed ultimate explanation. 
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As I do this, it is important to keep in mind that Social Identity theory marked a 
great leap forward in thinking about intergroup conflict since it introduced several key 
ideas to the field, such as the fact that group categories in and of themselves carry a 
powerful cue for behaviour, that intergroup conflict is not always the result of rational 
action, rather that it is the effect of our biased psychological tendencies, and that these 
tendencies are universal to human cultures across time. Furthermore, Social Identity 
theory has had great success at predicting human inter- and intragroup attitude formation, 
as well as how manipulations of self-esteem can moderate individual intergroup behaviour 
(Hogg, 2016). However, correlations between levels of social identification and behaviour in 
different group situations have been problematic (Brown et al., 1992; Hinkle & Brown, 
1990; Hornsey, 2008). Since the prediction of behaviour is the central point of interest in 
this work, SIT’s strengths will necessarily remain largely undiscussed, and its weak points 
will be addressed almost exclusively. 
Social Identity Theory started with an experiment. In 1971, Tajfel, Flament, Billig 
and Bundy created the minimal group paradigm, an experimental manipulation which 
divides participants into meaningless, “minimal” groups3. The hope was to disprove 
Realistic Conflict theory’s (Fearon, 1995; Jackson, 1993) premise that intergroup conflict 
occurs solely as a result of rational self-interest of the players, i.e. when someone stands to 
gain something. Rather, Tajfel and colleagues argued that categorization was enough. 
Indeed, the minimal group division alone was sufficient to elicit greater levels of reported 
                                                          
3 In practice, the minimal group divisions are often entirely random, meaning the participants are 
assigned group membership without reference to any measurements. However, the division is 
commonly presented to the participants as the result of their supposed preferences or cognitive 
characteristics. Thus, while the groups are truly arbitrary, it is usual to make the participants 
believe they are based on some supposedly meaningful criteria. Flip-the-coin group memberships 
have also been successfully used in minimal group experiments, but seem to induce more suspicion 
from the participants. 
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identification with the ingroup rather than the outgroup, as well as more positive overall 
attitudes towards them (Brewer, 1991, 1999; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). Having 
thus categorized participants and placed them into an intergroup setting, Tajfel and 
colleagues had them choose from a sliding matrix how much money they wanted to donate 
to an ingroup, and how much to an outgroup member. The results showed that people 
indeed chose to allocate more money to ingroup, rather than outgroup members, leading the 
researchers to formulate their self-based theoretical framework. 
However, we have since become aware of several issues with the original 
experiment. Firstly, the choice matrices did not enable the participants to favour their 
ingroup (meaning, provide them with the highest possible payoff), without damaging the 
outgroup. In other words, ingroup love and outgroup hate were fundamentally confounded. 
This led to a theoretical prediction that simply did not come true – that people will try to 
spitefully maximize the difference between ingroup and outgroup members, blindly trying 
to maintain a positive sense of self-esteem. This, perhaps most obvious criticism of SIT, has 
since been addressed by authors such as Marilyn Brewer, who is very vocal on the 
separation of ingroup love and outgroup hate within SIT (e.g. Brewer, 1999). She argued 
that experimental and real-life data shows attitudes and behaviours towards outgroups are 
characterized by decreased positivity rather than increased negativity. Indeed, subsequent 
tests showed that people rarely single out outgroup members for deliberate derogation 
(Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv, 2008; Mummendey et al., 1992; Simunovic, Mifune, & 
Yamagishi, 2013; see Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2014 for meta-analysis).  
Secondly, the original experiment was not as minimal as the authors initially 
claimed. Karp, Jin, Yamagishi, and Shinotsuka (1993) showed that participants in the 
original minimal group paradigm experiments had a naïve assumption other ingroup 
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members would reciprocate their generosity by likewise giving them more money than 
outgroup members. In other words, participants were counting on generalized reciprocity 
within the ingroup – a return of their favour by other ingroup members by way of a tacit 
consensus. Once this naïve expectation was explicitly removed (for example, by telling 
participants they were the only ones making the allocation) the bias was lowered or 
altogether eliminated (see Yamagishi, 2007 for review). The introduction of 
interdependence as a relevant concept in intergroup research, originally by Rabbie, Shot 
and Visser (1989), and later by Yamagishi and colleagues in the Bounded Generalized 
Reciprocity Approach (Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999; Kiyonari, Tanida, & Yamagishi, 
2000; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2009; Yamagishi, 2007), twisted the paradigm around from the 
self to the structure of the situation. I will go into more detail in the next segment of this 
chapter. 
When we apply SIT to the problem of minorities and majorities, a third problem 
emerges. While real-life studies find as much, if not more discrimination committed by the 
majority (as I have argued in the previous section), minimal experiments in the laboratory 
show an entirely different result. In the lab, minimal minorities are more likely to 
discriminate against the majority than the other way around (Bettencourt & Dorr, 1998; 
Bettencourt, Miller, & Hume, 1999; Brewer, Manzi, & Shaw, 1993; Hewstone, Rubin, & 
Willis, 2002; Leonardelli, 1998; Otten, Mummendey, & Blanz, 1996). SIT proposes identity 
as the proximal mechanism driving this type of intergroup bias as well, pointing to the fact 
people tend to identify more highly with minority rather than majority membership 
(Abrams, 1994; Brewer& Weber, 1994; Luecken& Simon, 2005). This feeling of relative 
distinctiveness has been related to the feeling of vulnerability and exposure inherent in 
being part of a distinctive minority (Ellemer, Doosje, van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1992; 
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Sachdev & Bourhis, 1984, 1991; Simon & Brown, 1987), and overall greater ingroup 
salience (Bettencourt, Charlton, Eubanks, Kernahan, & Fuller, 1999; Mullen, Brown & 
Smith, 1992). Brewer and colleagues (Brewer, 1999; Leonardelli and Brewer, 2001) argue 
that the trade-off between being distinct and being included into a cohesive group is 
relatively better for the minority rather than majority. This leads to greater satisfaction 
with the social identity and therefore more demonstrations of ingroup loyalty through 
discrimination. Meanwhile, the majority members feel their group identity is not distinct 
enough. They do not relate it to the self as much, and are therefore not very motivated to 
positively distinguish it from the minority. 
Yet Integrated Threat Theory or the Social Dominance Orientation approach, 
likewise self-based perspectives on intergroup conflict, would predict the exact opposite – 
the majority should discriminate more, since their dominant status in society is put under 
threat by the minority. Additionally, a loss of group cohesion through diversity means a 
drop in group performance on cooperative tasks, thus arguably presenting real risk. Thus 
we would always expect the majority to discriminate more. Why is this not the case in the 
lab? Where is the micro / macro discrepancy coming from? 
All of this brings me to my fourth criticism of SIT, which applies to its sister theories 
to varying degrees – it is structure insensitive. Social identity, as it stands, cannot 
distinguish between differentially incentivized situations, while humans can. For example, 
Rabbie, Schot and Visser (1989) showed that a simple change in incentive structures can 
lead people to exhibit outgroup love at the expense of ingroup outcomes. They argue this is 
a clear demonstration that ingroups favouritism is more contingent on rational cost / 
benefit calculations than on identity concerns. Thus, once outgroup members are the ones 
who can impact the individual's fitness, their loyalties follow. Again, the issue here is 
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interdependence. Seeing their outcomes are not entirely under their own control, 
individuals ask some of the following questions: what reaction will my behaviour elicit? 
Who is there to react? What are their goals in this situation? (Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003) 
The outcomes of this deliberation may be skewed by social identification and concerns about 
the self-concept, but not driven by them alone. 
In their seminal meta-analysis on the topic, Balliet, Wu and De Dreu (2014) 
demonstrate that mere categorization has an effect as predicted by SIT, but that it is not as 
robust as the effect of interdependence. They used 212 experimental studies on intergroup 
relations published from 1965 to 2013, all of which used economic games as the underlying 
methodology. Next, they coded the different game settings in which intergroup bias was 
tested, based on how interdependent the games were. Interdependence is here defined as 
the impact other’s choices have on own outcomes (Kelley & Thibaut, 1987; Rusbult & Van 
Lange, 2003). A game such as the Dictator game, in which a single player makes all the 
choices for both themselves and the partner, is very low on interdependence4. In 
comparison, a Prisoner’s Dilemma game is high on interdependence because each player’s 
choices impact both their own and the partner’s outcomes symmetrically. A real-life 
example of this would be hiring employees, as opposed to forging a business deal - in the 
first, one party controls the outcome totally, while in the other, the outcome depends on 
mutual choices. Balliet and colleagues found that intergroup bias in games low on 
interdependence was lower (e.g. Dictator game; d = 0.19) than in games high on 
interdependence (e.g. Prisoner’s Dilemma game, d = 0.42). Humans are not making 
decisions in a vacuum of abstracted identities and subconscious concerns about the self-
                                                          
4A guide to different economic games mentioned in the thesis text or the references is included in the 
Supplementary materials. For more details on the Dictator, or Prisoner’s Dilemma game, check 
there. 
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esteem, but in a world of incentives and other actors, which they have to be equipped to 
navigate. As I will argue in Chapter 2, social identity is a compass on that journey. It 
cannot be separated from reference to interdependence. 
A final criticism of SIT comes from an evolutionary perspective, and applies fully to 
all other self-based theories of intergroup conflict as well. Why should the sense of self ever 
become entangled with group membership? In other words, what is the evolutionary benefit 
of internalizing group membership? I argue in Chapter 2, that the answer lies in costly 
signalling (Zahavi,1975). An internalization of group membership of the kind proposed by 
SIT only makes sense if identifying with the group enhanced the individual’s fitness, in this 
case, their ability to survive and thrive within a group context. If we view groups as 
networks of interdependent individuals who share resources with each other, then each 
individual within that network has a vested interest to garner as much benefit from the 
group at as little cost as possible. Of course, if all individuals behaved this way, the group 
and its life-giving resources would collapse. In other words, group membership can be seen 
as a social dilemma, and social identity as an evolutionary rule of thumb for solving it. 
Those individuals who identify highly with the group are less likely to over-use its 
resources, more likely to comply with its norms. Thus, they are also more likely to be 
singled out for more positive, and fewer negative interactions with group members. This 
confers onto them a clear evolutionary edge. There is also a non-negligible cost of such 
behaviour. For example, high identifiers may be unable to transition to other comparable 
groups, or even get along with them. Apart from the opportunity costs, in times of resource 
depletion or warfare, this inflexibility can be a high cost indeed. Thus, we would not expect 
all individuals to identify highly, as shown in Luthanen and Crocker’s (1992) work on the 
development of a collective self-esteem scale, or in numerous experimental studies. 
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Leonardelli and Brewer (2001), for example, state that “identification is a necessary, but 
not sufficient explanation for discrimination” (p.470; see also, Brown et al., 1992; Hinkle & 
Brown, 1990), otherwise we would see a perfect correlation between levels of identity and 
behaviour in intergroup situations. Instead, we see variance in both identity levels and 
behaviour depending on the situation, precisely what we would expect if social identity 
responds to incentive structures and, possibly, moderates behaviour as a proximal 
mechanism. 
In summary, Social Identity theory, while an important and pervasive theory of 
intergroup conflict, fails to account for some phenomena, while making incorrect predictions 
when it comes to others. To a degree, this has been addressed over the years. However, 
some of the theoretical assumptions and issues remain, most importantly, structural 
insensitivity and the lack of an account for the construction of social identity itself, i.e. the 
connection between the self and group membership. In the next two sections, I will explain 
how Structural Goal/Expectation theory (sGET) addresses these core issues. I will first give 
a brief theoretical and historical account of the development of sGET, following it up with 
how I mean to apply it to the central research questions of the dissertation, the troubled 
dynamics between minorities and majorities. 
At this point, I should note that the form Structural Goal/Expectation takes in this 
dissertation is unique. I have attempted to extend the original, tentative theory in scope 
and theoretical breadth in several ways. First is an elaboration of the role of adaptive 
behavioural heuristics within the existing propositions of the theory, as applied to 
intergroup conflict. Secondly, there is the proposed integration of social identity into an 
evolutionary perspective on intergroup conflict, as guided by the structure and perception of 
the situation. Perhaps the most important contribution to the development of Structural 
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Goal/Expectation theory is my attempt to explain what the "structural" part means, and 
how it can more systematically be applied to predicting human behaviour. All of this comes 
with a caveat: the framework I will present here is still tentative and only a small part of it 
was tested in the thesis.  
Structural Goal/Expectation Theory 
Tracing the history of Structural Goal/Expectation Theory is more arduous and less 
clear than it was for Social Identity Theory and its cognates. Structural Goal/Expectation 
Theory (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; Yamagishi, 1986a, 1986b) was not originally informed by 
evolutionary sciences, or aimed at intergroup conflict specifically. The central ideas of sGET 
are essentially game-theoretical: humans calculate the likelihood of achieving their goals 
with respect to how they expect other relevant actors will behave. This occurs within a 
structured social environment which is more or less transparent to the decision-makers 
themselves. Some of the situations people encounter in everyday life trigger default 
responses, evolutionary rules-of-thumb for solving the situation in a sustainable way. It is 
possible to capture these responses even in minimal experiments, by replicating the 
structure of the situation in question. 
The 1977 paper by Pruitt and Kimmel, which marked its beginning as mere 
Goal/Expectation Theory, featured acritical analysis of 20 years of game theoretical 
research. Pruitt and Kimmel synthesized the various findings from research utilizing 
experimental economic games, with an eye towards integrating those findings, methods, 
and concepts into behavioural and psychological sciences. As stated before, the basic idea of 
the original Goal/Expectation theory is that behaviour can be predicted at the intersection 
of the individuals’ goals (preferences for different outcomes), and their expectations 
(predictions about other actors’ behaviour).Crucial to this calculation is interdependence, 
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defined as the degree to which other’s behaviour impacts our outcomes (Thibaut & Kelley, 
1978). Pruitt and Kimmel give the example of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in which the 
outcomes of the two players are impacted by both of their decisions. The game affords two 
choices to each player – defection or cooperation. For each of the combinations (CC, DD, CD, 
and DC) the payoffs of the players vary. Significantly, a player who cooperates while the 
other defects is left with the worst possible individual outcome (CD), while the player who 
defects while the other cooperates, with the best (DC). Mutual cooperation will, therefore, 
only occur if both players’ goals are cooperation, and they expect cooperation from their 
partner. A player who cooperates despite the fact they think the other will defect, is 
behaving irrationally and damaging their outcomes. In the long run, such behaviour is 
unsustainable. Situational preferences for mutually beneficial outcomes therefore must, at 
least in part, be contingent on predictions about partner’s behaviour (Brewer, 1999). 
Of course, these calculations are not occurring in a vacuum, but in a (social) 
environment (Yamagishi, 1986) which carries with it structural characteristics to which 
humans are (more or less) sensitive. At this point, it is necessary to define what structure of 
the situation is supposed to be. In the widest possible sense, it is any trait of the 
environment or the interaction between individuals which can influence their goals, 
expectations, or outcomes.  
Obviously, this definition is almost all-encompassing and thus hardly useful. For 
this reason, I suggest that the analysis of how people respond to different situations should 
go through at least two basic stages. The first stage describes the impact actors have, or 
perceive to have, on each other. We can refer to these as structural characteristics of the 
interaction. Put another way, this step serves to delimit the type and level of 
interdependence: how one actor’s choices affect another’s outcomes, and vice versa. With 
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this in mind, we can begin to plot the preferences and predictions of the people engaging 
with each other. I will discuss this topic in more detail in Chapter 2 where I list and define 
four types of interdependence: interpersonal, group-level, intergroup, and socio-cultural 
interdependence. I argue that all four reliably occur in intergroup situations, and engender 
social dilemmas of various types which lead to the formation of behavioural heuristics – 
adaptive rules of thumb for solving the dilemmas. 
The second stage I propose in the analysis of the relation between situation and 
behaviour describes the impact of environmental factors on the effectiveness, reliability and 
predictability of any given behaviour that the actors might take. We can refer to these as 
structural characteristics of the situation. To return to the example of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game, we may expect people to behave differently in it if we change certain 
parameters. For example, if the loss associated with cooperating while the other player 
defects is increased, more people will defect out of fear and a tendency to avoid risk (Ahn, 
Ostrom, Scmidt, Schupp & Walker, 2001; Simpson, 2003). If the choices in the Prisoner’s 
dilemma game are made consecutively, rather than simultaneously, people will usually 
reciprocate cooperation with cooperation, and defection with defection (Hayashi, Ostrom, 
Walker, & Yamagishi, 1998; Watabe, Terai, Hayashi, & Yamagishi, 1996). If the game is 
played with the knowledge that others are monitoring the interaction and are ready to 
sanction norm violators, cooperation levels increase (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). 
Likewise if the game is occurring between strangers, rather than within the group, 
people show differential cooperation levels. They are much more likely to cooperate with 
ingroup rather than outgroup members or strangers in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
(Kiyonari, 2002; Yamagishi et al., 2005), as well as other economic games engendering a 
dilemma, like the allocation game (Karp, Jin, Yamagishi, & Shinotsuka, 1993; Jin, 
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Yamagishi, & Kiyonari, 1996), the Dictator game (Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008), and the 
Trust game (Suzuki, Konno, &Yamagishi, 2007). Thus we can say group categorization 
itself is another structural characteristic of the situation that skews people’s goals and 
expectations, and thus impacts their behaviour. 
In contrast to many other structure-based perspectives, sGET acknowledges the 
impact of human biases and errors in judgment, since the level of analysis is not the 
structure itself, but human behaviour within that structure (Yamagishi, 1986). However, 
this logic can be extended even further – into evolutionary time. Given that certain 
dilemma-prone social situations have been reliably repeated by human ancestors, 
evolutionary psychology would suggest they resulted in psychological mechanisms to aid 
the individual in solving them. This formation needs-must have occurred with respect to, 
and under the influence of, real structural characteristics of the interaction and the 
situation.  
The addition of an evolutionary perspective to sGET is a logical next step to take. 
Evolutionary perspectives have been fruitful for social science (Laland & Brown, 2011), 
and, much as Theodore Dobzhansky said of evolution in biology (1973), uniquely able to 
provide a reliable matrix for the integration of multiple theoretical perspectives into a 
coherent whole. When it comes to sGET, evolutionary thought can guide every step of the 
process: from understanding the incentive structure of the situation, to explaining the 
varying goals and expectations of the human actors interacting therein.  
Humans are semi-rational decision makers (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) who very often follow rules of thumb (also sometimes referred 
to as heuristics or default behavioural strategies). The formation of default strategies, and 
the psychological mechanisms supporting them are a basic tenant of evolutionary 
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psychology (Tooby & Cosmides, 2002, 2013). Our environment and the challenges we face in 
it shape our psyche over the course of our evolution, by selecting for behavioural tendencies. 
If a dilemma-prone situation has occurred reliably throughout human evolutionary history 
(Caporael, 1994), and carried a high cost of failure (Haselton & Buss, 2000), it is likely to 
result in a psychological mechanism to promote a behaviour which reliably solves the 
dilemma5. My contention is that structural characteristics of the interaction and the 
situation affect the application of default behavioural strategies, thus making sGET 
structurally sensitive. 
In intergroup situations, this means that we will expect ingroup favouritism or 
outgroup derogation to be dependent on situational cues which make them more or less 
likely to “work”, what is to say solve the dilemma with the least risk and best reward 
possible for the individual in the long-term. Humans can identify that dilemma due to their 
sensitivity to situational cues, particularly when it comes to incentive structures which they 
and their interaction partners face. This sensitivity is not necessarily deliberate, but the 
result of psychological mechanisms which prop certain default strategies. At the same time, 
depending on structural characteristics of the environment within which the interaction is 
occurring, some default strategies will lose effectiveness, while others will gain it. Thus, 
their application will vary. 
The question remains as to why groups would be such powerful cues for behaviour to 
begin with. Why would humans care about group outcomes, or the outcomes of other group-
members?  What mechanisms have propped up the construction, and continue to promote 
                                                          
5Solving the dilemma here means achieving the best possible outcome at the least possible risk. It 
does not mean that dilemma is eliminated, nor does it mean that an optimum outcome is achieved. 
Since a dilemma may have more than one solution, we can expect the emergence of a variety of 
strategies, some of which may compete or support each other. The likelihood on of them will 
dominate and become a default strategy has to do with its evolutionary stability and sustainability 
(Boyd & Richeson, 2005). 
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the use of, typical intergroup behaviours? Which structural characteristics are key to their 
engagement or suspension? 
In response to this issue, Brewer started applying an evolutionary perspective to 
intergroup conflict in her 1999 paper. Originally meant to clarify the difference between 
ingroup love and outgroup hate, and show that the outgroup is not a necessary reference 
point to the formation of ingroup love, she suggested a mechanism she called "bounded 
social cooperation" (Brewer, 1999, p.434). She argued that this mechanism was a 
fundamental adaptation to group-living, As such, it had left traces on human psychology in 
the form of behavioural tendencies which are engaged when we think in group categories. 
From an evolutionary perspective, it is clear that group membership is a fundamental 
survival strategy for humans (Brewer & Caporael, 2006), a characteristic we share with all 
other primates (Dunbar, 1992). Furthermore, human groups are characterized by 
"obligatory interdependence" (Brewer, 1991, 1997; Brewer & Caporael, 2005; Caporael, 
1997), meaning that all individuals within it are in some way dependent for their outcomes 
on other group members. Under those circumstances, building a system ensuring 
cooperation bounded to the ingroup, makes evolutionary sense6.  
According to Brewer, this system should be based on trust. An indispensable part of 
cooperation (Deutsch, 1983; Kouzes & Posner, 2002), Brewer suggests that within-group 
trust is depersonalized and generalized to all group members. Indeed, we find ingroup 
members regularly trust each other more than strangers or outgroup members (Brewer & 
Campbell, 1976; Fiske, 2015). Trust, Brewer argues, is "a form of contingent altruism" 
                                                          
6Brewer’s proposed bounded social cooperation is very similar not only to Yamagishi’s bounded 
generalized reciprocity, but also to the parochial theory of the evolution of altruism (Choi & Bowles, 
2007). In an effort to explain the evolution of altruism, these researchers have created models 
showing how altruism could have been supported by intragroup cooperation and intergroup 
competition. This early altruism was thus parochial, meaning bounded to the ingroup, and limited to 
ingroup members. 
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(Brewer, 1999, p.431), extended to ingroup members so that the group can perform 
cooperative tasks, promote cohesion, defend itself, etc. 
The same year as Brewer's article was published, Yamagishi and colleagues put 
forward the Bounded Generalized Reciprocity approach (BGR; Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 
1999; Kiyonari, Tanida, & Yamagishi, 2000; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2009; Yamagishi, 2007) 
which explained how exactly this depersonalized trust is supposed to be attained and why it 
is necessarily limited to the ingroup7. The key is a systematic and reliable network of 
bounded generalized exchange which is established between group members through 
repeated interactions, as well as the expectation of future interactions (what Axelrod (1984) 
called "the shadow of the future"). In essence, one is likely to interact with ingroup 
members more frequently and more reliably than with outgroup members. As such, one is 
more likely to receive reciprocal treatment of their behaviour from ingroup, rather than 
outgroup members. Humans use reciprocity as one of the basic strategies of interpersonal 
behaviour (Axelrod, 1984; Boyd & Richeson, 1988; Trivers, 1971). This is true for other 
primates, mainly the anthropoid apes. For example, bonobo and chimps, our closest living 
cousins, share large fruits and meat in the wild (Boesch & Boesch, 1989; Goodall, 1963; 
Hohmann& Fruth, 1993; Jaeggi & van Schaik, 2011; Kuroda, 1984; Teleki, 1973) and in 
captivity, given that the food is attractive enough (de Waal, 1989; 1997). It is not only food 
that gets shared under the assumption of returning favours, but also grooming, a typical 
social activity of many primate species (Machanda, Gilby, & Wrangham, 2014; Xia et al., 
2012). At least partially, the food sharing and grooming activities are motivated by 
                                                          
7Yamagishi would refer to this system not as a system of trust, but a system of security (see 
Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994; Yamagishi, 2011). In other words, ingroup members do not have to 
trust each other, but only the sanctioning and monitoring systems in place, reliably targeting those 
group members who violate norms. In fact, he argues that such a system of security destroys trust, 
as well as the capacity of individuals to predict who will cheat (Yamagishi, Kikuchi, & Kosugi, 1999). 
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reciprocity. This means that they are either the result of gratitude for previously rendered 
favours, or the expectation that the favour will be returned (Gurven, 2004a, 2004b; Jaeggi, 
Burkart, & Van Schaik, 2010; Silk, Brosnan, Henrich, Lambeth, & Shapiro, 2013). 
Of course, this reciprocity does not only have to be positive. Negative reciprocity 
(varyingly conceptualized as punishment or retaliation) is another basic mechanism of 
interaction (Bruni, 2008; Friedman & Singh, 2004; Gouldner, 1960). For example, people 
will go against their own self-interest to punish unfair offers made to them in the 
Ultimatum Game (Gueth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982; Yamagishi et al,. 2012). This 
is true not only for humans, but also for chimps (Brosnan & de Waal, 2014; Proctor, 
Williamson, de Waal & Brosnan, 2013). Not only that, but humans will spend their own 
reward to punish unfair behaviour they had observed, even if it does not impact them 
directly, as seen in the Third Party Punishment game (e.g. Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; 
Shinada, 2009; Yamagishi et al., 2012). Furthermore, they will punish freeriders (non-
contributors) in games dealing with group resource management, such as the public goods 
game or the common resource dilemma (for meta-analysis, see Balliet, Mulder, & Van 
Lange, 2011; for literature review, see Fehr & Gaechter, 2000). 
Thus, positive reciprocity between individual group members is thought to promote 
cooperation, while negative reciprocity stabilizes it (Fehr, Fishbacher, & Gaechter, 2002; 
Fehr &Schmidt, 1999; Gintis, 2000; Guala, 2012), helping promote and validate moral 
standards of the group (Vidmar, 2002).Furthermore, this system is generalized, meaning 
that the reciprocity can be either direct (administered by the target) or indirect 
(administered by a non-affected party). Group members in particular, given the likelihood 
of repeated interaction, can expect their behaviour will be reciprocated not only by the 
initial target, but by all the ingroup observers, and beyond. “Beyond”, once we consider 
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reputation transference and management (Mifune, Hashimoto, & Yamagishi, 2009). In 
game-theoretical terms, reputation can be conceptualized as the information about previous 
behaviour of an individual or a group of individuals, used to predict future behaviour. 
Crucially, such information is more likely to be exchanged within the groups, rather than 
between them, additionally supporting the network of reciprocity. Thus, positive treatment 
of ingroup members, with whom one will interact often and repeatedly, is likely to elicit 
positive reciprocity and a positive reputation. Negative treatment of ingroup members is 
likely to cause negative reciprocity and a bad reputation. On the other hand, outgroup 
members are unlikely to be encountered regularly, and therefore unlikely to consistently 
reciprocate behaviour8 or transfer reputation information. 
We can conceive several simple default strategies just from these observations: 
1. It is always better for the individual to treat the ingroup members positively, for 
they are likely to respond in kind.  
2. Failing to treat the ingroup positively runs the risk of receiving negative 
reciprocity from ingroup members.  
3. Unless groups are facing a zero-sum game (meaning, a win-or-lose situation), it is 
best to leave outgroup members alone, and to treat them fairly if possible.  
Indeed, this is what the experiments have shown. Yamagishi and colleagues 
demonstrate that the necessary conditions for intergroup bias to occur, apart from group 
                                                          
8I would argue outgroup members are still likely to reciprocate negative behaviour for several 
reasons. Firstly, failure to address an offence sends a signal that one is exploitable. This can reduce 
the individual’s status and damage their reputation within the group. It can also invite others to 
attempt to cheat or dominate the individual. Secondly, an unanswered offence against a group 
member lowers the group’s status by the same token, affecting all ingroup members. Thirdly, in 
intergroup situations, failing to protect or retaliate on the behalf of an ingroup member can create 
uncertainty and strife within the group. If we assume one of the functions of a group is to ward off 
other groups (Kameda & Tindall, 2006) with hostile intentions, failure to do so for an ingroup 
member can crack the system of depersonalized trust and damage group cohesion. 
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categorization, are opportunities for reputation management (Foddy, Platow, & Yamagishi, 
2009; Mifune, Hashimoto, & Yamagishi, 2009; Mifune & Yamagishi, 2015; Platow et al., 
2012; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008; Yamagishi, Hashimoto, & Schug, 2008), and expectations 
of future reciprocity by ingroup members (Gaertner & Insko, 2000; Karp, Jin, Yamagishi, & 
Shinotsuka, 1993; Platow, Grace, & Smithson, 2011; Rabbie, Schot, & Visser, 1989; 
Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999). Without those in place, intergroup bias is suspended. It 
makes no sense for individuals to distinguish between the ingroup and the outgroup if these 
groups cannot perform their evolutionary function of impacting that individual’s fitness. 
To summarize, the BGR system explains why group members would be concerned 
with the outcomes of other group members, and therefore, with the outcomes of the group – 
given interdependence, those outcomes directly impact their own through the network of 
generalized reciprocity. The beliefs about ingroup interdependence seem to be so basic that 
they spill over into minimal experiments, accounting for the intergroup bias we find as a 
result of “mere categorization” (Yamagishi, 2007). Moreover, they are in part shared by 
apes other than humans. We can say that bounded generalized reciprocity is how ape 
groups work, and are assumed to work by the group members. The moment the network of 
exchanges stops functioning reliably, groups cease to carry meaning for the individual, and 
therefore no longer impact her behaviour. As long as it functions (or seems to function), it 
continues (as it has in evolutionary past) to prop up the default strategy of ingroup 
favouritism and, in some cases, outgroup derogation. 
We can put together the sGET perspective on intergroup conflict into the following 
several points, 
1. Groups are indispensable for human survival. They are networks of 
interdependent individuals who share a generalized trust and exchange. Both the trust and 
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the exchange rely on group members' willingness to contribute to its maintenance. 
Psychological mechanisms to support this trait, such as social identity, are in place, making 
the "group" an important situational cue for human behaviour. 
2. The interaction within and between groups has engendered a number of dilemma-
prone situations humans have had to solve. Over the course of our evolution, this has led to 
the formation of situation-sensitive behavioural heuristics in group situations. 
3. Behavioural heuristics for intergroup situations tend toward the cautious and 
parochial, meaning they minimize the risk of incurring a large cost by advocating 
ethnocentrism. Since the ingroup is more likely to reciprocate positive and negative 
behaviour, they should be preferred in all dilemma situations. 
4. The application of intergroup behavioural heuristics will depend on situational 
characteristics, and the perception of the situation by relevant actors. This means that two 
questions suggest themselves when looking at intergroup dynamics from a sGET 
perspective: How do different situational characteristics impact human intergroup 
behaviour? How do different situational characteristics contribute to the perception of 
intergroup situations? In this thesis, I will mostly be concerned with the former question, 
investigating the impact of realistic situational factors on behavioural responses. 
How does this help understand the complex dynamics between minorities and 
majorities? In the next section of this chapter I will finally discuss the application of sGET, 
as I have laid it out, to the research questions. In essence, if we consider minorities and 
majorities not as separate entities, but as distinct groups existing together within the 
framework of a larger, functioning group, we can begin to understand the default strategies 
which promote conflict between them. Thus, I will be looking at the impact of common 
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resource management and group-size as two structural characteristics which, I argue, can 
fundamentally influence human intergroup behaviour. 
Minority v. Majority: A Structural Goal/Expectation Theory Approach 
As I have discussed before, previous research on the topic of minority and majority 
dynamics has found conflicting results. In real life, we see majorities and minorities both 
discriminating against each other, with majorities in particular expressing strong negative 
views of minority communities or even their possible presence. Meanwhile, in the lab, in 
minimal situations, minorities are the ones more often engaging in discrimination. 
Obviously, there is a disconnect between reality and experimental studies. I argue that the 
problem lies in our theoretical and methodological conceptualization of minorities and 
majorities. More precisely, they should not be equivocated with the traditional ingroups and 
outgroups, as is often the case in literature. Rather, minorities and majorities are here 
defined as distinct groups of unequal size which are nevertheless interdependent, i.e. they 
recognizably belong to the same, functioning superordinate group. I argue this definition 
reflects the reality of their dynamics better than the independent ingroup and outgroup 
model most often used in research. To illustrate what I mean, we may compare Turks living 
in Turkey, as opposed to Turks living in Germany. To the majority German population, the 
first is an outgroup, while the second is what we may call an “ingroup other”, a salient 
subgroup with which they inhabit a common space, share institutions, decide upon state 
policy, et cetera. In other words, Germans are less interdependent upon Turks in Turkey 
then they are on Turks in Germany. I argue that once this aspect of minority / majority 
dynamics is recognized, we can begin to unravel the reasons for some of the issues with 
diversity I have mentioned above. In fact, these issues are inherent in the structural  
characteristics of minority / majority interaction. 
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More precisely, I contend that the minority stands to gain from defecting on common 
resource management and sharing the gains amongst themselves. The majority, on the 
other hand, cannot exploit minority contributions in the same way – on the group level, 
majority members can never outperform the scenario where everybody cooperates. This 
asymmetry of incentive structure has several negative implications. Firstly, it will skew the 
majority’s expectations of minority cooperation in the common resource management 
dilemmas. I argue that the majority will expect minority members to behave parochially 
and freeride on group resources in order to benefit themselves, as well as other minority 
members. Secondly, once we consider the fact generalized reciprocity has trouble working 
over group boundaries, opportunities for singling out and punishing individual defectors 
will be slim. At the same time, as Miguel and Gugerty (2005) already argued, any 
institutional system of sanction for norm-violators will likewise encounter problems. 
Thirdly, the common resource management dilemma of minorities and majorities 
ticks all the boxes for the formation of default strategies: it has occurred reliably over 
human evolutionary history, and it carries a high potential cost if mismanaged. Ostensibly, 
if a minority is allowed to continue amassing capital at the expense of majority 
contributions, not only will the minority eventually monopolize the resource as a sort of 
economic elite, but the resource itself might collapse. 
For all of these reasons, from a sGET perspective, we would expect majority 
members, if conscious of common resource management occurring between the minority 
and majority, to show greater intergroup bias. More precisely, this bias will take shape of 
outgroup hate – a deliberate detraction from another group’s resources. Below, I will make 
my case for this prediction by taking into consideration previous research on the topics of 
ingroup derogation, punishment of norm-violators, and the management of group resources. 
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Evolutionarily speaking, there is as fundamental difference in how humans treat 
ingroup members as opposed to outgroup members. Obviously, one part of that is ingroup 
favouritism, what is to say favourable treatment of members of one’s own group. However, 
the flip side of that coin is ingroup derogation, what is to say harsher punishment of 
ingroup rather than outgroup norm-violators (Mendoza, Lane, & Amodio, 2014; Shinada, 
2009; Shinada, Yamagishi, & Ohmura, 2004; cf. Valenzuela & Srivastava, 2012; Kubota, 
Bar-David, Banaji, & Phelps, 2013).  
On the attitudinal level, the phenomenon is called the Black Sheep effect (Marques, 
Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988; Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988; Branscombe, Wann, Noel & Coleman, 
1993; Castano, Paladino, Coull, & Yzerbyt, 2002; Coull, Yzerbyt, Castano, Paladino, & 
Leemans, 2001; Marques & Paez, 1994; Otten & Gordijn, 2014). In essence, deviant 
members of the ingroup are evaluated more negatively than outgroup members with the 
same characteristics. For example, Marques and Yzerbyt (1988) had philosophy students 
evaluate speeches supposedly written either by fellow philosophy, or law students. One of 
the speeches was written poorly, while the other was written well. Crucially, participants 
evaluated the badly composed speech more negatively if they thought it had been written 
by an ingroup rather than an outgroup member. Researchers dealing with the Black Sheep 
Effect contend that ingroup deviants are perceived as an inherent threat because they 
damage the group's reputation (Marques, Abrams, Paez, & Martinez Taboada, 1998), 
threaten the maintenance of a positive social identity (Abrams, Marques, Bown & Henson, 
2000), blur intergroup boundaries (Jetten, 2006; Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004), and may 
spread non-normative behaviour within the group (Ouwerkerk, Kerr, Gallucci, & Van 
Lange, 2005). More than that, they "hinder group locomotion (the group's ability to achieve 
goals; e.g. Festinger, 1957) [...] Because their current behaviour is unexpected, predictions 
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of future behaviour are also likely to be less certain" (Frings, Hurst, Cleveland, Blascovich, 
& Abrams, 2012, p.108). Little surprise then that ingroup deviants and norm-violators 
evoke negative emotions, including anxiety on the biopsychological level (Frings et al., 
2012). 
Ingroup derogation is more than a bias of attitude, however. Applying sGET, 
Shinada and colleagues (Shinada, Yamagishi, & Ohmura, 2004) argue that, since 
cooperation is necessary to maintain the benefits group members experience from belonging 
to the group, punishment of non-cooperators (conceptualized as a second-order social 
dilemma9) will therefore be more prominent in the ingroup rather than the outgroup. To 
examine this, they conducted a gift-giving game in which participants were separated into 
two 4-person groups. They were told another such group with participants hailing from 
another gakubu (roughly equivalent to a college or academic discipline) will be playing the 
same game. Each round, three of the four participants in the cell were given JPY 200 by the 
experimenter, and told they could allocate any part of that to one other group member. The 
allocations occurred in a daisy chain. The first allocator would gift the second, the second 
would do the same for the third participant, while the third would allocate to the first in a 
cycle of gift giving. Any amount the three participants choose to allocate to one another is 
doubled by the experimenter before being passed on. This game represents generalized 
reciprocity, and can be interpreted as a public good. The fourth participant in each cell, 
however, is given the role of observer. This participant would be playing a Third Party 
                                                          
9A first order social dilemma is the trade-off individuals have to make between their own, and 
collective outcomes when it comes to the generation of group resources. The question for the 
individual is, Why should I contribute if others can do it instead? The second order social dilemma is 
the trade-off between the benefits of the resource and the costs of supporting its generation through 
costly reward or punishment. The question for the individual is, Why should I punish freeriders or 
reward cooperators if others can do it instead? In other words, in the second order social dilemma, 
individuals have to choose whether to contribute to the solution of the first order social dilemma. 
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Punishment game, meaning they will decide whether any of the contributors should receive 
a punishment. The punishment is costly to the observer who has to give from their show-up 
fee in order to administer it. Shinada and colleagues’ results show that people are more 
willing to punish ingroup rather than outgroup cheaters, as predicted by sGET. 
Berhnard, Fehr and Fischbacher (2006) conducted an allocation game between two 
small-scale, tribal communities on Papua New Guinea. They followed up the allocation 
game with a punishment phase in which participants could expend some of their own 
winnings to sanction an allocator. The experiment showed that people are willing to pay a 
cost to preserve norms of fairness and sharing, but only if the recipient of the unjust 
exchange was a member of their own tribe. Thus, not only did people negatively reciprocate 
outgroup members who behaved unfairly towards ingroup members, they did the same to 
ingroup norm-violators. Since the same action did not occur when observing an unfair 
exchange between two outgroup members, we can conclude this is not a matter of abstract 
justice. Rather, it demonstrates a mechanism of intragroup cooperation maintenance at 
work. 
Goette, Huffman and Meier (2006) found similar results with new recruits to the 
Swiss army who were randomly assigned to platoons. This was an experimentally 
interesting situation since participants had no previous interaction with each other, yet 
could be certain to interact with group members in the future, making the interdependence 
aspect of group membership especially poignant. They likewise found the willingness to 
enforce a cooperative norm was higher when the offender was an ingroup member. 
Parks, Joireman and Van Lange (2013) conclude ingroup derogation was and is an 
adaptive strategy primarily aimed at maintaining group resources. Generation, 
maintenance and redistribution of group resources is a social dilemma which all human 
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groups had to solve (Parke, Joireman & Van Lange, 2013), and which is one of the most 
characteristic activities of human groups. While other primate groups have some sort of 
generalized reciprocal exchange which serves a similar purpose, it is unlikely they 
consciously generate and sustain group resources the way humans do. When it comes to 
resource management in human groups, we can talk about two basic models, the Public 
Goods game and the Common Resource dilemma. In the first, participants decide how much 
to actively contribute to the establishment of a resource, while in the second, they decide 
how much of the resource (which may or may not replenish after use) to take for 
themselves. Unsurprisingly, the first is sometimes called the give-some dilemma, while the 
latter, the take-some dilemma. To give a few examples, social security, public health 
insurance, and public welfare are examples of give-some dilemmas, while management of 
water sources, fossil fuels, or communal pastures are examples of take-some dilemmas. The 
dilemma itself is not that different - in both cases, each individual would benefit by taking 
more or giving less, while everybody else cooperates fully. In other words, each participant 
in the dilemma would be better off if they defected and became a freerider. However, if all 
participants acted on such short-term profit maximizing motivations, the resource itself 
would collapse, and everybody would be worse off. 
Significantly, this sort of generation, exchange and maintenance of common goods 
occurs within the group. As with the bounded generalized reciprocity system, common 
resource management in intergroup situations has already been shown to engage 
psychological mechanisms. Importantly for my argument, Dawes, de Kragt, and Orbell 
(1988) showed contributions to the public good are moderated by whether the resource will 
primarily benefit ingroup or outgroup members. The researchers showed cooperation in the 
Public Goods game is enhanced by discussion only when the beneficiaries of the cooperative 
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efforts are ingroup members. When the benefits of cooperation in the game went to the 
outgroup, cooperation levels dropped, despite the fact participants indicated their 
willingness to cooperate during the discussion stage. 
Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner and Weinstein (2007) conducted a series of 
economic games in a slum neighbourhood of Kampala, Uganda. Participants were variously 
paired with co-ethnics or non-co-ethnics. Apart from the expected finding that community-
level ethnic diversity impedes the provision of public goods, they also found that this result 
has little to do with the perceptions of similarity, or greater ethnocentrism, i.e. positive 
attitudes towards ingroup members. Rather, it is the effect of strategic decision-making: 
participants expected they would see a greater return on their investment from co-ethnics, 
and that the sanctioning systems in place are more likely to function within, rather than 
across ethnic lines. Again, this is what sGET predicts. 
Finally, Hugh-Jones and Perroni (2014; 2017) have been investigating the 
phenomenon of expropriation, i.e. the confiscation of an individual’s good acquired in the 
Public Goods game by other players. They contend that small-scale societies – the best 
model we currently have of early human groups in the Pleistocene – do not engage in 
individual punishment, because it is overly risky. Neither do they engage in a 
depersonalized institutional punishment; rather, the community achieves a consensus 
about the target and the severity of the expropriation, after which it is carried out by 
representatives. Replicating this system in the lab showed that the targets of such 
confiscation are often non-prototypical ingroup members10. 
                                                          
10Interestingly, Hugh-Jones and Perroni (2017) found no evidence that heterogeneity per se 
reducescontributions to the public good, in opposition to the macro-level, real-world findings by 
sociologists and economists. 
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To summarize, groups are more than just vessels of generalized reciprocity. In 
human societies, they are also vessels of common resource management. Individual group 
members are sometimes willing to detract from their own rewards to make sure the 
dilemma inherent in resource management is solved, by punishing norm-violators 
particularly harshly if they are fellow ingroup members. As such, heterogeneous groups 
face a problem of how to deal with freeriding across group boundaries. The experimental 
and real-world results indicate that ingroup members then overcompensate by targeting 
non-prototypical members. While some of the studies I have presented here deal with 
individual non-prototypical members, there is no reason to suspect the mechanism would be 
any different for a whole group of non-prototypical members, e.g. an ethnic, political, 
religious, sexual, or cultural minority. In fact, there is good reason to suspect they would be 
seen as even more culpable. 
Again, this is an issue of heterogeneous groups; not an issue of two independent 
groups. Thus, when we speak of minority / majority dynamics, it makes no sense to speak of 
them as merely two groups of unequal size. In modern times, they are also two groups 
engaged in resource management together, but lacking the system of depersonalized trust 
which Brewer (1999) deemed so important for the management of group resources, and the 
maintenance of a group identity. In fact, in a single footnote in the 1999 paper, Brewer 
mentioned how this fact is likely to disrupt cooperation between groups, even if both groups 
should have the same goal11, i.e. generating a common resource.  
What we know from previous experiments is that, testing merely for intergroup bias 
between groups of unequal size shows greater discrimination on the part of the minority – a 
                                                          
11This prediction is in direct conflict with Realistic Conflict Theory (LeVine & Campbell, 
1972; Sherif & Sherif, 1953; Sherif, 1966), which suggests that common goals between groups should 
make peace. 
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result not often seen in the real world. From a sGET perspective, we can interpret these 
results as the effect of relative group size – if groups are seen as networks of 
interdependent individuals who engage in generalized exchange, than the smaller the 
group the more effective the exchange will be. Smaller groups have more opportunities for 
mutual monitoring, reputation management, exchange of goods, favours and information, 
as well as punishment and sanction. Establishing a working system of generalized 
reciprocity is relatively simple. Larger groups, in comparison, suffer from greater 
coordination problems. The larger the group, the lower the chance of encountering the same 
group members again, and thus the greater the chances of getting away with cheating 
them. Even if group members are willing to behave in a normative way, larger group size 
means more errors will occur in that process, including errors of communication and 
memory (Stevens, Volstrof, Schooler & Rieskamp, 2010), infecting the network with 
defection. In addition, there is a cognitive cap-off to any individual’s capacity to maintain 
meaningful relationships with other individuals (Dunbar, 1992; 2010), which is reached and 
surpassed in modern, large scale societies. In other words, the larger the group, the more 
difficult it is to maintain a sense of community within it. This problem of big groups has 
been seen as fundamental to the development of modern states (Hugh-Jones & Perroni, 
2014), and even the emergence of religion (Norenzayan, 2013).  
Thus group size, and particularly, relative groups size, is a structural characteristic 
of the situation which fundamentally impact the ability of humans to solve the social 
dilemmas they encounter. Indisputably, it is an important element of investigation in 
minority and majority dynamics. However, I argue this is not enough. 
If we frame the interaction between minorities and majorities as two groups also 
managing common resources together, another effect of relative group size becomes evident. 
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
42 
 
As I will argue in more detail in Chapter 3, given the structure of n-person social dilemmas 
like the Public Goods and Common Resource dilemmas, all minority members stand to gain 
from defecting on the group resources, while the majority cooperates. Meanwhile, the best 
possible outcome for the majority collectively, is perfect cooperation on all sides. This 
asymmetry in outcomes exacerbates the dilemma inherent in common resource 
management. To use the sGET language, setting up a system of common resource 
management between groups of unequal size skews the predictions about minority 
members’ behaviour in the mind of the majority. Thus, I suggest a default strategy has 
emerged in which the majority sharing resources with the minority, is likely to engage in a 
preemptive reduction of minority resources. This action can be interpreted as a type of 
punishment for crimes not yet committed, and will be motivated by the expectation 
minority members will cheat on the public good.This makes evolutionary sense, since it can 
be interpreted as an error managing strategy – it is better to overreact to minority defection 
than to underreact to it.  
Significantly, this does not hold true for the minority. There is no incentive structure 
or impact of relative group size that would justify their a priori discrimination of an 
interdependent majority group. Thus, I predict that given group-level interdependence, the 
bias we had previously observed in independent groups of unequal size will be reduced or 
suspended. Discriminating against an interdependent majority in an a priori way can 
neither prevent a costly outcome, nor induce a beneficial one for either minority members 
individually, or the minority as a whole. 
To test this application of sGET to the question of minority and majority dynamics, I 
asked the following questions, 
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1. How does consciousness of common resource management impact minority / majority 
members’ predictions about each other’s behaviour? 
2. How does consciousness of common resource management impact minority / majority 
members’ allocations to minority/majority targets if the allocators themselves are 
independent of the interaction? 
3. How do those predictions and the behaviour relate to one another? 
I address these questions in Chapter 3, and add onto them in Chapter 4 by asking: 
4. How does consciousness of common resource management impact relations between 
groups of equal size which either share the common resource, or manage it in parallel? 
While I had no predictions attached for the fourth question, making Chapter 4 an 
exploratory one, my predictions for the first three questions were clear, and based on sGET. 
Namely, 
1. Consciousness of common resource management will induce more frequent and 
more severe discrimination of the minority by the majority, than the other way around. 
2. This will occur even is the individual is not directly involved in the exchange, 
taking the shape of outgroup hate. 
3. The size of the bias will be explained by predicted contributions to the public good. 
In summary, I argue that the troubles large-scale human societies encounter as they 
become increasingly and recognizably heterogeneous, share a structural impetus. Namely, 
the discrimination members of the ingroup majority demonstrate towards the ingroup 
minority comes as a result of the two groups sharing the management of common resources. 
This mismatch between the group boundaries and the interdependence means that 
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evolutionary mechanisms for solving the freerider problems (e.g. monitoring, sanctioning, 
exclusion, rewarding) fail. Given that the majority stands more to lose in this process, it is 
likely that they will resort to any available means to limit or actively reduce the influence 
minority members can exert on the society as a whole. This will include a reduction in 
minority economic benefits, or difference maximization, which we can call outgroup hate. 
The discrimination which majority members show to the minority may then account 
not only for the minority’s withdrawal from the superordinate group, but also their 
withdrawal from common resource management, leading exactly to the sort of loss in public 
goods that the majority feared, and which research has consistently found on the national 
and local levels. 
Several caveats must be added to this. Firstly, only one small part of this argument 
is tested in the present thesis – namely, the impact that being aware of group-level 
interdependence has on intergroup bias in different configurations (between interdependent 
groups of equal or unequal size, as well as between independent groups). I will, of course, 
explain these configurations in more details in the empirical chapters 3 and 4. As an 
orientation, however, in Chapter 3 the intergroup bias is assessed between ingroup 
minority and ingroup majority members, i.e. two interdependent groups of unequal size. In 
Chapter 4, the intergroup bias is assessed between the more traditional ingroup and 
outgroup, i.e. groups of (by assumption) equal size. These groups either share the 
management of the common resource (making them interdependent), or they manage it 
separately (making them independent), depending on the experimental condition. 
Secondly, it is obvious that my predictions of intergroup behaviour in the face of 
common resource management are geared towards the negative, i.e. towards discovering 
and explaining discriminatory behaviour. While one of my predictions is that the minority 
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will show less bias in comparison to the majority, I have little to say as to what would 
motivate such behaviour other than a lack of comparable motive to discriminate. 
In addition, a discussion of my use of “outgroup hate” is in order. As we have 
discussed already in this chapter, outgroup hate used to be confounded with ingroup love, 
standing in for any instance of skewed decision-making in intergroup situations. However, 
we have since began distinguishing between ingroup favouritism / ingroup love, being a 
deliberate maximization of ingroup outcomes irrespective of outgroup outcomes, as opposed 
to outgroup derogation / outgroup gate, being a deliberate minimization of outgroup 
outcomes irrespective of ingroup outcomes. These definitions are behavioural rather than 
motivational – thus outgroup “hate” does not have to include any actual emotion of hate, 
just as ingroup “love” does not have to include any feelings of attachment to ingroup 
members. Rather, the behaviour we can describe as ingroup favouritism can be the result of 
fear of negative evaluation, rational self-interest, as well as emotional attachment to the 
ingroup identity. The same way, outgroup hate can be the result of fear that the outgroup 
will become aggressive, selfish profit-maximization at the expense of outgroup members, or 
spite, for example. The motivations for both ingroup love and outgroup hate are left an open 
question, with the acknowledgement that there could be multiple motivations for the same 
behaviour. 
The most common working definition of outgroup hate is that it constitutes a 
deliberate detraction of the outgroup’s outcomes, even when this action cannot benefit the 
ingroup. In other words, it is deliberate difference maximization. However, there is a 
discussion in the literature as to whether outgroup hate should also be costly to the 
perpetrator. This addition of a personal cost serves several purposes. Firstly, it better 
models warfare, the ultimate form of intergroup bias, in which individuals are willing to 
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make absolute sacrifices to damage the outgroup, even if this does not directly benefit the 
ingroup (in terms of profit maximization). Secondly, introducing a cost to outgroup 
derogation in economic games removes self-interested, greed-motives, as well as error or 
boredom. Finally, making the derogation costly increases the strictness of the test. 
However, an opposite argument can be made. A strict test which includes personal 
cost into its operationalization of outgroup hate may let some other behaviours fall by the 
wayside. These behaviours, while not as costly as aggression, can nevertheless be 
considered discriminatory and damaging to the outgroup. Think, for example, of the 
difference between physically attacking an outgroup member, as opposed to anonymously 
denying them a promotion to a better pay grade. The first is extremely risky and costly to 
the individual perpetrator, while the other is neither that risky nor that costly, yet 
potentially very damaging to the victim. 
In this thesis, I chose to use the widest possible definition of outgroup hate to 
capture as wide an array of discriminatory behaviour as possible. Thus, outgroup hate is 
here defined as any action that lowers outgroup outcomes even if this action does not 
increase ingroup outcomes. The independent allocation game was chosen for this precisely 
this purpose. It allows people to benefit the ingroup to the maximum without influencing 
outgroup outcomes, and vice versa. Any difference in allocation patterns under such 
conditions constitute a difference maximization. While we cannot say that this difference 
maximization is aggressive, we cannot deny that it demonstrates discrimination either. A 
stricter test of willingness to sacrifice personal outcomes to derogate against the outgroup 
will be left for the next phase in the investigation process, and is discussed in the 
concluding chapter. 
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Abstract 
This paper presents an overview of the current literature from the economic games 
tradition pertinent to the theory of intergroup behaviour, adds to this discussion by 
integrating self- and structure-based approaches to intergroup conflict. More precisely, I 
use evolutionary psychology to bring together Social Identity and Structural 
Goal/Expectation theories.  
Groups can be understood as bounded networks of interdependent individuals. As such, 
they exhibit different types of interdependence, of which I list four. Social identity should be 
considered a costly signal, useful when negotiating group living within this framework. As 
such, it could have been selected for over the course of human evolution. 
In addition, I argue that social identity and intergroup bias are conditional, depending on 
how well group members are able to monitor each other’s behaviour, punish norm violators, 
etc. I propose several as-of-yet ignored structural factors which may impact this 
relationship, and suggest further lines of research.   
 
Keywords: Social Identity Theory, Structural Goal/Expectation Theory, interdependence, 
intergroup conflict, intergroup bias, evolutionary psychology 
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Introduction 
Social identity has been a central theme of research into human group behaviour 
since Tajfel and colleagues (1971) demonstrated how easy it is to trigger cooperation within, 
and competition between groups, by merely implying they exist. These meaningless, 
“minimal groups” carried with them a clear impact on behaviour, compelling people to 
favour their own, and derogate against the "other" – a finding repeated over and over in 
subsequent experimental studies as well as in real life (Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2014; 
Brewer, 1999; Hewstone et al., 2002). This phenomenon, usually contained under the 
umbrella term of intergroup bias, is stabile across human societies and cultures (Brewer & 
Caporael, 2006; Yamagishi, Hashimoto, & Schug, 2008), as well as time (Bowles, 2009; 
Keeley, 1997; Pinker, 2011). It emerges in both micro and macro interactions (Atran, 2003; 
Van Vugt, 2009), and we can even observe it in other primate species (Mahajan et al., 2011; 
Wilson & Wrangham, 2003). 
The standard explanation for intergroup bias comes from Tajfel and Turner’s work 
(1986) on the impact of group categorization. With consciousness of groups activated, 
outgroups become a referent against which the individual can judge the worth of their 
ingroup. Given that we are individually motivated to maintain a positive rather than 
negative or neutral image about ourselves, this should mean we are indirectly motivated to 
positively distinguish the ingroup against the outgroup. 
The assumption here is that our sense of self is inextricably connected to group 
memberships. This connection is social identity: an integral part of the self-concept derived 
from group membership, and including the emotional, cognitive, and psychological 
correlates thereof (Turner & Oakes, 1986). Alternatively, social identity has been defined as 
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those aspects of the self-concept which are shared among group members (Yamagishi & 
Mifune, 2008), often contrasted with personal identity which is unique to the individual. 
However, if social identity theory is examined from an evolutionary perspective, we 
are left with some awkwardly basic questions. Why has the sense of self become entangled 
with group membership in the first place? What selective processes could have led to the 
emergence of social identity? How does social identity respond to differentially incentivized 
intergroup situations if at all? In this paper, I will present an evolutionary view of social 
identity, explore its structural origins, and attempt to integrate it with structural 
Goal/Expectation theory (sGET, Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; Yamagishi, 1986a, 1986b) in order 
to get a more rounded view of intergroup processes. My main goal is to present a 
comprehensive typology of interdependences encountered within and between groups, and 
explain why they matter to the research on social identity and intergroup bias. I will 
concentrate on evidence from experimental economic games under the assumption that 
such de-contextualized paradigms of interactions offer a look into human default responses 
to certain social situations and stimuli, and thus to their evolutionary adaptations. Finally, 
I propose some lines of research in intergroup research which stem from my theoretical 
propositions. 
Why an Evolutionary Perspective? 
 In 1995, David Buss, a prominent proponent of evolutionary psychology, argued that 
an evolutionary perspective will bring some much needed resolution to the “broad field of 
psychology (…) [which is in] theoretical disarray” (Buss, 1995, p.1). While “evolutionary” 
has since become a buzzword in social sciences used in any number of ways, some of which 
are inappropriate and unscientific (Laland & Brown, 2011), it nevertheless continues to 
provide the most unifying framework of investigating human behaviour, psychology, and 
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social dynamics that we have at our disposal. Thus, one reason why an evolutionary 
perspective should matter to us as researchers is its power to integrate theoretical 
approaches and findings, and provide clarity in our attempted interdisciplinarianism. 
 However, when it comes to intergroup behaviour, I would argue an evolutionary 
perspective is even more crucial. The core assumption of evolutionary psychology is that 
those situations which reappear reliably over the course of human (pre)history (Brewer & 
Caporael, 2006; Caporael, 1994) and carry a high cost of failure (Hasleton & Buss, 2000) 
would act as selective pressures on human biological, psychological, and socio-cultural 
evolution. They resulted in what we may dub “default strategies”. Default strategies are a 
set of adaptive responses to certain situations which reduce the risk of incurring an 
extremely negative outcome. In other words, they are meant to prevent catastrophic loss of 
fitness. These strategies become integrated into human behaviour, often supported through 
some psychological or cultural mechanisms.  
 In intergroup situations, the default strategies we observe seem to tend towards the 
parochial (e.g. Choi & Bowles, 2007), what is to say ethnocentric. As I will argue below, this 
makes sense given that individuals are interdependent with their group members, and rely 
on them for their survival. Crucially, the reliance is relatively more intense and salient 
than it is for strangers, or members of the outgroup. Thus, humans, by default, will favour 
their ingroup to the exclusion, and sometimes at the expense of, any relevant outgroup. 
However, the real question are not the strategies themselves. Rather it is the application of 
these (parochial) intergroup strategies depending on situational factors we may be able to 
control or manipulate. 
Thus, on the one hand, investigating default responses informs predictions about 
human behaviour in general. On the other hand, understanding the forces that have 
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shaped the strategies themselves, by investigating the situations which acted as selective 
catalysts for their application, allows for more realistic policy making, since the policies 
would address the situation, not the psychological response to it. Thus, conflict resolution, 
intergroup cooperation, as well as threat perception or intergroup hostilities, once seen 
from an evolutionary perspective, become a matter of realistic incentive structures, and 
people’s perceptions of those structures, as I will explain in this text. There is, however, a 
long way yet to go between evolutionary psychology and informed policy making (Roberts, 
2012). 
A Criticism of Social Identity Theory 
The central prediction of social identity theory (SIT) requires that, as a result of our 
self-concept being connected to group membership, humans will try to maintain a positive 
distinction between the ingroup and the outgroup across situations. However, far from 
being unconditional, intergroup bias of the sort SIT proposes seems to be rather unstable. 
Here, I offer two criticisms of the theory. Firstly, it incorrectly predicts outgroup derogation 
should be a default human strategy for any intergroup situation. Secondly, it is insensitive 
to structural characteristics of the situation which have been shown to impact intergroup 
behaviour. 
Spiteful difference maximization in intergroup situations, i.e. outgroup hate, follows 
directly from the proposition that humans are essentially motivated to positively 
distinguish their own group against any referential “other”. However, outgroup hate is 
rarely observed in minimal groups outside of very specific situations. Generally, it seems 
that rather than increased negativity, attitudes and behaviours towards outgroups are 
characterized by decreased positivity (Brewer, 1999). For instance, Mummendey and 
colleagues (1992) asked participants to distribute negative rather than positive resources (a 
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high pitched, loud noise), and found no significant intergroup bias. In other words, 
participants were equally unwilling to subject outgroup members to prolonged negative 
stimuli, as they were ingroup members. Halevy, Bornstein and Sagiv (2008) created the 
IPD-MD, a Prisoner’s Dilemma game in which participants had the choice between 
favouring the ingroup while detracting from outgroup gains at no additional cost, or merely 
favouring the ingroup. Overwhelmingly, they chose the latter, indicating that people are 
not by default interested in maximizing the difference between groups, just in maximizing 
ingroup benefits.  
Secondly, the tendency to commit intergroup bias seems to be context sensitive. In a 
series of exhaustive research projects, Yamagishi and colleagues identified several 
mechanisms crucial to eliciting ingroup favouritism (and, depending on the situation, 
outgroup derogation), namely: opportunities for reputation management (Mifune, 
Hashimoto, & Yamagishi, 2009; Mifune & Yamagishi, 2015; Yamagishi, Hashimoto, & 
Schug, 2008), and expectations of future reciprocity by ingroup members (Karp, Jin, 
Yamagishi, & Shinotsuka, 1993; Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999; Yamagishi, 2007; also 
Gaertner & Insko, 2000; Rabbie, Schot, & Visser 1989). When these two are explicitly 
removed from the paradigm, intergroup bias is eliminated, disputing directly the 
predictions based on social identity alone.  
For example, Mifune and Yamagishi (2015) showed that ingroup favouritism 
commonly found in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game was suspended if knowledge about group 
membership was not shared. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game, perhaps the most famous of 
the economic games, involves two partners who have to simultaneously make up their 
minds whether to cooperate with each other or defect. In this particular experiment, the 
participants played a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, meaning they were paired with a 
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new partner in a series of one-shot interactions. At the beginning of each trial, the players 
were given 300 yen which they could allocate to the pair in increments of 50 yen. The 
portion of the money participants chose to allocate would be doubled before being given to 
the pair. The portion of the money participants chose not to allocate would be theirs to 
keep. In this way, if both partners allocate the full amount (300 yen) to their pair, they both 
walk away with the double amount (600 yen). However, if only one participant allocates the 
full amount, while the other allocates 0 yen, then the cooperator will have nothing, while 
the defector would have gained 900 yen. This tradeoff between mutual and individual 
benefit maximization is at the core of any social dilemma. 
Usually, when this game is played between groups, we see that people cooperate 
much more often and to a greater extent with members of their own group, rather than the 
outgroup. Yamagishi and Mifune’s experiment manipulated only the commonality of 
knowledge of group membership to showcase the impact of both of the mechanisms I have 
mentioned above: expectation of future reciprocity and reputation management. 
Participants, recruited from the general population, were repeatedly paired with members 
of their own, or the outgroup. In some trials, the paired participants knew each other’s 
group memberships (common knowledge), while in some only one of the participants had 
such knowledge (private knowledge), while the other was given no information about group 
membership. The ingroup bias was clear only in the common knowledge condition with 
participants allocating significantly more money to ingroup than outgroup members. This 
tendency was echoed in their predictions of reciprocal treatment – participants assumed 
that ingroup members would give more than outgroup members, indicating the importance 
of expected reciprocity. Mifune and Yamagishi also assessed the participants’ Fear of 
Negative Evaluation (Schlenker & Leary, 1982), and found a significant positive correlation 
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with ingroup favouritism only in the common knowledge condition. In other words, people 
were only interested in maintaining their positive reputations with ingroup members if 
ingroup members were aware of their shared social identity. If the knowledge of group 
membership was private, the intergroup bias was not significant, nor was it correlated to 
the need for reputation management. 
Thus, research shows that humans are certainly motivated to treat ingroup 
members positively, but this does not mean that we are compelled to mistreat the outgroup 
outside of “win-or-lose” (zero-sum) situations in which the ingroup outcomes are 
interdependent and incompatible with those of the outgroup (e.g. competition). 
Significantly, ingroup favouritism, while largely automatic, is not unconditional. Humans 
reflect on the structure of the interaction in order to ascertain if their ingroup favouring 
actions will impact their fitness. When it is made clear that the group cannot reciprocate 
the individual’s actions, the group ceases to function, and thus seems to become irrelevant 
as a category. 
This structural, rather than self-based, outlook on intergroup bias is not without 
criticism. McAuliffe and Dunham (2016) argue that structure-based accounts of intergroup 
bias are over-complex, and that there is little evidence uniquely indicative of their accuracy. 
They cite inconsistent findings of harsher punishment levelled at ingroup norm violators 
(Mendoza, Lane, & Amodio, 2014; Shinada, Yamagishi, & Ohmura, 2003; cf., Valenzuela & 
Srivastava, 2012; Kubota, Bar-David, Banaji, & Phelps, 2013) but neglect the evidences I 
have just presented. Perhaps the greatest obstacle to a wider acceptance and use of 
structure-based explanations for intergroup bias, seems to be their failure to account for 
social identity, and integrate the knowledge previously attained using SIT. In order to do 
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so, I will more closely examine a structure-based account of intergroup bias, and its relation 
to social identity, based on three propositions: 
1. Groups can be understood as structured networks of interdependent 
actors. They serve as powerful cues for behaviour in dilemma-prone 
situations. 
2. Social identity can be understood as a costly signal legitimizing that 
network. 
3. Structural characteristics of the group and the situation will impact levels 
of social identity. 
Groups as Interdependent Networks: Structural Underpinnings of Intergroup Bias 
In 1999, Brewer suggested a mechanism to explain preferential treatment of 
ingroups without the need for an outgroup to act as a referent. She begins by asserting that 
humans are group-living creatures for whom sustained positive interactions with 
conspecifics constitute a fundamental survival strategy. Groups are adaptive mechanisms 
to deal with a myriad of challenges humans encounter, from securing food, fuel, shelter, 
and mating opportunities, to acquiring knowledge about the environment, guarding against 
predators and enemies, and managing contact with outgroups (Kameda & Tindale, 2006). 
This concept is referred to as obligatory interdependence (Brewer & Caporael, 2006). We 
see very clearly that obligatory interdependence is older than the Homo species, and a 
characteristic of all other primates (Dunbar, 1992), indicating that whatever human-
specific psychology developed since the dawn of man, it had to have happened within a 
complex social setting of functionally interdependent individuals. Interdependence is here 
defined as the impact actors' choices have on each other's outcomes (Kelley & Thibaut, 
1978; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003). 
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Brewer's second proposition is that altruistic tendencies (or, at least, preferences for 
mutually beneficial outcomes) must be contingent on the probability that interaction 
partners will be likewise predisposed to cooperation. Certainly, psychological mechanisms 
to help us predict the intent of conspecifics have been subject of an arms race between the 
ability to cheat each other (Machiavellian intelligence; Byrne, 1995) and the ability to 
detect cheaters (Cosmides, 1989). Conditional cooperation, rather than unconditional 
cooperation, is an evolutionarily more sustainable strategy if it is based on accurate 
predictions of others' behaviour. This idea is at the core of structural Goal/Expectation 
theory which states that human behaviour can be predicted at the intersection of one's 
preferences (goals), and their predictions of other's behaviour (expectations). Pruitt and 
Kimmel (1977) use the Prisoner's Dilemma game to showcase what they mean. In order for 
simultaneous mutual cooperation to occur, each player has to prefer a mutually beneficial 
outcome, while at the same time predicting that the other player has the same basic 
preference, or is in some other way motivated to cooperate (e.g. through the threat of 
punishment). A player who prefers cooperation, but does not think it would be reciprocated 
by the other party, is likely to defect. 
We see support for this idea in the consistent and strong positive correlations 
between behaviour in economic games and predictions of partner's choices (Yamagishi & 
Kiyonari, 2000; Yamagishi & Sato, 1986). Evidence from sequential (not simultaneous) 
Prisoner’s Dilemma games shows that people will amend their choices to respond to the 
first player's choices (Hayashi, Ostrom, Walker, & Yamagishi, 1998; Watabe, Terai, 
Hayashi, & Yamagishi, 1996). In this way, others' intent to cooperate is rewarded with 
cooperation, while their intent to defect is met by defection. 
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Of course, in economic games players have limited information about their 
interaction partners, and thus can only make such predictions based on their personal 
attitudes towards human nature in general. In minimal group experiments, however, the 
salient information participants have is the existence of group categories. Brewer argues 
that group membership carries with it an implicit depersonalized trust, and constitutes "a 
form of contingent altruism" (Brewer, 1999, p.431). She further defines groups as bounded 
communities of mutual trust and obligation that delimit the structural interdependence 
between group members. 
The same year, Yamagishi and colleagues (Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999) 
outlined their Bounded Generalized Reciprocity approach to explaining ingroup 
favouritism. This approach leans heavily on sGET, and can be used to explain the 
mechanism behind Brewer's proposed depersonalized ingroup-directed trust. Given that 
human groups are characterized by repeated and reliable interactions between 
interdependent individuals, we are motivated to have as many positive, and as few 
negative, interactions with ingroup members. This is in contrast to outgroup members or 
strangers, with whom we can expect only sporadic and limited interpersonal exchanges. In 
other words, strangers and outgroup members are less likely to impact our fitness when 
compared to ingroup members. This has even been shown experimentally – when the 
interdependence structure is flipped so that the individual is more dependent on the choices 
of outgroup, rather than ingroup members, they start favouring the “other” (Rabbie, Schot, 
& Visser, 1989).  
To minimize the possibility of committing errors in judgment, and thus exposing 
ourselves to negative reciprocity from ingroup members, it is better to treat them positively 
and to favour them over all other interaction partners across situations. Generalized 
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
74 
 
reciprocity benefits each member of the interdependent network by actively creating 
incentives to favour ingroup members, entrenching more positive attitudes towards them, 
and promoting mutual trust. The system is perpetuated through mutual monitoring, 
information exchange (particularly about other actor's reputations), ingroup norms and 
institutions, punishment of norm-violators, etc. It supports both positive and negative, 
direct and indirect reciprocity. Crucially, it allows group members to more accurately 
predict each other’s behaviour. These beliefs about the way group membership works are 
basic enough to be tied to the very category of group, and thus imported into minimal group 
situations (Yamagishi, 2007) where they remain unless explicitly suspended. Put more 
bluntly, Bounded Generalized Reciprocity is how groups fundamentally “work”. 
What we see from this is that structural characteristics of the interaction between 
group members mimic economic games – they are structured, incentivized interactions 
which involve some sort of exchange. Often, they include a social dilemma situation which 
requires trust. Since the trust is bounded to the ingroup, dilemma-prone interactions 
between groups serve as cues for the activation of conditional ingroup favouritism and 
outgroup derogation. They likewise form the only context within which social identity (and 
social identifying) can be an evolutionarily stabile strategy, as I will argue in the next 
section of this paper. We can extend this logic to define other types of dilemma-prone 
interdependence that appear in group contexts. I will list and define them below. 
Interpersonal interdependence is the impact actors have on each other through an 
informal interpersonal network of exchange, as defined by Yamagishi and colleagues. It is 
implied by the category of group. As we have seen, when individuals can assume that no 
exchanges can take place between group members (whether in terms of goods, favours, or 
information), the levels of intergroup bias are lowered. Ostensibly, when actors are 
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reassured that the network is in place and functioning well, intergroup bias will increase, 
as will the levels of social identity. 
Group-level interdependence is the impact actors have on group resources. Unlike 
the interpersonal exchanges, which can be described as a series of dyadic economic games, 
and which take place between individual actors, group-level interdependence would more 
closely resemble an n-person social dilemma, like the Public Goods game. In it, a group of 
individuals contribute to the common pot, which is multiplied by a factor r, and then 
redistributed to them. If all group members cooperate, they maximize their mutual benefit. 
At the same time, each individual has a vested interest to defect (i.e. not to contribute to 
the common pot) and benefit from all others’ contributions. However, if all players behaved 
in this self-interested way, the public good would collapse and all the participants in the 
game would be worse off.  
We can describe it in terms of group resource management, which group members 
have to generate, maintain, and/or redistribute amongst themselves. Crucially, these 
resources carry with them the need for group coordination. Typical examples range from 
relatively simple resources (e.g., hunted meat, fire, constructed shelter), to modern public 
goods (e.g., social security, public health programmes, free education). Since it is in an 
individual’s short-term benefit to defect on the management of the common resource, but 
nevertheless profit from it, these all entail a dilemma that group members needed to solve: 
the freeriding problem. 
Recent work by Simunovic (in preparation; Chapter 4 of this thesis) has shown that 
engaging the consciousness of group-level interdependence results in intergroup bias, 
specifically difference maximization. Participants were categorized into minimal groups, 
and told they would perform a series of allocation games to members of the ingroup and 
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outgroup, who were supposedly taking part in a Public Goods game within the groups. The 
participants themselves were independent of both the interpersonal exchange structure and 
the Public Goods game being played by other group members. Nevertheless, in two studies 
done on student and general samples, they showed deliberate detraction from outgroup 
profits relative to ingroup profits. 
Apart from within-group interdependence structures, between-group 
interdependence is also an important structural characteristic of the interaction which can 
impact intergroup bias. It is the impact one group’s actions have on the outcomes of another 
group. Competition between groups certainly breeds conflict (Böhm, Rusch, Gürerk, 2016; 
Zarate, Garcia, Garza, & Hitlan, 2004), and has been suggested to increases social 
identification with the ingroup (Jetten, Spears, & Mastead, 1997). Perception of threat, 
whether merited or unmerited, likewise increase ingroup favouritism and outgroup 
derogation (Burke, Martens, & Faucher, 2010; Jonas & Fritsche, 2013) although this does 
not seem to extend across all situations (Simunovic, Mifune, & Yamagishi, 2013; Mifune, 
Simunovic, &Yamagishi, 2017). At the same time, cooperative intergroup contact may lead 
to less intergroup bias and more positive attitudes between groups (Desforges et al., 1991; 
Gaertner et al., 1990), although, again, there are some indications that this does not extend 
to cooperation which entails a salient dilemma (Brewer, 1999; Simunovic, in preparation). 
Jing and colleagues (2017; see also Deutsch, 1973) suggest that a crucial component in 
whether interdependent groups will show an increase in intergroup bias will be the beliefs 
that their interests and goals are aligned (positive outcome interdependence), or discordant 
(negative outcome interdependence). I add to that by suggesting that even if the outcome 
interdependence is perceived as positive, yet it entails a dilemma, it might nevertheless 
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lead to intergroup bias. Brewer (1999) made the same prediction based on the fact that 
coordinated cooperative action requires trust which simply does not exist between groups. 
Finally, we may talk about a socio-cultural interdependence, which I will define as 
the impact actors have on promoting behavioural strategies. In it, the groups and their 
interactions are perceived on a meta-level, as social representations, stereotypes, or 
cultural influences. The interaction is likewise symbolic, conceptualized as an exchange of 
cultural artefacts or concepts. Ingroup deviants, embedded minorities, geopolitically 
proximal outgroups, as well as portrayals of them in mass media, all pose a potential threat 
to overturn the established way of “doing things” within the ingroup. Groups like sexual 
minorities, subcultures, religious or political organizations which seek, or seem to be 
seeking, a change in generally accepted norms are met with disgust, distrust, and 
discrimination (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Thus, we are talking about symbolic threat to a 
group’s values, norms, and established way of life, all of which have been shown to induce 
greater intergroup bias in behaviour and attitudes (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; 
Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Socio-cultural interdependence has a greater potential impact 
than that with which we credit it. A fundamental shift in cultural influences can impact the 
paradigms of what is acceptable behaviour, and thus the expectations of how ingroup 
interaction partners behave, reducing the necessary trust between group members. 
However, to my knowledge, this type of interdependence has not been tested in behavioural 
experiments as a contributor to intergroup bias. 
I propose that these four types of interdependence form the framework within which 
social identity may have evolved, and continues to be a stabile adaptive strategy. I further 
argue any structural characteristic which endangers the reliability of existing strategies to 
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solve these dilemma-prone situations will impact levels of social identity, and intergroup 
behaviours. 
Not Identity, but Identifying 
Towards the end of the twentieth century, the Maori people of Aotearoa / New 
Zealand began a cultural resurrection of tikanga, customary practices, as a means of 
gaining recognition of "Maori cultural imperatives alongside usual western educational 
research ethics and procedures" (Ka'ai, 1995, p.112). As part of this movement, there was a 
re-emergence of traditional tattoo art, including ta moko, very characteristic facial tattoos 
which may seem extreme to many observers outside of this cultural context. Prison tattoos 
likewise convey deep symbolic meaning both within the group (in terms of hierarchy and 
personal narrative), and between groups (in terms of allegiance and belonging) (Bronnikov, 
1993; Phelan & Hunt, 1998). Archaeological evidence from the Tiwanaku society of South 
America suggests that cranial modification (elongating or otherwise changing the shape of 
the human skull) was indicative of ethnic identity within a multicultural community (Blom, 
2005). Of course, other, less permanent ways of indicating group membership are available 
as well. A study by Krakauer and Rose (2008) showed that young lesbians made moderate 
changes to their appearance soon after coming out, as a demonstration of their group 
identity, compliance with peer norms, as well as a sexual signal. Authors such as Fox 
(1987) and Frith (1982) described the typical attire of people from the punk subcultural 
groups which, while notoriously impermanent and transient on a local level (Yablonsky, 
1962), carried recognizable symbolic meaning all over the world. 
The purpose of such changes to the appearance was to convey group membership 
and, importantly, one's commitment to this particular group over all comparable others. In 
fact, willing body modification has been used to a similar purpose all over the world, 
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leading some sociologists to dub the body the interface between the individual and their 
society (e.g. Comaroff, 1985; Lock, 1993). Importantly, all of the behaviours I have listed 
here can be described as costly signals - behaviours or traits of the individual which carry a 
cost while at the same time serving as a believable signal to potential interaction partners 
(Zahavi, 1975; Smith & Bliege Bird, 2000; Sosis, 2000). The more costly the signal the more 
believable it is, and thus the more likely it is to achieve the desired goal (Smith, 1994). 
Already several human psychological characteristics as well as quite complex social 
behaviours have been examined in the light of the costly signalling hypothesis, among them 
large game hunting (Bliege Bird et al., 2001; Wiessner, 2002), food sharing (Hawkes & 
Bliege Bird, 2002; Gurven et al., 2000), altruism (Gintis, Smith, & Bowles, 2001; Iredale, 
Van Vugt, & Dunbar, 2008), and religious belief (Bulbulia & Sosis, 2011; Norenzayan, 
2013).  
By considering social identity as a signal to interaction partners in dilemma-prone 
situations we can situate the phenomenon within evolutionary science. The question thus 
becomes, what are the costs and benefits of demonstrating a high level of commitment to 
the group, and which selective mechanisms operate on it. 
Indeed, the benefits of identifying oneself as a prototypical group member are easy 
to imagine. High identifiers, provided they demonstrate this internal trait in some way, 
signal to other group members their willingness to adhere to group norms, including, 
significantly, the ingroup favouring norm. This, ostensibly, makes them more predictable in 
interactions, which reduces uncertainty, and is considered an important component of trust 
(Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). Preferences for 
prototypicality can be seen in the treatment of ingroup deviants who are often vilified 
beyond comparative outgroup deviants, while more prototypical ingroup members are seen 
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in a more extremely positive light than compatible outgroup members (Black sheep effect; 
e.g. Marques & Paez, 1994). Relative to low identifiers, high identifiers should thus enjoy a 
higher status within the group, as well as a better reputation. This would expose them to 
more positive, and fewer negative interactions with ingroup members.  
Thus, it pays to identify oneself as a group member, but what are the costs? Firstly, 
demonstrations of group membership may limit the individual's options to change groups. 
This opportunity cost could be severe in cases of depletion of ingroup resources, or 
organized intergroup violence. Under such circumstances, sticking to the ingroup may not 
be in the individual’s best interest. Yet it is possible that high identifiers are willing to forgo 
this rationale, or are unable to switch groups given their previous actions on its behalf. 
Additionally, while high identification with a group and plenty of signals to indicate 
such membership may protect the individual from random attacks out of fear of reprisal, it 
does not protect them from deliberate intergroup bias. Those whose group identification is 
clearly demarcated might be more likely to be targeted for derogation between groups. We 
can observe this logic in reverse, by seeing how the majority brands deviant members of 
their group, divergent minorities, and similar “ingroup others”. The yellow star, pink 
triangle, scarlet letter, or a tattoo were used to ostracise those members of the community 
who belonged to a subgroup of “norm-violators” by making them highly visible and 
identifiable. 
Given obligatory interdependence, social identity as a positively valenced 
relationship of the self to a network of non-kin could have been selected as a basic 
psychological trait. In other words, we can think of social identity as a psychological 
adaptation to help us survive in groups by attaching emotional value to our group identity, 
and promoting the demonstration of this identity (i.e. identifying). Individuals who signal 
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commitment to the ingroup should be selected for more positive interaction within the 
group, but they are also likely to have limited mobility across groups and might get singled 
out for more negative interaction between groups. 
Impact of Group Structure on Social Identity: Where to Look? 
There is ample data that the levels of social identification vary between individuals. 
Luhtanen and Crocker's (1992) work on the development of a collective self-esteem scale 
clearly showed individual differences in default levels of identification to relevant groups. 
The same is evident in experimental research where participants differentially identify 
with the imposed minimal groups. Using this distinction of high versus low minimal group 
identifiers, researchers have found levels of identification have a moderating effect on 
intergroup bas (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997; Roccas & Schwatz, 1993), perceptions of 
group variability (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995), evaluations of ingroup deviants 
(Branscombe et al., 1993), and levels of ingroup stereotyping (Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 
1997). These findings clearly show that differential levels of identification have an impact 
on people’s perception, attitudes, and behaviour. Where the individual difference comes 
from is, however, a separate albeit compelling issue. 
If we understand the group as a network of interdependent individuals, social 
identity could have evolved as a psychological adaptation to group living. I have described it 
as a costly signal, seeing as high levels of identification may benefit the individual within 
the group, but are detrimental in between-group interactions. My model implies that the 
level of identification/identifying should also be dependent on situational cues in social 
interaction, particularly if these cues impact the reliability and predictability of ingroup 
members’ behaviour, as well as the success of different strategies to solve the dilemmas 
inherent in group-living.  
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In this section of the paper, I will briefly list and discuss some structural 
characteristics of groups that may affect levels of identification and, through it, intergroup 
bias. I will concentrate mostly on group size and relative group size, since the greatest 
amount of previous research on the impact of group size is available. Most of these concepts 
come from social network analyses which have, to my knowledge, not been systematically 
tested for their psychological impact. Social network analysis is primarily based on the 
frequency and quality of relationships between individuals (nodes) within a network. It 
describes quantifiable, manipulable qualities which occur in natural groups. Chief such 
characteristics are group size, relative group size, centrality (variance in 
interconnectedness between individuals) and symmetry (variance in the reciprocity of 
relationships between individuals), number of weak ties leading outside of the group 
(connections theorized to serve as bridges for new information; Granovetter, 1973), and 
clustering (variance in relative density within the network). These can vary not only 
between existing groups, but also between geographical regions, political systems, and over 
time, giving us a systematic structure-based framework of investigating differences in 
social identity and intergroup bias across cultures. They impact the reliability and 
predictability of ingroup members’ behaviour within the different types of interdependence 
they share, and thus, I would argue, levels of identity / identifying with the particular 
groups and, by extension, intergroup bias. 
The brief discussions of each of these structural characteristics of the situation 
follow the same basic module. First, I will explain what each structural characteristic 
means in social network theory, and how we can conceptualize it in social psychology. Next, 
I offer a few words as to why the structural characteristic would influence people’s goals, 
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preferences, and levels of identification. Finally, if possible, I give a prediction as to how the 
variability along each characteristic could impact behaviour. 
The goal of this section is to present avenues of research which have not been 
explored yet, and present a framework for thinking about them in a constructive way. It is 
difficult if all, or any, of the structural characteristics mentioned below would have any sort 
of impact. Thus, what follows should be taken more as an argument for an investigation, 
rather than an argument for any particular outcome. 
1. Experimental data shows that groups relatively smaller in size exhibit higher 
levels of identification and intergroup bias (e.g., Bettencourt & Dorr, 1998; Otten, 
Mummendey, & Blanz, 1996). Brewer's optimal distinctiveness theory (1991; Leonardelli & 
Brewer, 2001; Leonardelli, Pickett, & Brewer, 2010) explains this phenomenon by greater 
satisfaction with minority social identity which comes as a result of being more distinct 
than the majority, while still fulfilling the need for inclusiveness. The most intriguing 
finding of these experiments is that (relative) group size in and of itself impacts default 
levels of identification even in minimal groups. A structural explanation of this effect comes 
from the effectiveness of smaller, relative to larger groups, in managing the network of 
interdependent actors. Groups with fewer members are generally more densely 
interconnected (Kadushin, 2012) and thus are relatively easier to monitor. This means 
there are fewer opportunities for group members to cheat on each other or freeride on 
managing group resources with impunity. In other words, smaller groups have a more 
reliable way of solving dilemmas inherent in interpersonal and group-level 
interdependence. 
Consider a more complex situation of a minority group embedded in a majority, and 
sharing group resources with them. Now, we are talking about group-level interdependence 
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between groups of unequal size. Simunovic, Boehnke and Wilhelm (in preparation; Chapter 
3 of this thesis) conducted a test of how these two structural characteristics of the group 
(relative size) and the situation (group-level interdependence between groups) affect 
intergroup bias. They theorized that relative size will have an adverse effect on predicted 
contributions to the group resource for the majority, and will thus result in a priori negative 
bias. Participants, whose personal outcomes were independent of ingroup members’ choices 
or outcomes, were categorized into an embedded minority and majority, and asked to 
distribute funds to different targets who were engaged in a Public Goods game together. 
Unlike the predictions made by SIT, the asymmetry was completely reversed. Under these 
conditions minority members exhibited no significant bias while the opposite was true for 
the majority. The bias was explained by predicted contributions to the group resources, but 
not by the degree of identification12. 
2. High centrality, i.e. the variance in interconnectedness between individuals, 
usually means the emergence of a leader or a leadership organization. Highly centralized 
groups, as opposed to groups with little centrality, might, as a whole, have higher levels of 
identification, since centrality has been connected to heightened group coordination 
(Borgatti, 2003; 2006), as well as a reduction in error (Kadushin, 2012), and therefore 
predictability of outcomes within different interdependence structures. However, the 
impact of centrality must in some way interact with the impact of symmetry. Symmetry 
denotes the frequency of reciprocal relationships between individuals, i.e. the number of 
relationships in which the impact of one actor on another’s outcomes is equal in both 
directions. Lower symmetry means some sort of hierarchy and power imbalance is in place. 
                                                          
12Simunovic, Boehnke and Wilhelm (Chapter 3 of this thesis) only took one pre-manipulation 
measure of social identity. A more accurate test of whether structural characteristics as I have 
described them impact social identity, and moderate intergroup bias through it, would be to measure 
it before and after the experimental manipulations are introduced. 
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Groups with power pyramids are likely to exhibit differential levels of social identity based 
on whether the individuals are higher or lower on the pyramid. Given that the more power 
an individual has, the less dependent they are on the actions of other group members, I 
would predict their levels of social identification are lower than an individual positioned 
toward the middle of the pyramid. Thus, the powerful might be less likely to identify with 
the group which is dependent upon their decisions, and more likely to start identifying with 
a cluster of other powerful individuals, creating an elite. 
3. In his seminal paper, The Strength of Weak Ties, Granovetter (1973) suggested 
that these standalone connections  are “disproportionately likely to be bridges as compared 
to strong ties, which should be underrepresented in that role” (p.130), meaning that they 
serve as connectors between networks of individuals, rather than constant and reinforced 
ties. The larger number of weaker ties between groups should serve a dual purpose. On the 
one hand, it should lower social identification and intergroup bias for those individuals who 
have access to the weak tie “bridge”, as predicted by intergroup contact theories (Allport, 
1954, 1958). On the other hand, the existence of weak ties might be threatening to those 
individuals who do not have, or do not seek, such bridges, since weak ties imply 
permeability between groups. That means influx of new ideas, and a reduction in the 
boundedness of the group (as well as the exclusivity of the favouritism between its 
members). Thus, weak ties are a destabilizing agent, both in the context of interpersonal 
and socio-cultural interdependence. 
6. Clustering (relative density) is defined as the existence of individuals with greater 
number of internal connections compared to some equivalent, randomized part of the 
network (Newman, 2006a, 2006b; Newman & Girvan, 2004; Girvan & Newman, 2002). 
Such cliques within the group should reduce the predictive abilities of all ingroup members 
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and thus reduce total levels of social identification. The smaller clique will identify more 
strongly with their own, denser network and less with the superordinate group than 
majority which stands outside of the clique. This is demonstrated on real-life minorities 
who dissociate from the superordinate, majority identity (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 
1999; Steele, 1997), and prefer distinctiveness over assimilation (Lambert & Taylor, 1990; 
Verkyuten, 2005). On a group-level, groups with clustering might identify less strongly 
than groups without clustering, since it reduces the reliability of solving the dilemmas 
inherent in interpersonal interdependence. However, clustering can also be interpreted as a 
threat, thus increasing social identity, as well as intergroup bias.  
While intergroup bias is certainly a universally human tendency, its frequency and 
extent differs across societies (Fiske & Derham, 2016; Yamagishi, Jin & Miller, 1998). 
Structural characteristics of the network can vary not only between existing groups, but 
also between geographical regions, political systems and over time. This provides 
researchers with a systematic structure-based framework of investigating cultural 
variability in social identity formation, intergroup behaviours, and their interaction. For 
example, groups who have fostered greater density are likely to have less need of a 
signalling strategy, and would thus be less reliant on social identity as a cue or a proximal 
mechanism of intergroup bias. Groups with a higher number of weak ties, on the other 
hand, would have to develop and maintain a more salient relationship to their social 
identity, express it more often, and relate it more intimately to intergroup bias. The 
strength of the structuralist approach is that it allows researchers to consider realistic, 
quantifiable socio-ecological differences between particular groups situated in historical, 
geo-political, and environmental contexts, without reference to proposed cultural 
dimensions based on self-reported data, and confounded with personality traits. 
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Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper was to attempt a theoretical integration of the Social 
Identity, and Structural Goal/Expectation theories from an evolutionary perspective, and 
suggest further lines of research that proponents on both sides could consume and engage. I 
have presented an overview of current literature from the tradition of economic games 
between minimal groups, with the assumption that this method of data collection gets most 
closely at human default responses to certain situations and dilemmas. I argue that modern 
experiments on intergroup bias show social identity is neither unconditional nor fixed, but a 
dynamic proximal mechanism mediating between behaviour and the perception of a 
situation. We can explain its origins and functions through the evolutionary lens by 
positing it exists as a costly signal. Internalized identity cannot be developed and sustained 
without reference to a benefit of identifying. This benefit could have come from the fact 
prototypical group members (those who exhibit a high degree of social identity) are 
evaluated more positively than non-prototypical group members, and selected for more 
positive and fewer negative interactions with other interdependent individuals within the 
group. At the same time, prototypicality may come at a cost in between-group interactions 
when high identifiers experience limited mobility and can expect higher levels of 
discrimination, as well as deliberate targeting by outgroup members. Precisely this cost is 
what makes it a potent signal in the first place. 
I define four types of interdependence that exist within and between groups: 
interpersonal, group-level, intergroup, and socio-cultural interdependence. My contention is 
that if any of them are activated, we will observe an intergroup bias. This bias comes as a 
response to the dilemma which is entailed in each of the interdependence types. Dilemma 
situations typically require trust, or assurance that the interaction partner will cooperate. 
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Since no such trust or assurance typically exists between groups, high-cost dilemma-prone 
situations force humans to respond using error-management strategies, like ingroup 
favouritism, outgroup derogation, derogation of ingroup deviants. Furthermore, any 
structural characteristics which prevent or promote, the effectiveness of those strategies, 
will likewise prevent or promote levels of social identification as well as levels of intergroup 
bias itself. I propose some lines of research based on structural characteristics of the group 
taken from social network theory which could be used to falsify my reasoning. 
To summarize, social identity can be understood as a psychological adaptation for 
successful group living. By internalizing and externalizing one’s group membership, we 
create reliable cues for other ingroup members that we are trustworthy and predictable 
members of the group. These cues are particularly important in any dilemma-prone 
interaction, of which I have listed four: interpersonal, group-level, intergroup, and socio-
cultural interdependence. The reliability of our default strategies to solve these dilemma-
prone situations will be impacted by structural characteristics of the groups themselves. As 
such, they should serve as cues for the ebb and flow of social identity / identifying, and by 
extension, the emergence or suspension of intergroup bias.  
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Abstract 
In the face of modern migration trends, communities around the world are becoming more 
ethnically and culturally diverse. As a result, previously homogeneous societies have to 
manage their common resources alongside a minority group. We argue that the nature of 
such group-level interdependence may be a driver of intergroup conflict. Two experimental 
studies were conducted using student and general population samples respectively. 
Participants were divided into a minimal minority and a minimal majority, whereupon they 
were asked to distribute funds to ingroup and outgroup targets in a non-zero-sum allocation 
game. An additional manipulation was introduced to simulate group-level interdependence 
between the minority and majority. We predicted asymmetrical negative intergroup bias 
based on Structural Goal/Expectation Theory. More precisely, we predicted that the 
majority will exhibit a priori negative bias more severely and more frequently than the 
minority. Furthermore, we predicted the bias will be explained by expected contributions to 
the common good. Our results are supportive of these hypotheses. Even though the 
participants’ own outcomes were independent of either the common good or the actions of 
other allocators, majority allocators sought to maximize the difference between ingroup and 
outgroup. We discuss the findings from an evolutionary perspective, and suggest future 
research directions. 
 
Keywords: intergroup bias, minority, majority, structural Goal/Expectation theory 
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“Die Personenfreizügigkeit war dazu gedacht, europäischen Bürgerinnen und 
Bürgern zu erlauben, in der Schweiz arbeiten zu können. Heute aber steigt die Zahl jener 
Personen, die – von der Krise getrieben – in unser Land kommen, ohne dass sie über einen 
Arbeitsvertrag verfügen oder nach einer Kündigung einfach bleiben. Und das auf Kosten 
des Sozialstaats.” 
"The personal freedom of movement [policy] was made so that European citizens 
could work in Switzerland. Today however, the number of people who, driven by the crisis, 
come to our country without a work contract, or stay after the termination of the work 
contract, is increasing. And this at the expense of the welfare state." 
Guy Parmelin, Swiss People’s Party (SVP 
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Introduction 
Ethnic and cultural diversity within a society is hardly a new phenomenon, but one 
which has recently been put front and centre all over the world. Waves of mass migration 
into Southern and Western Europe are in part a reflection of a longer trend of transnational 
mobility (Castles, Haas & Miller, 2013; Katseli, Lucas, & Xenogiani, 2006; Sievers, 
Fassman, & Bommes, 2014) which establishes relatively stable minority communities 
embedded in the host country’s society. Germany, for example, has seen a fourteen-fold 
increase in populations with migration backgrounds between 1960 and 2003 (BAMF, 2006), 
with no signs of stopping (Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung, 2016). The same 
trend is evident in the rest of Europe (Beck-Gernsheim, 2007; Carballo, Divino, & Zeric, 
1998), the US (Lee & Bean, 2004; Perez & Hirschman, 2010; US Census Bureau 2009), in 
Australia and Southeast Asian Nations (Hugo, Wall, & Young, 2015), and elsewhere. Yet 
hostility towards these migrant communities has likewise been a staple finding (Farrell, 
1993; Fuchs, 1995; Kessler et al., 2010; Nelan, 1993; Pereira, Vala & Costa-Lopes, 2010; 
Takaki, 1989). To compound the issue, migration and increasing heterogeneity of society 
have become more salient in social discourse (Castles, Haas, & Miller, 2013), seemingly 
driving the entire political spectrum to the right (Davis, 2012). It would therefore seem that 
understanding the dynamics of intergroup relations, particularly the relations between 
minorities and majorities, is as relevant now as it ever was. 
In this paper, we address the specific case of minorities and majorities who share the 
management of a common resource, i.e. they are interdependent on the group-level. 
Common resource management has been a staple evolutionary conundrum that all human 
populations had to solve (Dunbar, 1999; Olson, 1965; Parks, Joireman, & Van Lange, 2013). 
Examples range from the management of clean water sources or pastures, to social 
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security, taxation, and voting. These can be described as n-person social dilemmas in which 
each individual has a vested interest to make use of the resource without contributing to its 
maintenance. However, should all the individuals fail to contribute, the common resource 
will collapse and all the co-dependents will be worse off. The negative effect of diversity on 
contributions to the common good (Alesina, Baqir & Easterly, 1999; Alesina & LaFerrara, 
2000; Miguel & Gugerty, 2005) and management of an existing resource (Khwaja, 2002; 
Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005) has been observed in real life, leading Hjort (2014) to 
conclude that at least part of the issue is due to discrimination between the different 
groups. However, to our knowledge, there have been no experimental studies seeking to test 
how consciousness of common resource management impacts intergroup bias between 
minorities and majorities. 
Interdependent Minority and Majority 
Previous research on intergroup relations between groups of unequal size has 
revealed that the minority is more likely to discriminate against the majority than the 
other way around (Bettencourt & Dorr, 1998; Bettencourt, Miller, & Hume, 1999; Brewer, 
Manzi, & Shaw, 1993; Hewstone et al, 2002; Leonardelli, 1998; Otten, Mummendey, & 
Blanz, 1996). Social Identity theory (SIT; Tajfel, Flament, Billig, & Bundy, 1971; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979) proposes identity as the proximal mechanism driving intergroup bias, 
pointing to the fact people are likely to identify more highly with membership in minority 
groups rather than majority groups (Abrams, 1994; Brewer & Weber, 1994; Luecken & 
Simon, 2005). Authors have associated this effect with the vulnerability felt when being in 
the minority (Ellemer, Doosje, van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1992; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1984, 
1991; Simon & Brown, 1987), and greater ingroup salience due to smaller size (Bettencourt, 
Charlton, Eubanks, Kernahan, & Fuller, 1999; Mullen, Brown & Smith, 1992). Brewer and 
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colleagues (Brewer, 1991, 1999; Leonardelli & Brewer, 2001) talk about the optimal 
tradeoff between inclusion and distinctiveness, proposing that minorities have a uniquely 
balanced identity which creates greater satisfaction. 
We present two criticisms of this body of research. Firstly, minorities and majorities 
have so far been operationalized as two independent groups. Our contention is that in real 
life situations, minorities and majorities are often embedded into a larger, functional group, 
i.e. they are interdependent. Apart from a superordinate identity, they share other aspects 
of groupness, including common resource management. 
Secondly, the findings based on relative identification as the mechanism of 
intergroup bias are structure insensitive. In other words, SIT makes no predictions on how 
identification levels will change when social situations vary in incentive structures, i.e. in 
rational motivations for behaviour. Thus, it is not applicable to the particular question of 
how minorities and majorities will behave in the face of knowledge they are managing a 
common resource together, since, as we will argue, this particular situation carries specific 
incentive structures. 
In order to tackle this issue, we will apply structural Goal/Expectation (sGET) 
theory. The core proposition of sGET is that human behaviour can be predicted at the 
intersection between one's own goals (preferences) and expectations (predictions). Using the 
Prisoner's Dilemma (PDG) game as an example, Kimmel and Pruitt (1977) argue that 
simultaneous mutual cooperation arises when both decision makers have a preference for 
cooperation, and predict that their interaction partner shares this preference. A PDG player 
who prefers cooperation, but does not predict it would be reciprocated, will defect, as will 
the player who prefers taking advantage of the interaction partner. Strong support for this 
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proposition comes from bountiful evidence that expectations of others' behaviour 
systematically predict individual choices across economic games (Alcock & Mansell, 1977; 
Croson, 2007; Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977; Fischbacher & Gaechter, 2006; Fox & 
Guyer, 1978; Marwell & Ames, 1979; Orbell & Dawes, 1991, 1993; Yamagishi& Sato, 1986; 
Yamagishi 1988a, 1988b). 
Yamagishi and colleagues (Yamagishi, 1986, 2007; Yamagishi & Sato, 1986; 
Yamagishi, Hashimoto, & Schug, 2008; see also Gaertner & Insko, 2000; Rabbie, Schot & 
Visser, 1989, for a similar argument) built on this basis by arguing that the preference and 
prediction formation happens within a social context which carries specific incentive 
structures. In other words, the individuals' preferences and predictions will reflect the 
structural characteristics of the situation. Applied to intergroup behaviour, Yamagishi and 
colleagues argue that activating group categorization leads to a naive belief among 
participants that their ingroup is more likely to reciprocate their behaviour than the 
outgroup in what they call Bounded Generalized Reciprocity (BGR; Yamagishi, Jin, & 
Kiyonari, 1999). Thus, participants prefer to treat their group members more positively 
because they predict that the ingroup members can and will reciprocate their actions more 
often than outgroup members. This belief is even imported into minimal group situations 
(Yamagishi, 2007). BGR successfully identified several mechanisms which, if removed, 
suspend intergroup bias, notably reputation concerns (Mifune, Hashimoto & Yamagishi, 
2009; Mifune & Yamagishi, 2015; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008) and expectations of future 
reciprocity (Karp, Jin, Yamagishi, & Shinotsuka, 1993; Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999). 
If the experimental setting explicitly eliminates the naive belief that groups operate as an 
interdependent unit, the participants cease treating it as a relevant category, and 
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intergroup bias disappears as a result (see Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2014 for meta-analysis 
and discussion on BGR v. SIT). 
In this way, structural characteristics impact both individual preferences and 
predictions in intergroup situations. When it comes to the particular case we have 
identified here—that of a minority and majority managing a common resource together—
the structural characteristics of the situation we may consider are, 1) relative group size, 2) 
the common resource management dilemma, and 3) the mismatch between group identity 
and interdependence structures. To show why these three are theoretically relevant within 
the sGET perspective, we must first consider the common resource dilemma. 
Asymmetrical Incentives and Group-Level Interdependence 
Kelley and Thibaut (1978; see also Kelley at al., 2003; Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003) 
defined interdependence as the impact others' choices have on the individual's own 
outcomes, and used it to explain the shift from immediate self-interest to more prosocial 
behaviour in dyadic and n-person social dilemmas. Yamagishi and colleagues speak about 
interpersonal interdependence as the driving force behind BGR, in which the network of 
indirect reciprocity and reputation provide incentive structures for self-interested 
individuals to act prosocially (or, rather, in their long-term self-interest). Here, we are 
discussing a different type of interdependence: namely, the impact other's choices have on 
the common good the individual shares with them. Such an interdependence is best 
showcased by common resource dilemmas, which include a public good dilemma and the 
common-pool dilemma as the two main models. In the former, the dilemma emerges as a 
result of how much the players contribute to the resource, while in the latter the dilemma 
emerges as a result of how much players detract from the resource. For simplicity sake, we 
will use the public good dilemma as our example. 
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Much like Pruitt and Kimmel's (1977) Prisoner's Dilemma example, the Public 
Goods game likewise provides a framework within which players examine their preferences 
and predictions: Shall I cooperate or freeride? Will others cooperate or freeride? We argue 
that when common resources are managed between two distinct groups of unequal size, the 
players' preferences and predictions will be moderated by their membership in either the 
smaller, or the bigger group. 
Let us engage a simple thought experiment (see Table 1). Two distinct groups of 
unequal size engage in a Public Goods Game. The minority numbers 2 individuals (A1 and 
A2), while the majority numbers 3 (B1, B2, and B3). All of the players have the same initial 
endowment of 3 tokens which they can contribute to the common pot. The contributions are 
multiplied by a factor of r = 2, and redistributed equally to all players. 
 If all members cooperate (All-C), the maximum size of the common pot is 15 tokens. 
Once doubled and redistributed, the players can make a maximum of 6 tokens each. 
Aggregated over group-identity lines, the minority A has received 12 tokens, while the 
majority B has received 18. 
As is the standard case for social dilemmas, however, each individual player has a 
vested interest to defect on the cost of the public good, and enjoy the benefits. Let us 
consider what happens on the group level if this defection occurs among the minority, or the 
majority. 
If one of the two minority members, A2, defects on their contribution to the public 
good, and invests only 1 token into the common pot, the total size of the pot is reduced. 
Each of the five players then gets 5.2 tokens. In the case of the minority defector, A2, this 
amounts to 7.2 tokens, when added to the 2 tokens they did not contribute. On the group-
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level the minority will, thus, have 12.4 tokens, while the majority will be left with 15.6: the 
minority will make a profit compared to the All-C situation. 
However, if the situation is reversed, and a majority member, B2, defects, the size of 
the pot is unchanged at 26 after duplication, but the distribution between minority and 
majority reveals a striking asymmetry on the group-level with the minority receiving 10.4, 
and the majority receiving 17.6, a reduction for both groups in comparison to All-C. 
Table 1.Thought experiment: Public Goods game played by a minority and a majority 
group. All participants are assumed to have an initial endowment of 3 tokens. 
 a) All-C Condition 
 Player A1 Player A2 Player B1 Player B2 Player B3 
Initial 
endowment 3 3 3 3 3 
Contributions 3 3 3 3 3 
Common pot 15 x r  = 30 
Individual-level 
benefit 6 6 6 6 6 
Group-level 
benefit 12 
18 
 b) Minority Defection Condition 
 Player A1 Player A2 Player B1 Player B2 Player B3 
Initial 
endowment 3 3 3 3 3 
Contributions 3 1 3 3 3 
Common pot 13 x r  = 26 
Individual-level 
benefit 5.2 5.2+2 = 7.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 
Group-level 
benefit 12.4 > 12 
15.6 
 c) Majority Defection Condition 
 Player A1 Player A2 Player B1 Player B2 Player B3 
Initial 
endowment 3 3 3 3 3 
Contributions 3 3 1 3 3 
Common pot 13 x r  = 26 
Individual-level 
benefit 5.2 5.2 5.2+2 = 7.2 5.2 5.2 
Group-level 
benefit 10.4 
17.6 < 18 
 
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
105 
 
We can describe these observations mathematically. The following is a simple 
expression of the total benefit of participating in the Public Goods game for all players: 
ܤ௜  =  ݎ × ෍ ܥ௜
௜ ୀ ஺௅௅
 
where B is the benefit attained from participating in the common resource dilemma, 
and C are the contributions to the common pot. 
In the case of All-C, where all contributions equal the maximum, we can express the 
formula as, 
ܤ௜  =  ݎ ×  ෍ ܧ௜
௜ ୀ ஺௅௅
 
Where E is the original endowment before contribution. 
What we propose is that the benefits from participating in the PGG and the un-
contributed resources (E - C) for the minority are always equal or higher than All-C, while 
the opposite is true for the majority. Expressed mathematically, 
for the minority: 
෍ ܤ௜
௜ ୀ ெூே
+  ෍ (ܧ௜ − ܥ௜)
௜ ୀ ெூே
 ≥  ݎ × ෍ ܧ௜
௜ ୀ ெூே
 
for the majority: 
෍ ܤ௜
௜ ୀ ெ஺௃
+ ෍ (ܧ௜ − ܥ௜)
௜ ୀ ெ஺௃
≤  ݎ ×  ෍ ܧ௜
௜ ୀ ெ஺௃
 
Theoretically, each minority member stands to gain by defecting on the private good 
and then redistributing the accumulated wealth amongst other minority members. Majority 
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members can defect, but cannot use those benefits to better the standing of other group 
members. Thus, on the individual level, minority members have a double incentive to 
defect, one of which is parochially prosocial, while majority members can only defect out of 
selfish reasons. 
A Priori Negative Bias: The Unpleasant Heuristic 
While these observations may be interesting, how do they make any predictions 
about intergroup bias? In the beginning of this paper, we have quoted Guy Parmelin, a 
member of the Swiss People’s Party which professes anti-minority and particularly anti-
immigrant sentiments (Summermatter, 2014). He was one of many to jump on the 
bandwagon of fear-mongering populism in the last few years, in promoting the idea that 
migrants to Western Europe are predominantly driven by selfish economic motives, and not 
by the wars fought in the Middle East, Northern and Central Africa. A major part of this 
argument resides on the idea that minority communities have come to take advantage of 
the welfare state, job opportunities and Western democracy, becoming so-called “parasites 
of the social state”. This is evident from the rich body of research on realistic and symbolic 
threat (Stephan & Stephan, 1996; Stephan et al., 2002) in which participants' ideas that 
the outgroup will steal jobs and cheat the state contribute to negative attitudes towards 
them. It seems that there may be at least a naïve understanding of the asymmetry we have 
described, and it drives not only anti-minority sentiment, but also negative attitudes about 
the welfare state itself (Gilens, 1996, 2000; Soroka, Harell, & Iyengar, 2013; Schram, Soss, 
Fording & Houser, 2009; c.f., Peffley, Hurwitz, & Sinderman, 1997; Sinderman, Carmines, 
Layman, & Carter, 1996). High immigration levels lower support for redistribution of 
wealth through welfare (Luttmer, 2001; Soroka, Banting, & Johnson, 2006). In a recent 
paper, Brown-Iannuzzi, Dotsch, Cooley and Payne (2017) demonstrated, for a sample of 
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predominantly European Americans (79.9%), that support for welfare was negatively 
impacted by the respondents’ assumption the welfare will benefit African Americans. In a 
more direct test, Soroka, Harrell and Iyengar (2013) ran a vignette study investigating the 
impact of ethnic identity on the willingness to extend social benefits to minority or majority 
targets. They used representative samples in the US, UK and Canada, and found that 
majority targets (ethnically European) were preferred over all the minority targets 
(ethnically African, East and Southeast Asian). 
If the majority believes the minority is likely to skim off the top of the common 
resource, this, in conjecture with salience of the mismatch between group membership and 
the interdependence structure, might lead to an attempt by the majority to pre-empt future 
freeriding by maximizing the difference between themselves and the minority. In other 
words, we would predict a priori negative bias, or outgroup hate. This prediction not only 
goes against predictions from SIT, but also against previous research into minority and 
majority dynamics which showed more intergroup bias committed on the part of the 
minority (e.g. Brewer, Manzi, & Shaw, 1993).  
Outgroup hate, is one of the more elusive phenomena in experimental intergroup 
research. Although it has often been methodologically and theoretically confounded with 
ingroup love (in older SIT research, in Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986; Turner et al., 1987; 
also, more recently in parochial altruism research, Choi & Bowles, 2007), the tide of opinion 
seems to be turning. In her seminal paper on intergroup bias, Brewer (1999) argued for an 
independence of the ingroup positive and outgroup negative motives. Yamagishi and 
Mifune (2008; 2015) have likewise repeatedly argued that most of the intergroup bias seen 
in laboratories are due to motivated positive ingroup bias, rather than outgroup aggression. 
Halevy, Bornstein, and Sagiv (2008) have provided further compelling evidence. Using a 
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modified Prisoner’s Dilemma game, they gave participants the option of contributing to the 
ingroup, or contributing to the ingroup while at the same time damaging the outgroup with 
no additional cost. Default behaviour of the participants seems to have been ingroup love 
without outgroup hate, even among all-male groups, which have been associated with more 
intergroup aggression (Van Vugt, 2009; Van Vugt, Cremer & Janssen, 2007; Yuki & 
Yokota, 2009). 
Most significant for the topic at hand is the work Leonardelli and Brewer (2001) 
have done on minority and majority discrimination. In Study 3 they found that, given the 
choice between ingroup profit maximization (ingroup love) and intergroup difference 
maximization (outgroup hate), minority participants chose both equally, while majority 
participants more often than not chose difference maximization. Based on Optimal 
Distinctiveness Theory (Brewer, 1991), they propose that majority members are more 
dissatisfied with the lack of distinctiveness of their group identity. They compensate by 
maximizing the difference between themselves and the more distinct minority group. 
While our predictions are in line with Leonardelli and Brewer's findings, they are 
based on different starting points. Our contention is that outgroup hate will be exhibited by 
the majority as a function of their predictions of minority contributions to the public good. 
Note that this logic holds even if the minority does not in fact take advantage of the 
common resource as described previously. It is enough that they are able to do so. We 
propose that the particular situation we have identified here fulfils two criteria set forth by 
evolutionary psychology, which candidate it for the creation of a default psychological and 
behavioural strategy. Namely, that common resource management between a minority and 
majority occurs regularly throughout human history (Caporael, 1994), and that it carries a 
high potential cost of failure (Hasleton & Buss, 2000). Systematic defection by the minority 
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will skew the group's resource distribution, creating a ruling elite. Alternatively, the group 
will fracture, and the common resource itself might collapse as a result. If this is true, we 
should see non-random behaviour even under minimal, experimental conditions where 
group memberships are meaningless categories, and the function of the group is suspended 
as Yamagishi and colleagues indicated. 
Study 1 
The purpose of Study 1 was to test whether introducing the consciousness of group-
level interdependence is enough to elicit a priori negative bias between a minimal minority 
and majority. Since the crux of our argument is that majorities have a vested interest to 
discriminate against the minority if they are involved in a common resource dilemma 
together, in Study 1 it was made clear to the participants that each group is involved in a 
Public Goods game (PGG). As discussed, other structural causes of intergroup bias were 
controlled for, so that the individual allocators were independent of the situations in which 
their group found itself. 
The participants could allocate up to EUR 5 to an ingroup minority member, an 
ingroup majority member, and a member of the independent outgroup. In this way, each 
participant performed three non-zero-sum allocations to different targets. They were not 
able to keep any of the money for themselves. The maximum a participant could allocate to 
any recipient was EUR 5. Anything under EUR 5 could be interpreted as a deliberate 
detraction from the best case scenario for that recipient. Conversely, any difference in 
allocations to targets can be interpreted as a deliberate difference maximization, i.e. an a 
priori negative bias. We predicted just such a bias would be committed more frequently and 
more strongly by majority members. 
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Since the participants were assigned to two experimental treatments (minority 
membership or majority membership) with three separate measurements (allocations to the 
minority, majority, and an independent outgroup) a G*power calculation for at medium 
effect size f = 0.25 indicated a necessary sample size of at least n  = 86 (Cohen, 1977). The 
calculation was performed using a G*power calculator (Faul & Erdfelder, 2004). 
Method 
Participants 
Eighty-seven participants (43 female) were recruited from Jacobs University, an 
international, English-language university situated in Bremen, Germany. The experiment 
was conducted on campus, in the Social and Behavioural Laboratory. The mean age of 
participants was 20. Their cultural, ethnic and national backgrounds were varied, with 
Germans as the largest national group (16.05%, n = 13). 
Procedure 
A maximum of ten participants were invited to the laboratory per session. They 
were welcomed by an assistant who was always female. Upon arriving, the participants 
selected an ID number, and were led to an individual computer booth. Once all the 
participants assembled in the laboratory, the assistant announced the beginning of the 
study. The participants were instructed to input their ID numbers and gender into the 
computer. 
Embedded minimal group categorizations 
The first portion of the experiment dealt with the group membership manipulation. 
Two separate tasks were used to create embedded minimal groups. The first task (Dot 
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Estimation Task13) categorized participants into a Blue and Green group (in reality, all the 
participants were categorized into the Green group). The feedback about group membership 
was displayed in a header for the remainder of the experiment. After the initial 
categorization, the participants were given a questionnaire (adapted from Grieve & Hogg, 
1999) to determine to what degree they identified with the Green and Blue groups. During 
this time, the assistant distributed green and blue flags, asking the participants to indicate 
their group membership before handing them the appropriate flag. No participant 
identified themselves as a member of the Blue group.  
Thereupon, the second task (Embedded Figures Task) categorized the participants 
into a minority (20%) and majority (80%). In the effort to avoid attaching particular values 
to being assigned to the majority or minority conditions, this division was expressed only 
numerically, as total percentage of the population. To prevent suspicion, it was implied that 
the division is based on accumulated previous research, instead of only the scores of people 
in this particular experimental session. 
The categorization was determined by the order of registering the ID number at the 
beginning of the study. Feedback about their minority-majority categorization was added to 
the group-identity header and displayed for the rest of the experiment. 
Individual outcome independence 
After the participants were categorized as minority and majority Green group 
members (MIN and MAJ conditions), the assistant presented a gambling task. Participants 
chose a folder which supposedly contained a code determining which task they will perform. 
Once the participants entered the code into the computer, they were given the instructions 
                                                          
13 For a more detailed discussion of the experimental procedure, please view Supplementary 
Materials. 
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to the rest of the experiment. First, they were told that they would be paid EUR 10 for their 
participation. Furthermore, they were assured that their own reward will be independent of 
their decisions in this task, as well as the decisions of all other participants. All of these 
manipulations served to break down the naive expectation of reciprocity from other group 
members (Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999), and separate the fate of the group from the 
fate of the individual making the decision. 
Group-level Interdependence Manipulation 
The participants were told they would supervise a “Public Exchange Task” in which 
all the remaining participants (hereafter referred to as recipients) in the session would be 
contributing to a common good for their own group (the Green or the Blue group). The 
“Public Exchange Task” was modelled on a traditional Public Goods Game (PGG; Ledyard, 
1995). The recipients supposedly had EUR 3 available for the Public Exchange task. They 
could choose to contribute any portion of that reward to the common pot in increments of 10 
cents. What they did not contribute, they would get to keep for themselves. Once all the 
contributions to the common pot were made, the amount would be doubled and 
redistributed equally to all recipients, irrespective of how much they had contributed. It 
was made clear to the participants that each recipient can profit from not contributing and 
keeping the full EUR 3 for themselves, but that the best outcome all around is if everybody 
contributed the full amount. 
In order to make sure the participants have read the instructions, they were given a 
short questionnaire to check their understanding, as well as two questions pertaining to 
their predictions about a) how much they would contribute to the common pot were they 
taking part in the PGG, and b) how much they think most members of the Green group 
would contribute to the common pot.  
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Having explained what the recipients would be doing, the participants were shown a 
decision-making interface which would load three randomly chosen recipients and list their 
group membership, minority or majority status, and ID number. The participants would 
then be given EUR 5 per recipient, and could give allocate any amount from EUR 0.1 to 
EUR 5 in increments of 10 cents. Whatever they choose to allocate to the recipients would 
supposedly be added to the recipients’ gains from the Public Exchange task. The 
participants were not able to keep any portion of the endowment for themselves.  
Each supervisor was presented with three dummy recipients: one from the Blue 
group, one from the Green group minority, and one from the Green group majority. After all 
three allocations were completed, the participants were asked their opinions of the 
recipients’ trustworthiness and prosociality (e.g. likelihood that they would “follow the 
rules, help group members, or sacrifice for the good of the group”). The participants were 
also asked for their predictions on how much each particular recipient contributed in the 
PGG, and how much they might have contribute to the supervisor had the roles been 
reversed. After this, they were paid, and individually led out of the laboratory. 
Analysis 
The analysis of results will go through several stages. First, the difference in mean 
allocations to minority and majority targets will be tested for statistical significance using a 
simple T test. Next, a general linear model will test for impact of between-group variables 
(minority or majority membership, and sex, as a control variable) upon allocations to 
minority and majority targets. This is the basic test of our hypothesis that the allocator’s 
group membership will impact allocations to different targets. Next, in a related test, we 
will calculate the bias score – the difference in allocations to the target most similar to the 
allocator and the target less similar. The size of the bias will be compared to 0 in a test of 
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its absolute significance. Thereafter the size of the bias will be related to predictions of 
different target’s contributions to the common resource, and to levels of identification with 
the group whose membership the participant was assigned. A regression and partial 
correlation analyses will be used to compare the explanatory power of each of these 
variables. 
Results 
 First, we tested whether absolute allocation amounts differed over targets. Overall, 
minority targets received an average of M(87) = 3.24 (SD = 1.67), while majority targets 
received M(87) = 3.48 (SD = 1.48). The difference did not reach significance (t(86) = 1.65, p 
= .10). Female participants were more generous, allocating more to both majority (M = 3.81, 
SD = 1.35), and minority (M = 3.41, SD = 1.67) than male participants (to majority: M = 
3.15, SD = 1.54; to minority M = 3.08, SD = 1.66). This difference reached significance only 
for the majority targets (t(85) = 2.14, p = .04). 
Our design included one between-group variable (membership in the minimal 
minority or majority, MMP) and one within-group variable (allocations to minority or 
majority targets). Thus we performed a repeated measures general linear model analysis 
and found the within subject effect of MMP on allocations to minority and majority (F(1, 83)  
= 19.6, p < .001; (Partial) ?2 = .19). We found no within-subject effect of sex (F(1, 83) = 2.57, 
n.s.), or an interaction between MMP and gender (F(1, 83) = .001, n.s.).We found no main 
effect of MMP (F(1, 83) = 1.09, n.s.), and a marginally significant effect of gender (F(1,83) = 
3.02, p = .09). A pairwise comparison of target identity (minority or majority) and 
participants’ identity (MMP) shows the significant difference occurs in allocations to 
majority targets (mean difference = 0.26, p = .48), but not in allocations to minority targets 
(mean difference = -0.90, p < .01). 
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A bias score was calculated by subtracting allocation to the outgroup from allocation 
to the ingroup. Both minority and majority allocators exhibited a bias, but it was smaller in 
the case of minority (M(43) = 0.33, SD = 1.09) rather than majority allocators (M(44) = 0.79, 
SD = 1.32). The difference was marginally significant (t(85) = -1.76, p = .08). The bias was 
significantly different from zero for the majority (t(43) = 3.95, p ? .001), and approached 
significance for the minority (t(42) = 1.98, p = .054). 
We next turn to the question of predictions of others' average contributions in the 
PGG, as well as reports of what the participants themselves would contribute to the 
common pool. Interestingly, the majority expected slightly higher levels of contribution to 
the PGG (M(44) = 1.89, SD = 0.86) than the minority (M(43) = 1.73, SD = 1.10). At the same 
time, minority members reported higher intended contributions to the common pot in the 
PGG (M(43) = 2.23, SD = 1.00) than the majority (M(44) = 2.08, SD = 0.92). However, 
neither difference achieved significance in a t-test, nor did either contribute to an 
explanation of the bias. 
We also collected predictions of average contributions in the PGG for the minority 
and majority targets separately. Majority participants assumed that majority members will 
contribute significantly more than the minority members (for majority, M(42) = 2.17, SD = 
0.80; for minority, M(38) = 1.88, SD = 0.86; t(41) = -2.32, p = .03). The opposite was the case 
for minority participants (for minority, M(38) = 2.06, SD = 0.93; for majority, M(38) = 1.74, 
SD = 1.03; t(37) = 2.41, p = .02). However, a regression analysis in which expected minority 
and majority contributions predict bias, showed that the model is significant only for 
majority participants, and only for expected minority contributions (see Table 2). 
These results were replicated using partial correlation coefficients. Controlling for 
predicted majority contributions to the public good, minority contributions were 
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nevertheless significantly and negatively correlated to bias (r = -.35, p = 0.03) shown by 
majority members. In the case of minority members, majority contributions were also 
negatively correlated to bias after controlling for predicted contributions to the public good. 
However, this correlation was not significant (r = -.24, p = 0.16). 
Table 2. Regression analysis coefficients for expected minority and majority 
contributions predicting intergroup bias for minority or majority members. 
Majority members 
 B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 1.598 .608  2.628 .012 
Majority 
contributions 
.195 .292 .116 .667 .509 
Minority 
contributions 
-.638 .274 -.406 -2.328 .025 
Minority members 
 B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) .044 .428  .103 .918 
Majority 
contributions 
-.320 .224 -.306 -1.428 .162 
Minority 
contributions 
.367 .247 .319 1.488 .146 
 
Next, we tested the level of identification with the ingroup, i.e. the green group, as 
opposed to the outgroup. On average, participants identified more with the ingroup (Green 
group: M(85) = 4.59, SD = 1.13) than the outgroup (Blue group: M(85) = 4.3, SD = 1.3). The 
difference between these two was significant (t(84) = 2.66, p = .009) indicating our minimal 
group manipulation has been successful. There was no significant difference between the 
level of identification of the minority (M(42) = 4.56, SD = 1.12), and the majority members 
(M(43) = 4.61, SD  = 1.15; t(83) = -0.22, p = 0.83). While this may seem inconsistent with 
previous research (e.g., Leonardelli & Brewer, 2001), which found a greater degree of self-
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identification with minority rather than majority groups, our measure of identification 
concerned the superordinate, Green group, rather than the minority or majority 
membership. Furthermore, the identification with the superordinate group was estimated 
before participants were given feedback about membership in the minority or majority, 
meaning that group size could not have impacted the level of identification. 
In addition, level of identification did not significantly correlate with the size of the 
bias (for minority members: r = 0.07, p = 0.67; for majority members, r = -0.05, p = 0.74) or 
predictions of either ingroup (for minority members: r = -0.20, p = 0.21; for majority 
members, r = -0.19, p = 0.22) or outgroup (for minority members: r = -0.20, p = 0.19; for 
majority members, r = -0.09, p = 0.53) contributions to the public good 
Discussion 
 We predicted that, if a minority and majority are interdependent on group resources 
which are managed in a social dilemma, majority will exhibit more severe outgroup 
negative bias. The bias exhibited by minority members, on the other hand, will be smaller 
and rarer. Concordant with our predictions, majority members exhibited negative outgroup 
bias more frequently and more severely than minority members. In fact, minority members 
made no significant distinction between allocations to ingroup and outgroup members, 
unlike the predictions made by SIT or BGR. Importantly, the size of the bias was explained 
by predicted contributions to the common pot in the case of the majority, justifying our 
logic. However, the predictions of contributions to the common pot in this study were taken 
a posteriori, opening the possibility that participants merely justified their behaviour in the 
allocation game after the fact. Furthermore, allocations to single targets within our 
experimental paradigm may have appeared as an artefact to participants, or an invitation 
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to be unjust. After all, why would one person from each of the three different groups be 
singled out for additional reward? What about the other group members? 
 In the face of a crisis of replication in social sciences (Schooler, 2014), we are very 
careful to make more claims based on a single test. Therefore, we conducted another study 
which studied a different sample in a different experimental setting, and also attempted to 
address some of the limitations from Study 1. 
Study 2 
The purpose of Study 2 was to address the short-comings of Study 1, particularly the 
fact that a student sample was studied, and that the extent of deception was fairly high. 
For this reason, an online platform (Prolific Academic; see Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, & 
Acquisti, 2017, for review of Prolific's sample, response rate, and data quality) was used to 
recruit an online sample, and the experimental design was streamlined.  
The participants would once more be allocating to minority and majority members of 
the same group who would be playing the PGG together. In an effort to make the results 
more robust, each participants allocated money to three minority and three majority 
targets. 
As in Study 2, the main behavioural measure was an independent allocation game in 
which the participants would be able to allocate up to GBP 3 to each recipient. Because of 
the smaller amount available for allocation and the fact the study was taking place online, 
we anticipated small effect sizes (f = 0.15). We found that the necessary sample size of at 
least n = 98 (Cohen, 1977). The calculation was performed using a G*power calculator (Faul 
& Erdfelder, 2004). 
Method 
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Participants 
Ninety seven participants (48 female) were recruited via Academic Prolific, an online 
platform which recruits participants from the general population for participation in online 
studies. Academic Prolific has a database of over 50,000 potential participants, most of 
whom have been recruited during college years. This means that the sample has a higher 
education level than the general population. Ages in the sample ranged from 16 to 64, with 
the average being 29. 
Procedure 
Participants were invited to the study via their Academic Prolific accounts. The link 
to the study was sent to them automatically. Most participants pre-registered for the study 
and completed it within the next two or three days, so that the entire data-collection of the 
study was done within a week. 
After they input their ID and gender, participants were given the Dot Estimation 
task. Unlike in Study 1, in Study 2 this single task was used to split them into majority and 
minority members of the Green group. The Blue group was once again merely implied. 
Thus, in the minority condition, the participants would be told that they “are a member of 
the GREEN group. [Their] scores in the perception task have been similar to 20% of other 
participants who have been members of the GREEN group.” This header was permanently 
displayed at the top of the page. After the minimal group categorization, the participants’ 
level of identification with the Green and Blue groups was ascertained. 
Behavioural Measure 
The participants were told they were going to act as supervisors of a parallel study 
in which six international students (hereafter referred to as recipients) are taking part in a 
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public exchange task hosted by Jacobs University. For their efforts, the participants would 
receive GBP 7.514. This amount was fixed and neither the experimenters’, other 
participants’, nor the participant’s own actions would impact it.  
With this in mind, the participants were presented with the Public Exchange task 
that the recipients would supposedly be performing15. They were told that the recipients 
were given GBP 2, and asked to decide how much of that money to donate to a common pot. 
The contributions to the common pot would be doubled and redistributed equally among the 
six Green group members. The participants were given a concise understanding check at 
the end of the instructions, and were asked their predictions about (a) how much they 
would contribute to the common pot were they taking part in the public exchange task, and 
(b) how much most people would contribute to the common pot. 
Then, the participants were familiarized with the decision-making interface and 
their participants task. Apart from allocating money to each of the six targets, the 
participants were also instructed to predict each target's contributions to the PGG. As in 
Study 1, they were told to allocate at least 10 pence to each participant. The maximum they 
could give to each participant was GBP 3. They could keep none of the money for 
themselves. 
After the participants made their decisions, they were given a post-experimental 
questionnaire dealing with their understanding of the task, the conceptualization of 
                                                          
14GBP 7.5 is not equivalent to the EUR 10 our student participants received in Study 1. The currency 
and amount were dictated by Academic Prolific. 
15 Since the first author is planning to perform the PGG under just the conditions described, the 
allocations made by the participants will eventually be matched to real participants. Thus, no 
deception was used in this design, apart from the claim that the Dot Estimation task was indicative 
of psychological tendencies. 
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intergroup relationships and the tendency to identify with social groups. They were then 
paid for their participation and individually led out of the laboratory. 
Analysis 
Once again, the analysis of results will go through several stages, beginning with a 
test of the significance of mean allocations to minority and majority targets, and moving on 
to a general linear model testing our central hypothesis. Next, we will examine the size of 
the bias, relating it to predictions of different target’s behaviour in the Public Goods game. 
The size of the bias for minority as opposed to majority members will be compared to 0 in a 
T test to ascertain whether the majority’s or minority’s bias crossed the threshold of 
significance Finally, the size of the bias will be related to predictions of contributions to the 
common resource, and to levels of identification using regression and partial correlation 
analyses. 
Results 
On average, minority targets received M(97) = 1.71(SD = 0.92), whereas majority 
targets received M(97) = 1.83 (SD = 0.94) GBP. The difference was marginally significant 
(t(96) = -1.9, p = .06). Once again, women were overall more generous to both minority 
(M(48) = 1.76, SD = 0.92) and majority targets (M(48) = 1.9, SD = 0.88) than men (to 
minority, M(49) = 1.66, SD = 0.92; to majority, M(49) = 1.75, SD = 1). Unlike in Study 1, the 
difference did not reach significance for either minority or majority targets. 
The within subject effect of MMP on allocations to minority and majority was 
replicated (F(1, 93) = 7.81, p = .006; ?2= .09) with marginal significance. We found no effect 
of gender (F(1,93) = 0.24, p = 0.62), or an interaction between MMP and sex (F(1,93) = 0.14, 
p = 0.71).We found no significant main effects of MMP (F(1,93) = 2.22, p = 0.14), or sex 
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(F(1,93) = 0.44, p = 0.51). A pairwise comparison of allocations to minority or majority 
targets, by minority or majority participants reveals a significant difference in allocations 
to the minority (mean difference = 0.44, p = 0.02), but not the majority (mean difference = 
0.44, p = 0.02). This is a reverse from what we had found in Study 1.  
Once again, both minority and majority allocators exhibited a bias. It was smaller in 
the case of the minority (M(44) = 0.07, SD = 0.59) than the majority (M(53) = 0.27), SD = 
0.58), a difference which was marginally significant (t(95) = -1.7, p = .09). In a replication of 
our previous results, the size of the bias was significantly larger than 0 in the case of 
majority allocators (t(52) = 3.39, p = .001), but not in the case of minority allocators (t(43) = 
0.73, p = 0.46). 
The majority expected higher overall levels of contribution in the PGG (M(53) = 1.21, 
SD = 0.63) and reported higher intended contributions to the common pot (M(53) = 1.38, SD 
= 0.63) than the minority (expected contributions, M(44) = 1.17, SD = 0.57; intended 
contributions, M(44) = 1.29, SD = 0.64). Neither difference achieved significance, nor 
contributed significantly to an explanation of the bias. 
Next, we turn our attention to the target-specific predictions of contributions to the 
PGG. Once again, both minority and majority members exhibited ingroup positive bias in 
their predictions. Minority participants predicted other minority members would contribute 
an average of M(44) = 1.28, SD = 0.59, whereas majority members would contribute an 
average of M(44) = 1.22, SD = 0.59). The difference did not reach significance (t(43) = 1.13, p 
= 0.26). However, majority participants predicted other majority members would contribute 
M(53) = 1.31, SD = 0.58, and minority members M(53) = 1.06, SD = 0.53, a difference which 
was once again significant (t(52) = -4.11, p?.001). In a regression analysis model where the 
dependent variable, bias, is explained by predictions of minority and majority contributions 
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to the PGG, the model is significant for the majority participants (F(2) = 11.55, p < .001, 
Adjusted R2 = .56). However, the same was true for the minority participants as well (F(2) = 
4.83, p = 0.01, Adjusted R2 = .44). Unlike in Study 1, both predictions of minority and 
majority contributions were significant in explaining the bias. 
We performed a partial correlation analysis to get a clearer picture of these 
determinants of bias. If we control for predicted majority contributions, predicted minority 
contributions were nevertheless significantly and negatively correlated to levels of bias (r = 
-0.50, p < .001) for majority members. Likewise, in the case of minority members, predicted 
majority contributions correlated significantly and negatively with expressions of bias (r = -
0.40, p < .01), even when we control for predicted minority contributions. 
Identification with the Green group was significantly higher than identification with 
the Blue group for minority (average difference  = 0.85, SD = 1.48; t(43) = 3.79, p ?.001), 
and majority members (average difference  = 1.04, SD = 1.9; t(52) = 3.91, p ? .001). Thus, we 
may conclude that our minimal group manipulation was successful. Once again, levels of 
identification were not significantly correlated to levels of exhibited bias either for majority 
(r = -0.09, p = 0.53) or minority participants (r = -0.12, p = 0.42). Likewise, levels of 
identification were not significantly correlated to predictions of contributions to public 
goods either for majority (majority targets: r = -0.12, p = 0.38; minority targets: r = -0.04, p 
= 0.78), or minority participants (majority targets: r = 0.08, p = 0.59; minority targets: r = 
0.13, p = 0.42).Interestingly, the participants’ own intended contributions to the public good 
were negatively correlated with identification levels. For minority members, this did not 
reach significance (r = -0.08, p = 0.59). However, for majority members, the correlation was 
significant (r = -0.37, p = 0.03), meaning the more majority members identified with the 
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superordinate group, the less willing they were to contribute to the management of group 
resource. 
Finally, we addressed the issue of relative identification with the superordinate 
identity. Since feedback about relative group size was presented alongside the membership 
in the superordinate ingroup (Green group), we could capture any difference in the 
subsequent levels of identification expressed by minority and majority participants. We 
found that majority participants expressed a significantly higher level of identification with 
the superordinate Green group (M(53) = 6.18, SD = 1.79) than the minority (M(44) = 5.29, 
SD = 1.61; t(95) = -2.53, p = .01). Interestingly, the same was true for identification with the 
Blue outgroup, with the difference achieving marginal significance (for majority, M(53) = 
5.14, SD = 1.97; for minority, M(44) = 4.45, SD = 1.54; t(95) = -1.90, p = 0.06). Again, since 
we did not record levels of identification with the minority or majority respectively, these 
results do not contradict previous research - instead, they provide complementary evidence 
which needs to be discussed. 
Discussion 
In our second study, the majority once again exhibited a priori negative bias more 
frequently and more severely than the minority, in line with our predictions and in 
opposition to predictions made by SIT or BGR. In fact, minority participants did not 
significantly differentiate between ingroup and outgroup members neither in the 
allocations, nor in their predictions of targets’ contributions to the common pot. However, 
this time the size of the bias was explained by predicted contributions of the ingroup and 
outgroup in the case of both the minority and the majority. This leads us to believe that the 
a priori negative bias we have observed here is possibly framed as a preventive measure to 
discourage defection, in which any player, regardless of their minority or majority 
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
125 
 
membership, with long-term self-interest might engage. The fact that predicted 
contributions to the PGG explain the bias better in the majority case, may reflect the 
majority assumption of more minority defection than the other way around. 
At the same time, we found no indication that the minority truly intends to defect on 
the contributions to the PGG in relation to the majority. While this seems to contradict our 
premises at first glance, this is not so. As we have already argued, it is enough for the 
majority to believe that minority members will take advantage of the common resource. 
This belief may never be true, or it may only be true under some conditions. For example, 
we may argue that minorities had no incentive to defect on the common resource 
management dilemma because their network of exchange (which we may expect to be 
relatively denser, smaller and more bounded than that of the majority) is not in operation. 
Thus, if a default strategy supporting minority freeriding exists, we may expect it only 
when minority members stand to gain through generalized reciprocity, or reputation. 
Additionally, for the minority, a repeated PGG should present a greater temptation to 
defect than a one-shot PGG, such as we had used in this experiment. Likewise, a repeated 
PGG should pose an even greater threat to the majority, causing a more severe bias. 
The differential level of identification with the superordinate identity is an 
interesting echo of real-life findings in which minority members dissociate from the larger 
group (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Steele, 1997) and endorse multiculturalism 
at the expense of assimilation (Lambert & Taylor, 1990; Verkuyten, 2005). For such an 
observation to be made in minimal group situations may indicate fundamentally held 
beliefs about “minority” and “majority” as categories. As part of a pretest for Study 1 (N = 
19; see Supplementary Materials for details), we collected data on the perception of 
minority and majority identities. In it, participants assigned a minority membership 
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
126 
 
expressed feelings of confidence and entitlement, but also unease. Participants assigned the 
majority membership expressed positive feelings of safety and confidence, but also reported 
that their group membership lacked distinctiveness (“lost in the crowd”). These findings are 
in line with Brewer’s Optimal Distinctiveness Theory (1991), which postulates a conflict 
between inclusiveness and distinctiveness of different identities. While satisfied with the 
level of visibility, minority members did not identify as strongly with the superordinate 
identity, and reported unease. Conversely, majority membership satisfied the need for 
inclusion, but, in comparison to the minority, did not achieve a satisfying level of 
distinctiveness. 
General Discussion 
The current study shows that activating the consciousness of common resource 
dilemmas may cause outgroup hate, here defined as deliberate difference maximization, 
directed at the salient minority. The degree of this hate is at least partially due to the 
assumption majority members have that minorities will freeride on the common good. If we 
consider the findings from previous research, which have recorded greater levels of 
intergroup bias from the side of the minority, we may give a different slant to our results. 
While consciousness of the common resource dilemma may initiate outgroup negative bias 
from the majority, it can be said to suspend the bias in the case of the minority. This 
finding, if valid, carries an interesting implication for peace-making efforts and the impact 
of media representations of conflict, particularly when it comes to cooperation and 
integration of heterogeneous communities—the effect of stressing mutual interdependence 
may have a positive effect on minority members’ relationship to the majority, but a negative 
one on majority members’ relationship to the minority. 
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Additionally, our findings challenge the truism that superordinate goals mean a 
greater degree of intergroup cooperation (Sheriff, 1966). Part of the reason for that may be 
that, to the best of our knowledge, previous research on the impact of superordinate goals 
on intergroup bias have used restricted cooperative tasks which did not engender a salient 
enough social dilemma, and thus did not rely on trust. Rather, our results support Brewer’s 
(1999) proposal that the lack of depersonalized mutual trust which usually exists within 
ingroups is put into stark contrast in cooperative tasks between groups, breeding more 
hostility instead of peace. This research begs the question if the group-level 
interdependence is not confounded by relative group size, i.e. when the social dilemma is 
being played by two groups of equal size, how will that impact intergroup bias? It seems to 
us more than a throw away question. Ostensibly, the psychological impact group-level 
interdependence has on human decision making may have an underpinning in evolutionary 
and cultural history, going back at least to Pleistocene communities. 
 Finally, we will address the limitations of the study. Firstly, we find that the 
majority of participants in both Study 1 and Study 2 often did not allocate the full amount 
(EUR 5 or GBP 3, respectively) to ingroup targets. In Study 1, we assumed this was the 
result of the participants being unwilling to allocate the full amount to recipients since they 
would then make more money than the participant (EUR 5 + EUR 6, in case of All-C, for 
the recipients v. EUR 10 for the participants). Thus, in Study 2, we reduced the initial 
endowment for the recipients to GBP 2, and the maximum allocation to GBP 3. This means 
that in the case of All-C, recipients could make a maximum of GBP 7, while the supervisors 
would be paid GBP 7.5 Nevertheless, most participants did not allocate the full amount, not 
even to ingroup members (Study 1, 72%; Study 2, 77.3%). We have no explanation for this 
finding. 
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 A possible criticism of our design is the fact that we had explicitly named the 
participants “supervisor”, which puts them in a position of relative power to the 
“recipients”. According to contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954, 1958), status differentiation 
prevents reduction in intergroup hostility, and may in fact promote it (Gaertner & Dovidio, 
2005; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1991). While we agree that this could have played a role in the 
level of discrimination, it cannot account for the asymmetry we have found. In addition, 
Allport’s caveat that differential status may promote rather than prevent intergroup bias 
was framed as a differential status of the groups, not of individual decision-makers. 
 In conclusion, our research suggests that the consciousness of common resource 
dilemmas should be considered as a contributor to intergroup bias. Importantly, the impact 
it has on behaviours towards the outgroup is moderated by relative group size in such a 
way that it promotes outgroup hate for the majority, but reduced it in the case of the 
minority. Several questions have remained unanswered, and are left for future research to 
tackle. Obviously, we are interested in the external validity of our findings. If true, then 
minorities should express more positive attitudes towards the majority if they are aware 
and invested in the management of common resources. Conversely, majority members 
would express more negative attitudes if they are aware and invested in common resource 
management. 
 This research also begs the fundamental question of whether the minorities are 
more likely to take advantage of the common resource, and under which conditions would 
this be true, if ever. We hypothesize that, if minority defection is indeed more frequent, it 
would only be so given (a) no institutionalized method of monitoring, (b) no institutionalized 
method of punishment (unless it is within rather than between groups), and (c) 
interpersonal interdependence is in place in some fashion. 
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Abstract 
In this exploratory work, I begin the investigation of intergroup bias in the face of a core 
proposed characteristic of human groups – the common resource management dilemma. In 
two studies using a student, and then a non-student sample (N=87 and N=153, 
respectively), I find indications that consciousness of this ongoing dilemma may cause 
“outgroup hate”. Even those individuals who had no link to the fate of their group, 
purposefully maximized the difference between ingroup and outgroup members in a form of 
a priori negative bias. As a next step, I use the same experimental paradigm to test the 
impact of common resource management as a superordinate goal shared between groups, 
on intergroup bias. Unlike previous research suggests, common resource management 
between groups (a type of a superordinate goal) does not seem to promote peaceable 
intergroup relations, but likewise promoted outgroup hate. While the scope of my 
conclusions is limited by a failure to reproduce results from previous literature in the 
control condition (Study 2), the results indicate activating the consciousness of group-level 
interdependence leads to outgroup hate irrespective of whether the interdependence 
includes or excludes the outgroup. I discuss these findings from an evolutionary 
perspective. 
 
 
Keywords: Structural Goal/Expectation theory, outgroup hate, intergroup bias, public goods 
game 
 
  
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
138 
 
Introduction 
 Intergroup behaviour continues to pose a theoretical as well as a real-life 
conundrum to social science generally and psychology in particular. Research has made it 
painfully obvious that intergroup behaviours are marked by avoidance, discrimination, and 
even aggression directed at the outgroup (Brewer, 1979, 1999; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 
2002; LeVine & Campbell, 1971; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992; Turner, 1981; Wit & 
Wilke, 1992). This phenomenon is pervasive across human societies (Brewer &Campbell, 
1976; Falk, Heine, & Takemura, 2014; Yamagishi, Hashimoto, & Schug, 2008), levels of 
magnification (Atran, 2003; Van Vugt, 2009), as well as time (Bowles, 2009; Keeley, 1996; 
Pinker, 2011) and even species (Goodall, 1986; Mahajan et al., 2011; Manson & Wrangham, 
1991; Wrangham & Peterson, 1996). In the face of such findings, we are justified in 
assuming intergroup behaviour, including outgroup negativity, has a basis in evolutionary 
psychology (Choi & Bowles, 2007; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1974; Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Neuberg, 
Smith & Asher, 2000; Schaller & Neuberg, 2008; Schaller, Park & Faulkner, 2003; 
Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Van Vugt & Park, 2010), and thus in the structural characteristics 
of human societies and interactions. 
 Initially, this (mis)treatment of outgroups seemed inextricably tied to ingroup 
positivity. Indeed, in one of the first modern works on intergroup bias (referred to as 
ethnocentrism), Sumner (1906) proposed that the two were one and the same. Thus, 
positive emotions associated with members of one’s own group are proportional to negative 
emotions associated with outgroup members. He further argued that without such 
pressures as resource scarcity and intergroup competition, neither ingroup love nor 
outgroup hate could be activated. While his socio-functional approach to intergroup 
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behaviour was not yet infused with evolutionary psychological thinking, the argument was 
clear – we cannot effectively love our own without hating the other.  
 It is, at this stage, impossible to say whether the period during which our typically 
human psychological mechanisms for dealing with intergroup situations developed was 
marked by frequent adversity and organized intergroup conflict (the Hobbesian state of 
“warre”; Keeley, 1996; Pinker, 2011), or by more isolated, less dense bands of relatively 
peaceful groups who had little contact with each other (a more refined model of the 
Rousseauite “noble savage”; Ferguson, 1997). However, what is increasingly clear is that, 
while some costly forms of ingroup-directed altruism may have developed in the face of 
intergroup conflict (Choi & Bowles, 2007; Bowles, 2009), the psychological mechanisms 
supporting ingroup love are separate from outgroup hate. 
 For all its supposed prevalence in real life, outgroup hate, here defined as deliberate 
difference maximization between ingroup and outgroup outcomes in a way which does not 
absolutely benefit the ingroup, has been notoriously difficult to elicit in the laboratory. For 
example, if the paradigm of the interaction between groups is not framed as a zero-sum 
game, meaning that participants are able to favour the ingroup without directly damaging 
the outgroup, the negative bias disappears (Balliet, Wu, & DeDreu, 2014). Participants 
asked to distribute a negative (instead of the more commonly used positive) resource, have 
likewise shown no significant intergroup bias (Mummendey et al., 1992). Finally, given the 
choice between contributing to the ingroup, or contributing to the ingroup while at the same 
time damaging the outgroup (i.e. maximizing the difference), participants overwhelmingly 
opted for the former (Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv, 2008; Weisel & Böhm, 2015).  
In 1999, Brewer argued that ingroup positivity and outgroup negativity should be 
conceptually separated. She suggested a mechanism she called “bounded social cooperation” 
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(Brewer, 1999, p.434) to explain preferential treatment of ingroups without the need for a 
hostile outgroup as a categorical referent or potential competition over resources. Brewer 
summarizes her argument in three propositions: 
1. Humans are group-living creatures for whom positive interaction with 
conspecifics is a fundamental survival strategy. In other words, we are, as a species, 
characterized by "obligatory interdependence" (Brewer, 1991; Brewer & Caporael, 2006; 
Caporael, 1997). Again, this is not a finding limited to the Homo but other primate species 
as well (Dunbar, 1992). 
2. Altruism (or, at least, preferences for mutually beneficial outcomes) must be 
contingent on the probability that interaction partners will be likewise predisposed to 
cooperation. Accurately predicting the likelihood of an interaction partner cooperating 
comes under powerful selective pressures, springing into life adaptations such as cheater 
detection (Cosmides, 1989), or Machiavellian intelligence (Byrne, 1995). At the same time, 
it is clear that conditional cooperation can benefit the individual more so than 
unconditional cooperation, depending on the situation. Indeed, experiments using economic 
games have found a consistent and strong positive correlation between player’s actions and 
their predictions of other’s actions (Kollock, 1988; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; Yamagishi, 1986; 
Yamagishi & Kiyonari, 2000; Yamagishi & Sato, 1986). While there is criticism that this 
finding is the result of players’ projecting their own behaviour onto others (Dawes, 1980), 
evidence from sequential (rather than simultaneous) Prisoner’s Dilemma games show that 
people will amend their behaviour to respond to the first player’s choices (Hayashi, Ostrom, 
Walker, & Yamagishi, 1998; Watabe, Terai, Hayashi, & Yamagishi, 1996). Thus, others’ 
intent to cooperate is more often than not met with cooperation, while their defection is met 
likewise with defection. 
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3. Groups can be defined as bounded communities of mutual trust and obligation 
that delimit obligatory structural interdependence between group members. Brewer argues 
that group membership carries with it a depersonalized trust of ingroup members, 
indicating that cooperation with them is always possible, and in fact the default strategy. 
As she puts it, “Ingroup membership is a form of contingent altruism” (Brewer, 1999, p 
431). In this way, group members can reduce the cost and risk of non-reciprocation, and 
benefit from this bounded network of exchange (see also Karp, Jin, Yamagishi, & 
Shinotsuka, 1993; Insko, Schopler & Sedikides, 1998; Tomasello et al., 2012). 
The same year as Brewer’s argument for the separation of ingroup love and 
outgroup hate, Yamagishi and colleagues formulated the Bounded Generalized Exchange 
approach (BGR; Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999; Kiyonari, Tanida, & Yamagishi, 2000; 
Yamagishi & Mifune, 2009; see also Yamagishi, 2007) which expressed a remarkably 
similar view in even more depth. The key to both explanations is a systematic and reliable 
network of bounded generalized exchange which exists between group members, and is 
assumed to work even in minimal group situation (Yamagishi, 2007). Through the 
interpersonal network of generalized reciprocity (both positive and negative), mutual 
monitoring, and information exchange (particularly about other actors’ reputations), each 
individual shares the benefits of group membership, and is invested in maintaining it. 
Positive treatment of ingroup members, with whom one is more likely to interact 
repeatedly, is a sound strategy across situations, and thus an error management strategy 
(Haselton & Buss, 2000). On the other hand, interactions with outgroup members are likely 
to be restricted. Both of these assumptions can be subverted. For example, Rabbie, Schot 
and Visser (1989) showed that if the participants are functionally interdependent with the 
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outgroup rather than the ingroup, the bias they exhibit is likewise switched to favour the 
outgroup at the expense of the ingroup. 
Therefore, we can expect outgroup hate under specific circumstances when it is 
inexorably connected to ingroup love. This can only be if there is functional 
interdependence in place, so that the individual can invest into their relative standing with 
other group members. Some of the mechanisms shown to be crucial to eliciting both ingroup 
love and, by extension, outgroup hate, are opportunities for reputation management 
(Foddy, Platow, & Yamagishi, 2009; Mifune, Hashimoto & Yamagishi, 2009; Mifune & 
Yamagishi, 2015; Platow, Foddy, Yamagishi, Lim, & Chow, 2012; Yamagishi & Mifune, 
2008; Yamagishi, Hashimoto, & Schug, 2008), and expectations of future reciprocity by 
ingroup members (Gaertner & Insko, 2000; Karp, Jin, Yamagishi, & Shinotsuka, 1993; 
Rabbie, Schot & Visser, 1989; Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999). For example, using a 
general sample of Japanese participants, Mifune and Yamagishi (2015) found ingroup 
favouritism in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game only when both decision-makers knew each 
other’s minimal group membership (common knowledge condition). In the unilateral 
knowledge condition, the players showed no significant intergroup bias, meaning that social 
identity in and of itself is not enough to elicit intergroup bias (Brewer, 1999) – the identity 
category must be public and meaningful. The results showed that the predictions of 
cooperation for each condition, mirrored actual behaviour, with people expecting more 
cooperation from ingroup members only in the common knowledge condition. The bias 
shown in the common knowledge condition (but not the unilateral knowledge condition) was 
strongly correlated with fear of negative evaluation (Watson & Friend, 1969; Leary, 1983), 
further supporting the reputation management hypothesis. 
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Combined, Brewer and Yamagishi’s work all but dispelled the idea that outgroup 
hate exists as a necessary outcrop of ingroup favouritism, or a standalone phenomenon 
removed from the immediate concerns for ingroup outcomes. Instead, it requires ingroup-
bounded interdependence to be in operation, so that participants can expect groups to 
behave the way they do in real life, i.e. containing a network of generalized exchange. 
However, I identify here an additional variable which should have existed among 
natural groups throughout human history, but which has been neglected as a contributor to 
intergroup bias. In this study, I will explore the impact of common resource management on 
intergroup behaviour, and outgroup negative bias in particular. My contention is that 
common resource management involves a different type of interdependence than the one 
described by Yamagishi and Brewer. In it, each individual is dependent on a common 
resource being managed by the group as a whole. Unlike interpersonal interdependence, 
which requires perception of repeated dyadic interactions, group-level interdependence 
requires a meta-cognition of the group as a whole, and one’s reliance on the resources 
provided through and impacted by group members’ actions. 
Group-level Interdependence and Its Impact on Intergroup Bias 
I define group-level interdependence as the impact other’s choices have on the 
common resource the individual shares with them. The common resource I speak of in this 
case is one which is generated, maintained, and redistributed by the group members 
themselves (such as hunted meat, fire, or constructed shelter). This distinguishes it from 
plentiful natural resources which required little human agency before they could be 
exploited, or resources which were exploited by individuals without the need for group 
coordination (such as water, fruit, scavenged meat, or natural shelter).  
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Resources which require human coordinated agency for exploitation are subject to 
the n-person social dilemma. As such they are characterized by a conflict of long-term and 
short-term selfish incentives. Each individual has the vested interest to benefit from the 
common resource without contributing to it. Simultaneously, if all individuals behave in a 
short-term self-interested way, the common resource will eventually collapse, and all the 
participants will suffer as a result. Thus, common resource management dilemmas 
incorporate a “conflict between individual and collective rationality” (Parks, Henager, & 
Scamahorn, 1996, p.135).  
Martin Wolf, writing for the Financial Times (2012) noted that “The history of 
civilization is a history of public goods”. It seems a simple enough statement to suggest that 
the complexity of human social systems coincided with, or were even driven by, the need to 
manage common resources between group members. However, at the time of writing, the 
author is not aware of any work which would shed light on the evolution of common 
resource management strategies, or even a recognition of when human (or pre-human) 
communities began to engage in complex, dilemma-prone resource management. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be a consensus that common resource management was a 
staple evolutionary conundrum which all human populations had to solve (Dunbar, 1999; 
Olson, 1965; Parks, Joireman, & Van Lange, 2013).  
A possible origin of common resource management comes with the emergence of 
hunting. Thieme (1977) found the first irrefutable evidence of hunting in Homo Erectus, 
living between 500,000 and 400,000 years ago in the Schöningen and Boxgrove regions. 
Other anthropologists have suggested that this marks a division of labour, particularly on 
gender lines (Knight, 1991; Knight et al., 1995; Power & Watts, 1996), into mostly male 
hunters and mostly female gatherers. This coincides with the finding that early Homo 
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transported meat to a central location or a “campsite” (Isaac, 1978; Deacon, 1997), where it 
was shared. This tendency became more and more prevalent. Even in the very recent 
evolutionary past, we can see very little archaeological evidence of symbolic artefacts or 
food transport in the Neanderthal, compared to Homo Sapiens from the same time (Steele 
& Shennan, 1996). 
The sharing of meat is observed across human hunter-gatherer societies (e.g., 
Cashdan, 1989; Kaplan & Hill, 1985; Kaplan, Gurven, Hill, & Hurtado, 1990; Woodburn, 
1982), and even in non-human primates such as chimps, bonobo, and capuchin monkeys 
(see de Waal, 1996, 2005 for an overview). This has occurred frequently enough to have 
caused a social sharing norm in chimpanzees (de Waal, 1989), as well as humans (Gurven, 
2004; Gurven, Hill, & Kaplan, 2002; Kameda, Takezawa, Tindale, & Smith, 2002, Smith & 
Bliege Bird, 2000). Hawkes and colleagues (Hawkes et al., 1993) argued that widely shared 
resources of this kind can be functionally equivalent to a public goods dilemma. 
All of this necessarily means that ingroup members became increasingly specialized 
in their food acquisition skills, yet partook in the eating of all of it. Kameda, Takezawa and 
Hastie (2003) surmise that this presents an unsolved dilemma situation where individuals 
would be better off if they did not participate in the acquisition of the resources, but do 
participate in their consumption. 
If it is the case that common resource management dilemmas have occurred reliably 
during the course of evolutionary history (Caporael, 1994) and carried a high potential cost 
of failure (Hasleton & Buss, 2000), we might expect the formation of default behavioural 
strategies, and psychological systems to support their implementation. Indeed, the intense 
automaticity (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Zaki & Mitchell, 2013) and prevalence of human 
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prosociality (Henrich et al., 2005; Warneken & Tomasello, 2009) may in part be the result 
of the need to solve the common resource dilemma. 
In this exploratory study, I ask two separate but related question. Firstly, how does 
activating awareness of the ingroup-bounded common resource management dilemma 
impact intergroup behaviour, particularly outgroup hate? Secondly, how does extending the 
dilemma across group borders impact the intergroup behaviour? 
The predictions we can make for these two questions run in opposites. I will discuss 
them briefly. Classical Social Identity theory would predict bias, irrespective of the 
circumstances. Thus, whether the group is involved in common resource management with 
another group, or independent of it, should exert no impact. The intergroup bias should be 
present, and the variability in it accounted for by the level of identification. On the other 
hand, the Bounded Generalized Reciprocity approach would predict that as long as the 
individual has no vested interest in maintaining their reputation within a network of 
interpersonal exchanges associate with the ingroup, they should not make the distinction 
between ingroup and outgroup outcomes. Structural Goal/Expectation theory (Pruitt & 
Kimmel, 1977; Yamagishi, 1986) would suggest that intergroup bias will occur if the 
participants perceive the situation to engender a dilemma which cannot be solved across 
group borders, i.e. without the co-existence of a reliable network of interpersonal exchange 
which can be assumed to work reliably, based on Brewer’s system of depersonalized trust. 
Thus, we would expect that intergroup bias will be explained by the perception that a 
dilemma exists in the common resource management situation, and by the predicted 
contributions to the common good. 
Study 1 
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
147 
 
The purpose of Study 1 was to investigate the impact of introducing consciousness of 
group-level interdependence on intergroup bias, more particularly, outgroup hate. 
Participants who have been assigned a minimal group membership were told other ingroup 
members were involved in a Public Goods game (PGG) with each other. They had no 
information about the activities of the outgroup. The participants could allocate money to 
two ingroup16, and one outgroup target. The maximum a participant could allocate to any 
recipient was EUR 5. Anything under EUR 5 could be interpreted as a deliberate detraction 
from the best case scenario for that recipient. Conversely, any difference in allocations to 
targets can be interpreted as deliberate difference maximization, i.e. an a priori negative 
bias. 
For performing this task, they were paid a fixed sum of EUR 10. Thus, each 
participant performed three non-zero-sum allocations to different targets. They were not 
able to keep any of the money for themselves, eliminating own-outcome maximization as a 
motive for behaviour in the experiment. In addition, the participants were told they were 
the only ones performing the allocations. Thus, the bounded generalized system of 
reciprocity operating within the group (Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999) was 
discontinued. According to previous research, this explicit removal of any opportunity for 
management of social capital (through reciprocity or reputation) should reduce intergroup 
bias to non-significance. Thus, any intergroup bias observed should be a reaction to the 
knowledge of common resource management within the group or the result of the 
individual’s levels of social identification, and not an effect expectations of future reciprocity 
or reputation concerns. 
                                                          
16 Study 1 corresponds to Study 1 from Chapter 3. The participants were assigned group membership 
in the Green group, as well as membership in the minority (20%) or majority (80%) within that 
group. The Blue group, the outgroup, was only inferred by participants. 
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A G*power calculation for at medium effect size f=0.25 indicated a necessary sample 
size of at least n = 86 (Cohen, 1977) for the purposes of the original design. The calculation 
was performed using a G*power calculator (Faul & Erdfelder, 2004). 
Method 
Participants 
Eighty-seven participants (43 female) were recruited at Jacobs University, an 
international, English-language university situated in Bremen, Germany. The experiment 
was conducted on campus, in the Social and Behavioural Laboratory. Participants were on 
average twenty years of age, of mixed cultural, ethnic and national backgrounds. Germans 
were the largest national group at 16.05%, N=13. 
Procedure 
Participants were invited to the lab in groups of up to ten. They were welcomed by a 
female experimental assistant. The participants randomly selected an ID number, and were 
led into individual computer booths. Once all the participants arrived, they were told to 
input their ID numbers and sex into the computer, whereupon the experiment could begin. 
Minimal group categorizations 
The first portion of the experiment dealt with the creation of two types of group 
categories. Two separate tasks divided the participants first into a Blue and Green group, 
and subsequently into a minority and majority within the group17. The tasks were 
                                                          
17 This minority / majority distinction was meaningless for the research questions in this paper. The 
impact of having been categorized as minority or majority members is treated as a confounding 
variable and controlled for in the analysis. For a more detailed discussion of the experimental 
procedure, please view Supplementary Materials. 
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presented as tests of perception which have been shown to carry certain behavioural 
implications, thus potentially loading them with meaning.  
In reality, all participants were assigned membership in the Green group, as either 
minority or majority members. The Blue group was only implied. The categorization into 
minority or majority Green-group members was determined by the order of registration at 
the beginning of the study. 
Feedback about group membership was permanently displayed in a header for the 
remainder of the experiment. After the initial categorization into Blue and Green group, the 
participants were given a questionnaire (adapted from Grieve & Hogg, 1999) to determine 
their degree of identification with the minimal groups. During this time, the experimental 
assistant distributed green and blue flags. She asked the participants to indicate their 
group membership before handing them the appropriate flag. No participant identified 
themselves as a member of the Blue group.  
Individual outcome independence 
After categorization into minority and majority Green group members (MIN and 
MAJ conditions), the assistant presented the participants with a gambling task. 
Participants were asked to choose a folder which contained a code supposedly determining 
the tasks they would be asked to perform in the study. In fact, all participants received the 
same code. The purpose of this step was to 1) eliminate the possibility of indirect reciprocity 
between group members, and 2) to introduce the Public Goods game as a credible 
interaction with real consequences. 
Once the participants entered the code into the computer, they were given the 
instructions to the rest of the experiment. Firstly, they were informed that their reward is 
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
150 
 
fixed at EUR 10, and will not be affected by their decisions, or the decisions of other 
participants 
Group-level Interdependence Manipulation 
Next, the participants were told they would be taking part in a Supervision task. 
More precisely, they would supervise a “Public Exchange task” in which the remaining 
participants (hereafter referred to as recipients) in their group would take part. They were 
given no information as to what members of the Blue group would be doing.  
The Public Exchange task was modelled on the Public Goods game (PGG, Ledyard, 
1995). The recipients were supposedly given EUR 3 by the experimenters, which they could 
choose to contribute to a common pot in increments of 10 cents. Whatever they did not 
contribute would be theirs to keep. Contributions from all recipients would be summed up, 
doubled, and then redistributed equally. It was made clear to the participants that this 
meant those recipients who did not contribute to the common pot could profit from their 
freeriding. 
Participants were given a short test of their understanding of the PGG, as well as 
two questions pertaining to their predictions about 1) average contributions to the common 
pot by Green group members, and 2) their own intended contributions to the common pot, if 
they were taking part in the PGG. Thereafter, they were familiarized with the details of the 
Supervision task they would be performing. They were shown a decision-making interface 
which would enable them to allocate up to EUR 5 to three randomly chosen recipients. The 
participants could allocate a minimum of EUR 0.1 and a maximum of EUR 5 to each 
recipient, in increments of 10 cents. This money would supposedly be added to the 
recipients’ winnings from the PGG. The participants were not able to keep any part of the 
endowment for themselves. 
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After the participants read the instructions and interacted with the decision-making 
interface, they were presented with three dummy recipients: one from the Green group 
minority, one from the Green group majority, and one from the Blue group. After they 
completed all three allocations, the participants were asked to estimate the recipients’ 
trustworthiness and their tendency for prosocial behaviour. In addition, they were asked to 
predict how much each recipient would contribute in the PGG, and how much each 
recipient would give to the supervisor if the roles were reversed. 
Analysis 
The first step in the analysis will be to ascertain whether a significant difference 
exists in the absolute donations to ingroup (Green group) versus outgroup (Blue group) 
targets, thus giving us an answer to the central question of how consciousness of a common 
resource management dilemma within the ingroup impacts intergroup bias. Next, the 
allocations to the ingroup and outgroup are treated as within-subjects variables, and 
entered into a general linear model as outcomes. The predictors will be the two between-
subjects variables, sex and membership in the minority or the majority. Rather than 
explanatory variables, both of these are treated as possible confounders. 
Next, the size of the bias will be calculated by subtracting the allocations to the 
outgroup (Blue group) from the allocations to the ingroup (Green group). However, since in 
this study the ingroup itself contained a minority and a majority, I will consider the 
allocations to the targets most closely resembling the participant as the allocations to the 
ingroup. Thus, the allocations to the Green group minority will be taken as a measure of 
ingroup allocations if the participant was initially classified as a minority member. The size 
of the bias will be related to measurements of social identification with the Green group, 
and the predicted donations to the common resource by ingroup rather than outgroup 
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members. These predictions will once again follow the scheme as the allocations – 
predictions about those targets most closely resembling the participants themselves will be 
considered predictions about ingroup behaviour. These two variables (levels of social 
identification and predictions about outgroup contributions to the common good) will be 
tested for their contribution to explaining the size of the intergroup bias using a linear 
regression analysis. 
Results 
On average, participants contributed M = 3.64 (SD = 1.45) to the ingroup18, and M = 
3.01 (SD = 1.78) to the outgroup. This difference was highly significant (F(1,83) = 24.93, p <  
.001; Partial η² = 0.23). A general linear model analysis has revealed no impact of 
membership in the minority or majority (MMP; F(1,83) = 0.18, p = 0.67), sex, (F(1,83) = 
0.23, p = 0.63), or an interaction of the two (F(1,83) = 2.64, p = 0.11). Likewise, there were 
no main effects of MMP (F(1,83) = 2.37, p = 0.13) or sex (F(1,83) = 2.15, p = 0.15) on 
allocations to the ingroup and outgroup. 
To operationalize the size of the bias, I subtracted the allocations to the outgroup 
from the allocations to the ingroup. On average, participants maximized the difference 
between their own group, and the outgroup (M(87) = 0.63, SD = 1.20) to a degree which is 
significantly larger than zero (t(86) = 4.88, p < .001). The size of the bias was slightly 
smaller for minority (M(43) = 0.58, SD = 1.13) that it was for the majority (M(44) = 0.68, SD 
= 1.29), but the difference did not achieve significance (t(85) = -0.37, p = 0.71). The size of 
the bias was not explained by predictions of outgroup targets’ contributions to the 
(outgroup) common pot (F(1,78) = 0.008, n.s.).  
                                                          
18 Ingroup allocations here signify the amount given to the targets most similar to the individual 
participants. In other words, it is the allocation majority members made to majority targets, and 
those minority members made to minority targets. 
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Next, I turn my attention to the level of identification with the minimal groups. On 
average, participants identified more strongly with the Green (M(85) = 4.59, SD = 1.13) 
rather than the Blue group (M(85) = 4.3, SD = 1.3; t(84) = 2.66, p < .01), indicating that the 
minimal group manipulation was successful. According to social identity theory, we would 
expect that high identifiers behave in a more parochial way, exhibiting more ingroup 
preference and outgroup derogation. Within the confines of this study, we would expect 
high identifiers to maximize the difference more severely than low identifiers. For this 
purpose, participants were grouped into those whose level of identification with the Green 
group was higher than the mean, and those whose identification scores were lower than the 
mean. Since Simunovic, Boehnke & Wilhelm (in preparation; Chapter 3 in this thesis) 
showed that minority members may identify with the superordinate identity less intensely, 
MMP was included alongside it into a general linear model to explain differential 
allocations to the ingroup and outgroup. However, a general linear model revealed no 
within subject effect of identification levels (F(1,81) = 0.1, n.s.), MMP (F(1,81) = 0.33, n.s.), 
or an interaction of the two (F(1,81) = 1.73, n.s.). The same was true for between subject 
effect, which did not reach significance for either MMP (F(1,81) = 1.35, n.s.), levels of 
identification (F(1,81) = 0.59, n.s.), or their interaction (F(1,81) = 1.64, n.s.). Furthermore, 
the size of the bias was not explained by the level of identification with the Green group 
(F(1,83) = 0.25, n.s.), or the preference for the Green as opposed to the Blue identity (F(1,83) 
= 0.04, n.s.). 
Finally, we will consider the predicted contributions to the PGG. Unsurprisingly, 
participants predicted ingroup members (M(80) = 2.12, SD = 0.86) would contribute 
significantly more to the common pot than outgroup members (M(80)=1.87, SD=0.91; t(79) 
= 2.37, p = 0.02). A simple linear regression was calculated to predict the size of the bias 
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based on predicted contributions of the outgroup to the common pot. No significant 
regression equation was found (F(1,78) = 0.01, n.s.).The same was true when the predictor 
variable is the difference score between predicted contributions by the ingroup and the 
outgroup (F(1,78) = 0.88, n.s.). Instead beliefs about the trustworthiness of outgroup 
members and their tendency to behave in a prosocial way (identified in the questionnaire as 
the tendency to follow rules, help group members and sacrifice for the good of the group) 
provided a better explanation of the size of the bias (F(2,77) = 10.49, p < .001, with an 
Adjusted R² = .21). In other words, the beliefs that outgroup members are likely to behave 
in a selfish way accounted for the size of the bias. 
Discussion 
Participants who were conscious of a common resource dilemma occurring within 
their ingroup exhibited a priori negative bias against the unconnected outgroup. This, 
despite the fact their own rewards were fixed and independent of the others’ actions, and 
the fact that they could not count upon a system of indirect reciprocity to reward their 
actions. In addition, I found no effect of the level of identification on either the size of the 
bias, or the tendency to commit it in the first place, as Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 
Flament, Billig, & Bundy, 1971) would predict. However, this connection is known to be 
unstable (Brewer, 1979; Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Kosterman & 
Feshbach, 1989). 
Study 1 was not geared exclusively to testing the impact of group-level 
interdependence on intergroup bias. While I found no direct impact of membership in the 
minority or majority on allocations to the outgroup, I cannot discount the possibility that 
the experimental setting skewed responses paradigmatically, as a result of the introduction 
of embedded groups. In other words, it is possible that implying non-cohesion within the 
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Green group drove negative bias against the Blue group by default. Thus, a more correct 
test of my research question should include only a minimal group categorization into Green 
and Blue groups. 
Additionally, the results raised questions. If the consciousness of common resource 
management truly activates negative intergroup bias as the present results would suggest, 
what impact does sharing this common resource between groups have?  
Impact of Superordinate Goals - Intergroup setting 
Seminal research going back to Sherif and colleagues (1966) has shown that 
introduction of a superordinate goal may reduce intergroup conflict. In the classic Robber’s 
Cave study, groups of 11- and 12-year-old boys who had been feuding for weeks, were faced 
with a challenge they could only solve by cooperating. Since both groups had a vested 
interest to overcome the “common predicament” (get the water truck safely to the camp), 
the two groups entered into a temporary alliance which grew into a reduction of intergroup 
tension, and even intergroup friendships. Subsequent research has found support for the 
idea that cooperative interdependence based on superordinate goals reduces outgroup 
directed negativity (Aronson, Stephan, Sikes, Blaney, & Sapp, 1978; Brewer & Miller, 1984, 
1996; Brown & Wade, 1987; Cook, 1984; Deschamps & Brown, 1983; Desforges et al., 1991; 
Deutsch, 1973; Gaertner, Mann, Dovidio, Murrell, & Pomore, 1990; Johnson, Johnson & 
Maruyama, 1984; Miller & Davidson-Podgorny, 1987; Rabbie, Benoist, Oosterbaan, & 
Visser, 1974;  Slavin, 1985). 
 However, to my knowledge, none of these studies have framed intergroup 
cooperation as a common resource management dilemma. Unlike one-off cooperation tasks 
usually used to induce intergroup cooperation and a reduction of hostilities, group-level 
interdependence of the kind I have described here includes a mixed motive incentive 
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matrix. The mixed motives are not only apparent on the individual, but also on the group 
level. Consider two groups of equal size who play the Public Goods game together.  
A typical Public Goods game (PGG) is an n-person dilemma in which each 
participant has the choice of contributing to the common resource from their own 
endowment. Each participant may then choose how much of their endowment to contribute 
to the common pot19. The contributions are multiplied by a factor r, meaning that they grow 
in value for having been assembled. Subsequently, the common pot is redistributed equally 
to all players. In this way, if all players contribute the maximum to the common pot (All-C), 
they will all receive their initial endowment multiplied by r. For each participant 
individually it is better to contribute nothing while everybody else cooperates fully. In this 
way, the individuals may accrue the benefit from participating in the PGG without losing 
any of their initial endowment. 
The same is true on a group level. If two groups share the management of common 
resources whichever group has the most defectors will, on the group level, make a greater 
profit than the group with more cooperators. This extra profit may be redistributed among 
other group members, increasing their relative standing. In other words, group-level 
interdependence carries with it the possibility for difference maximization on the group 
level. At the same time, any defection reduces the size of the common pot and, therefore, 
each individual’s benefit accrued from participating in the management of the common 
resource. If this competition continues, the common resource will eventually collapse. 
                                                          
19While the most common experimental paradigms equate the type of resource with the type of 
endowment, this rarely holds true in real life. In most cases, the resource invested into the common 
pot (e.g. effort, time, risk) is qualitatively different from the resources expected from the common pot 
(e.g. big game). Thus it is much more difficult to estimate the relative values of the endowment to the 
return. The assumption is that the benefit outweighs the cost in most cases, and in the long term. 
Ergo, the contributions are multiplied by a factor r to signify this profit. 
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In fact, evidence from macroeconomics and sociology suggest just that. Rather than 
promote intergroup peace, group-level interdependence seems to drive defection on the 
common resource, and even outgroup hate. Alesina and colleagues (Alesina Baqir, & 
Easterly, 1999; Alesina & LaFerrara, 2000) have consistently found a negative effect of 
diversity, i.e. the presence of outgroups, on contributions to the common resource. This also 
holds for the management of an existing resource which tends to be overexploited in more 
heterogeneous communities (Khwaja, 2002; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005). Miguel and 
Gugerty (2005) investigated contributions to public goods in Kenya. They found that ethnic 
diversity was associated with lowered giving to primary school funds, overall worse school 
facilities, and even poorer water well maintenance. They put the effects down to the 
inability of ethnically diverse communities to impose social sanctions and successfully 
cooperate in the face of uncertainty. This finding goes in line with Brewer’s (1999) 
prediction that superordinate goals may lead to intergroup bias, particularly outgroup hate. 
She explains it in similar terms – the spill-over of the interdependence structure from the 
ingroup to include the outgroup does not imply the spill-over of the depersonalized trust. 
Thus, rather than establish trust, some superordinate goals “make salient the absence of 
mutual trust” (p.436) and promote intergroup conflict and hostility.  
Finally, using world-wide data, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) found that 
ethnic and religious polarization has significant negative effects on economic development, 
due to the reduction of investments, and increased public consumption. They further found 
that diversity under such conditions contributes to the probability of civil war. Such failure 
of collective action has been theorized to lead directly to increased discrimination (Hjort, 
2013). 
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However, this does not always seem to be the case. Investigating nested social 
dilemmas, in which people face the decision between benefitting themselves, their 
subgroup, or the superordinate group within which the subgroup exists (Wit & Kerr, 2002), 
has yielded opposite results. Notably, Buchan and colleagues (Buchan et al., 2009) found 
globalization, what is to say increased interconnectivity and interdependence on people 
from various groups, is negatively correlated to intergroup bias. This bias was measured by 
the variability in parochial, and universalist choices in a multilevel Public Goods game. In 
other words, intergroup bias was conceptualized as preferential giving to a common 
resource pool reserved for the “local”, subgroup benefit, or the “world”, superordinate 
group’s benefit. Their results indicated that the higher globalization levels are for the 
individual as well as their community on the aggregate level, the less intergroup bias in 
allocations to the common pool will be. While not exactly equivalent to the cases discussed 
above, where heterogeneity led to a decrease in donations to public goods benefitting the 
superordinate group, we cannot ignore this discrepancy. 
Given that we have found the mere consciousness of ingroup-bounded group-level 
interdependence caused outgroup hate, we now have two competing hypothesis for what 
would happen if the group-level interdependence is extended to include the outgroup. Thus, 
in Study 2 I will address three separate goals: 
1. Replication of findings from Study 1 
2. A test of two competing hypothesis on the impact of common resource 
management as a superordinate goal, on outgroup hate 
3. Replication of Yamagishi’s findings that, with both interpersonal or group-level  
interdependence suspended, no intergroup bias should be observed 
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In addition, and since the participant’s intended and predicted donations to the 
public goods are recorded, we can ask an additional question: Does heterogeneity in the 
Public Goods game necessarily lower contributions to the common pool? While this research 
is not designed to answer this question, the data we do have may serve as an indicator of 
whether the mismatch between group boundaries and group-level interdependence 
inherently means a loss of common resource. Namely, the intended and predicted donations 
to the public good will be compared between the Interdependent condition (in which two 
groups share in the common resource management), and the Matched condition (in which 
two group match the resourced separately).  
Study 2 
The purpose of Study 2 was to address the impact of group-level interdependence on 
intergroup bias between groups of equal size who either share the management of the 
common resource, or who manage a common resource separately. For this purpose, I 
introduced three experimental conditions: Interdependent, Matched, and Control. In the 
Interdependent condition, participants were told the ingroup and outgroup were playing 
the PGG together. Thus, the management of the common good could here be constructed as 
a superordinate goal, transcending group boundaries. In the Matched condition, structural 
interdependence was matched to the identity boundaries, so that the participants were told 
ingroup and outgroup members were playing the PGG only with other members of their 
own groups. Thus, the Matched condition was equivalent to the conditions of Study 1, 
without the categorization into minimal minorities and majorities. Finally, a Control 
condition was added. In it, the participants were not given any information about what the 
recipients of their allocations were doing. Since the participants were independent of the 
ingroup fate, and could not expect opportunities for reputation management, the control 
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condition was conceived as a replication of Yamagishi’s findings (Yamagishi, Jin, & 
Kiyonari, 1999). 
In addition, Study 2 would address some additional short-comings of Study 1, 
particularly the problems inherent in using a student sample on a small campus, and the 
extent of the deception used in Study 1. Thus, in Study 2, I used a general population 
sample, committed to a subsequent study which would utilize the participants’ decisions as 
presented in the experiment, and removed the additional categorization. In an effort to 
make the results more robust, each supervisor allocated money to three ingroup and three 
outgroup targets. 
An online platform (Prolific Academic; see Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, & Acquisti, 
2017, for review of Prolific's sample, response rate, and data quality) was used to recruit a 
relatively heterogeneous sample (in 2017, 35% female, 56% UK and European nationals, 
average age of 27). 
As in Study 2, the main behavioural measure was a non-zero-sum allocation game in 
which the participants would be able to give a minimum of GBP 0.1, and a maximum of 
GBP 3 to each recipient. Anticipating small effect sizes (f = 0.15), indicated a necessary 
sample size of at least n = 120 (Cohen, 1977). The calculation was performed using a 
G*power calculator (Faul & Erdfelder, 2004). 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and fifty six participants (74 female) were recruited via Academic 
Prolific, a database of over 50,000 potential participants. Most of these have been recruited 
while attending a college, meaning that the sample has a higher average education level 
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than the general population. Average age of the participants was 30. Ages ranged from 18 
to 61. 
Procedure 
Participants were invited to the study via their Academic Prolific accounts. Once 
they registered, the link to the study was sent to them automatically. Most participants 
completed the study within the next two or three days. 
After they input their Prolific ID and sex, the participants took part in a Dot 
Estimation task which split them into the Green and the Blue group. This information was 
permanently displayed at the top of the page. After the minimal group categorization, the 
participants’ level of identification with the Green and Blue groups was ascertained using 
the same questionnaire as in Study 1. 
Behavioural Measure 
The participants were told their task was to supervise a “Public Exchange task” 
which 6 international students (hereafter referred to as recipients) are performing as part 
of a series of studies hosted by Jacobs University. For their participation, the participants 
would receive a fixed reward of GBP 7.520. It was made clear to them that neither the 
experimenters, nor the other participants, nor the supervisor’s own actions would impact 
this amount.  
Then, the participants were familiarized with the Public Exchange task21, i.e. the 
PGG. In it, recipients were given GBP 2 by the experimenters, and asked to donate any 
                                                          
20GBP 7.5 is not equivalent to the EUR 10 our student participants received in Study 1. The currency 
and amount were dictated by Academic Prolific. 
21 Since the author is planning to perform the PGG under just the conditions described, the 
allocations made by the supervisors will eventually be matched to real participants. Thus, no 
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portion of that money to a common pot. The sum of all contributions to the common pot 
would then be doubled and redistributed to all 6 recipients equally. The instructions make 
it clear that it is in the interest of each person taking part in the PGG to contribute 
nothing, and reap the benefits of others’ contributions. 
The participants were given a manipulation check to capture their understanding of 
the instructions. They were also asked to 1) predict the amount of money most people would 
contribute to the common pot, 2) indicate how much they themselves would contribute to 
the common pot if they were taking part in the PGG. 
Finally, the participants were familiarized with the decision-making interface and 
their supervision task. The task consisted of two steps. First, the participants were asked to 
predict each recipients’ contributions to the common pot. Secondly, they were asked to 
allocate up to GBP 3 to each of the recipients. As in Study 2, they were asked to allocate at 
least 10 pence to each recipient. The participants could keep none of this money for 
themselves. After making their decisions, the participants were given a post-experimental 
questionnaire dealing with their understanding of the supervision task, the 
conceptualization of intergroup relationships, the tendency to identify with social 
categories, and their social dominance orientation. 
Analysis 
Once again, the first step of the analysis will be to check whether allocations to 
ingroup (Green) as opposed to outgroup (Blue) members showed a significant difference. 
This will be done across all conditions, and then in a general linear model where the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
deception was used in this design, apart from the claim that the Dot Estimation task was indicative 
of psychological tendencies. 
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
163 
 
predictors are between-group factors, condition (Matched, Interdependent, and Control) and 
sex. 
Next, the size of the bias is calculated and related to levels of identification and 
predicted contributions to the common resource. This latter analysis will be done using a 
linear regression model, and partial correlation analysis. 
Finally, I will address the differences in predicted and intended contributions to the 
common pool in order to ascertain whether heterogeneity in the face of common resource 
management dilemma necessarily leads to a loss of the public good. For the purpose, I will 
use a general linear model in which predictors will once again be condition and sex. 
Results 
Overall, participants were more generous towards members of their ingroup (M(156) 
= 1.99, SD = 0.93) rather than the outgroup (M(156) = 1.7, SD = 0.98) across all conditions. 
This difference was highly statistically significant (t(155) = 6.47, p < . 001). A repeated 
measures general linear model was conducted which showed no within subject effect of 
condition (F(2,150) = 0.51, p = 0.60), sex (F(1,150) = 0.06, p = 0.82), or an interaction of the 
two (F(2,150) = 1.53, p = 0.22). The same analysis showed no between subject effects of 
condition (F(2,150) = 0.11, p = 0.90), sex (F(1,150) = 1.05, p = 0.31), or an interaction 
between the two (F(2,150) = 1.56, p = 0.21). 
As before, I calculated the size of the bias by subtracting allocations to the outgroup 
from allocation to the ingroup. The size of the bias was significantly larger than zero across 
all conditions (in the Interdependent condition, t(52) = 3.38, p = 0.001; in the Matched 
condition,  t(51) = 3.48, p = 0.001; in the Control condition, t(50)=4.29, p < .001). These 
results limit the scope of what could be concluded from this experiment. Since the 
Interdependent and Matched conditions both showed a priori negative bias, it is tempting 
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to assume this means the mere consciousness of common resource management dilemmas 
activate negative outgroup bias, irrespective of whether this is occurring within or between 
groups. However, the same behaviour was observed in the Control condition, against the 
predictions of BGR. 
Instead, I turn my attention to levels of identification as mechanisms promoting 
negative intergroup bias. On average, participants identified more with the Green group 
(M(156) = 5.84, SD = 1.81) than with the Blue group (M(156) = 4.84, SD = 1.79; t(155) = 
8.14, p < .001), indicating the minimal group manipulation was successful. Levels of 
identification with the Green group, and the degree of preference for the Green as opposed 
to the Blue group were used to predict the size of the bias in a linear regression model. The 
overall model for all conditions was highly significant (F(2, 150) = 3.54, p = 0.03. However, 
once this is broken down by condition, the level of identification explains negative outgroup 
bias only in the Control condition, i.e. when there is no additional information on common 
resource management occurring within the group (F(2,150) = 7.14, p < .01). The model was 
not statistically significant in the Interdependent (F(2, 150) = 0.09, p = 0.92) or the Matched 
condition (F(2,150) = 0.31, p = 0.74). 
Table 1. Regression coefficients for Interdependent, and Matched conditions, where 
expected contributions to the public good by ingroup and outgroup members predict the size 
of the bias. 
Interdependent Condition 
 B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) .092 .157  .588 .559 
predout -.668 .222 -.799 -3.011 .004 
predin .709 .231 .814 3.071 .003 
Matched Condition 
 B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) .001 .165  .007 .995 
predout -.664 .148 -.716 -4.483 .000 
predin .779 .160 .776 4.856 .000 
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Instead, the size of the bias in the Interdependent and Matched conditions is best 
explained by predictions of contributions in the PGG (in the Interdependent condition, 
F(2,150) = 4.95, p = 0.01; in the Matched condition, F(2,150) = 13.01, p < .001). It is 
noteworthy that both predictions of ingroup contributions, and predictions of outgroup 
contributions are significant in explaining the bias (Table 1). While the two predictions are 
highly positively correlated (in the Interdependent condition, r(53) = 0.87, p < .001; in the 
Matched condition, r(52) =  0.69, p < .001), their individual correlation to the size of the bias 
is far less stable. Predictions of outgroup contributions to the common pot show no 
significant correlation to the size of the bias in either condition (in the Interdependent 
condition, r(53)= -0.9, n.s.; in the Matched condition, r(52)= -.18, n.s.), while the predictions 
of ingroup contributions are significantly positively correlated to the size of the bias only in 
the Matched condition (r(52)= 0.28, p = 0.04; in the Interdependent condition, r(53) = 0.12, 
n.s.). To try and understand this finding, I partially correlated the bias score to predicted 
outgroup contributions, while controlling for predicted ingroup contributions. In both the 
Interdependent (r = -0.39, p = 0.004) and the Matched condition (r = -0.54, p < .001) the 
predictions of outgroup contributions were significantly and negatively correlated to the 
size of the bias even after eliminating their correlation to predictions of ingroup 
contributions. 
In addition, I examined the predicted and intended contributions to the public good 
in the Interdependent and Matched conditions. First, participants were asked to indicate 
how much they expected people would contribute to the common pool on average. While 
participants in the Interdependent condition expected slightly higher overall contributions 
(M(53) = 1.23, SD = 0.68) than participants in the Matched condition  (M(52) = 1.08, SD = 
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0.69), the difference did not reach significance (F(2, 104) = 0.79, p = 0.50). Additionally 
there was no within-subject effect of condition (F(2, 104) = 1.16, p = 0.29), sex (F(2, 104) = 
1.08, p = 0.30) or an interaction of the two (F(2, 104) = 0.07, p = 0.79). Next, participants 
were asked to indicate how much they intended to contribute to the common pool if they 
were actually taking part in the PGG. Once again, although the intended contributions 
were slightly higher in the Interdependent (M(53) = 1.44, SD = 0.67) rather than the 
Matched condition (M(52) = 1.22, SD = 0.74), the effect did not reach significance (F(2, 104) 
= 0.81, p = 0.49). Additionally there was no within-subject effect of condition (F(2, 104) = 
2.32, p = 0.13), sex (F(2, 104) = 0.01, p = 0.91) or an interaction of the two (F(2, 104) = 0.09, 
p = 0.77). There seems to be no a priori effect of heterogeneity on contributions to group 
resources, seeing how our participants reported intending to contribute the same amounts 
irrespective of whether they were playing the Public Goods game across or within group 
boundaries. 
Discussion 
 Study 2 succeeded in replicating the findings from Study 1 by showing that 
individuals who should have no personal investment in the outcomes of their groups show 
outgroup negative bias if they are made aware of a common resource management dilemma 
being played within their group (Matched condition). In addition, when the common 
resource management dilemma is extended beyond group borders to include the outgroup 
(Interdependent condition), the motivation for difference maximization does not seem to be 
eliminated. However, the motivation for this bias is unclear. Neither predictions of ingroup 
contributions, nor predictions of outgroup contributions alone are enough to explain the size 
of the bias. Rather, it seems to be an interaction of the two. In addition, neither the 
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absolute level of identification with the ingroup, nor the preference for ingroup identity 
relative to the outgroup identity, contributed to the explanation. 
 At the same time, the level of identity was a significant predictor of bias only in the 
Control condition, as predicted by Social Identity Theory. The failure of the Control 
condition to replicate Yamagishi’s findings (Yamagishi, Jin, &Kiyonari, 1999) casts a 
shadow of doubt on all the other results. It is possible that my experimental design did not 
successfully eliminate individual’s perceptions of independence from the group’s fate. If this 
is the case, it is possible that all of my results are nothing but an experimental artefact. 
However, the fact that identification did not contribute at all to the explanation of bias in 
the Matched and Interdependent conditions speaks against this interpretation. If the 
experiment was functionally equivalent across conditions, then identification should 
operate as the proximate mechanism of bias in all three of them. 
An alternative explanation is that the Public Goods game in some way provided a 
justification for the bias participants would have committed anyway (Dawes,1980). In this 
way, when the justification is available, it is used instead of levels of social identification. 
However, if this was the case, levels social identification should contribute to the 
explanation of the bias, or at least correlate with the size of the bias, even in the Matched 
and Interdependent conditions, which was not the case. 
Additionally, I found that managing group resources across group lines does not 
lower the intended contributions to the public good. This was an interesting result since it 
contradicts the macro-level findings from real life which suggests that heterogeneous 
societies contribute less to the public goods, eventually leading to their collapse. Even 
though the participant’s intended contributions were just that – reports of intentions, 
rather than incentivized behaviour – they pose an interesting conundrum. Mine was not 
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the only study which has shown the same result (Hugh-Jones & Perroni, 2014; 2017). Thus 
we must ask, if a mismatch in group identities is not enough to elicit the sort of reduction in 
efforts to manage group resources which we see time and again in heterogeneous 
communities, what factors are decisive in accounting for those real-life findings? In other 
words, what exactly causes the collapse of public goods when they are managed by diverse 
groups? 
General Discussion 
 The current study was exploratory in nature and constitutes only the beginning of 
an investigation into the impact of common resource management on intergroup relations. 
The motivation behind the bias exhibited across conditions is currently unclear. 
Nevertheless, I will consider possible interpretations and future research directions. 
 I observed a consistent and severe negative bias against independent outgroups in 
the face of consciousness of the common resource management dilemma within the group. 
Ostensibly, this cannot be explained by investment into one’s own standing with other 
ingroup members, since no such opportunities were afforded. Even if they were, previous 
research suggests that this should motivate people to benefit the ingroup, but not derogate 
against the outgroup by maximizing the difference. Thus, in a non-zero-sum allocation 
game, like the one I had used, we would expect maximum allocations to the ingroup, and 
maximum or near-maximum allocations to the outgroup. 
 If the consciousness of the common resource dilemma is indeed the variable which 
enticed participants whose rewards were independent of the group’s fate to maximize the 
difference between the ingroup and the outgroup, one interpretation may be that 
consciousness of a common resource within the group automatically frames the outgroup as 
a threat. Unfortunately, I have not collected data which would indicate whether the 
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participants framed the experimental situations as more competitive (aggressive, 
threatening) or more cooperative (peaceable, friendly). However, realistic conflict theories 
(Fearon, 1995; Levine& Campbell, 1972) would predict that reminding people of a finite and 
uncertain resource within the group may increase security concerns which can spill over 
into intergroup behaviour. The same logic holds for groups who share the management of 
such a resource. Without the ingroup-bounded depersonalized trust, or the network of 
generalized reciprocity which supports it, group-level interdependence can be seen as even 
more uncertain, risky and threatening. 
 The effect of threat on intergroup bias is inconsistent. Realistic and symbolic threat 
perception (Stephan & Stephan, 1996, 2000) have certainly been shown to drive more 
negative attitudes towards outgroups. However, Simunovic, Mifune and Yamagishi (2013; 
2016) tested fear-based aggression between groups in a Preemptive Strike game (PSG), 
which was designed specifically for this purpose. In the PSG, participants were paired up 
and had to choose, in real time, between pushing a red button, or doing nothing. If both 
players did nothing, they both received the highest possible payoff, making this the 
perfectly rational strategy. However, the first person to push the red button would lose a 
certain portion of their reward. At the same time, the attacked player would lose a more 
substantial portion of the reward, as well as their ability to attack in turn. In this way, two 
incentives were dominant in the PSG: fear and spite. It seems like a sound expectation that 
both of those are less common among ingroup members rather than outgroup members, yet  
no intergroup bias was observed in the PSG. Simunovic and colleagues concluded that, 
having no opportunities for ingroup-bounded generalized reciprocity, the ingroup and 
outgroup were meaningless categories. If the bias observed in the current study is the 
result of threat-perception, then participants conscious of a common resource management 
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dilemma within, or between groups, should exhibit a greater attack rate against the 
outgroup in the PSG, which is a question for the future. 
 An alternative explanation is that the bias we observed had nothing whatsoever to 
do with perceived threat, but rather with the engagement of long-term thinking. While 
participants may have recognized that they have no immediate interest in derogating 
against the outgroup, the presence of a common resource management dilemma may have 
forced them to consider a future in which they are interdependent on the ingroup indeed. 
Under such conditions, it is in their interest to show ingroup loyalty and invest into future 
interaction. In this experiment, the only way in which participants could do that is by 
deliberately maximizing the difference between ingroup and outgroup outcomes. This 
second interpretation would force us to consider the possibility that group-level 
interdependence between groups is, even in the long run, not seen in a favourable light. 
One way in which to test the validity of this hypothesis is to force participants to make 
decisions under time constraint, which has been shown to elicit more default, heuristic-
based behaviour, and – by necessity – discourages long-term thinking. Alternatively, long-
term thinking may be primed on an individual level, through reminders of mortality, or life-
course planning, such as having participants recount the decision-making process 
connected to big life-style changes such as having children, or putting money aside for 
retirement. 
 Finally, I discuss implications of my findings for evolutionary social sciences. The 
fact humans may have managed common resources in an increasingly complex way 
throughout their evolutionary history, suggests that there may exist psychological 
mechanisms formulated to respond to it. Certainly, these mechanisms operate within the 
group as sense of fairness, the norm of reciprocity, and ingroup loyalty. It is more 
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controversial to suggest they may have had an impact on intergroup behaviour. If the 
consciousness of ingroup-bounded common resource management dilemmas indeed elicit 
outgroup negative bias, we may expect that in the period of human cultural and 
evolutionary history in which resources of the kind I had described (i.e. those which require 
human agency and coordination before they can be exploited) emerge, we should see an 
increase in intergroup conflict. This would be reduced as institutions are put into place to 
manage the common resources, and flare up each time those institutions seem to fail. 
 There is an additional, theoretical question which must be addressed: if 
interdependence on common resources is not enough to open group boundaries and build 
communities, what is? It seems logically inconsistent to claim on the one hand that 
interdependence structures make human groups “function”, supporting the development of 
a common social identity and the establishment of depersonalized trust, while on the other 
hand claiming that interdependence also increases intergroup bias, strengthening group 
boundaries and promoting conflict between groups. 
The easiest way to address this issue is to discuss Buchan and colleague’s (2009) 
study from the nested social dilemma literature – namely, that globalization on the level of 
the individual and their community actually leads to less intergroup bias. In order to 
explain this discrepancy, three topics issues must be addressed: firstly, the difference 
between heterogeneity and levels of globalization, secondly, the different conceptualization 
of intergroup bias, and thirdly, the difference between collective and relational social 
identification. 
 Heterogeneity is defined merely as the presence of outgroup within the framework of 
a superordinate group. Globalization, however, is defined as the rate of exchange of ideas 
and other goods between groups. In the supplementary material of Buchan and colleague’s 
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work, we see that both the individual and country-level measurement of globalization is, in 
fact, the measure of engagement with the cultural and material artefacts originating in 
other national and ethnic contexts. In other words, it is a measure of between-group contact 
that the individual introduces into their life, and that their entire community promotes and 
nourishes. 
 The researchers themselves agree – the positive effect globalization has on the 
suspension of intergroup bias, as seen by more universalist choices in the multilevel public 
goods game, should be put down to the growth of the participants’ interpersonal networks 
to include members of outgroups, rather than mere presence of those outgroups. One may 
say that heterogeneity must exist first to provide the opportunity for such exchanges to 
take place. However, that still does not mean that heterogeneity itself is enough to promote 
peace. Rather, an element of interpersonal exchange – what Granovetter called “weak ties” 
(1973) - must be present, building the depersonalized trust required within the group by 
entering dyadic exchanges with outgroup members. Given that high levels of globalization 
already mean group boundaries have been loosened are made more permeable, this has led 
to an opportunity to generate trust, meaning that the dilemma inherent in managing 
common resources across groups has become less problematic. 
 Secondly, Buchan and colleagues’ work does not provide a test of intergroup bias as 
we have conceptualized it here – independent allocations to unconnected ingroup and 
outgroup targets. Instead, their measure of intergroup bias is the willingness to invest in a 
local, subgroup common resource pool, or in a global, superordinate group common resource 
pool. It is important to note that the superordinate pool potentially carried greater rewards 
for the individual, thus making it the self-interested choice given that the participants 
predicted others will behave the same way. Once portrayed this way, the findings cease to 
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be surprising: in countries, and for people, who have experienced more frequent interaction 
with outgroup members, interpersonal interdependence has been established across group 
boundaries. Thus, enough trust may be shared between groups to promote the choice which 
benefits not only the individual but also the greatest number of other participants, i.e. a 
universalist choice. Those people and communities in which fewer exchanges between 
members of different groups took place, the strategies are necessarily more parochial – 
people chose to take part in the dilemma they were more sure they could solve. While I 
cannot say that contributions to the subgroup’s resource were not a demonstration of some 
type of intergroup bias, it is difficult to compare it to the one tested in this study, and 
discussed in the literature (e.g. Hjort, 2013; Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005). 
 From this study, I can conclude only that presenting members of two, previously 
unconnected groups with the social dilemma inherent in common resource management can 
nurture conflict between them. For reasons I can only speculate, it seems not to matter 
whether this dilemma is shared across group boundaries (as in the Interdependent 
condition in Study 2), or separated across group boundaries (as in Study 1 and the Matched 
condition in Study 2). This conflict may be result of a lack of a network of generalized 
reciprocity which would generate trust on an interpersonal level. Without this network 
being established not only within the group (where it is assumed; Yamagishi, 2007), but 
also between groups, the dilemma inherent in common resource management causes group 
members to maximize the difference between their own and the outgroup, even when this 
difference maximization does not benefit the ingroup in any immediate way. With the 
establishment of such a network of exchanges, the group boundaries become more 
permeable allowing for trust to be tested and carried over from the ingroup to include the 
interdependent outgroup. 
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 Finally, we arrive at the issue of collective and relational social identity. It stands to 
reason that, in order to solve the dilemmas resulting from communal living, humans had to 
be able to understand the differences between individual and collective rationality. This, 
logically, entails the ability to perceive the group as an entity, beyond the immediate 
interpersonal network of the individual. Previous research suggests that there is a 
universality of ingroup/outgroup concepts beyond the concepts of family or village (Brewer, 
1986; Brewer & Campbell, 1976; Levine & Campbell, 1972). If this is true, we would expect 
a difference in identification with group members, and identification with the group, and 
indeed, we see just that. In the discussions of social identity, researchers have found 
evidence of a duality (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Prentice, Miller, & Lightdale, 1994). One 
type of social identity, called relational identification, stems from knowledge of previous 
interactions with other individuals, while the other, collective identification, stems from a 
meta-cognition of the group. I propose that collective identity would logically have to be 
constructed as more exclusive and would be more likely to be juxtaposed against outgroup 
categories, breeding conflict22. 
 Variations in relational identification should be connected more strongly to the 
establishment of a personal network of exchanges than they are to juxtaposition of the 
group against the group. Meanwhile, variations in collective identification levels should be 
connected to the awareness of group performance and success in absolute terms, as well as 
relative to other compatible groups. The way in which the intergroup contact is framed, i.e. 
                                                          
22 Hamamura (2017) recently published a study which not only created a more sensitive measure of 
social identity I have called for, but also showed that collective identification is connected to less 
positive attitudes towards diversity (cf. Lee, Adair, Mannix, & Kim, 2012). This was in accordance to 
my prediction. Since I have written this section before Hamamura’s work was published, I chose to 
postpone the discussion of his work for the conclusion, leaving a record of my prediction here. 
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how group members perceive the interaction, will presumably influence the emergence and 
importance of either type of identification as a behavioural cue. 
In a heterogeneous society, it is likely that people will eventually enter into 
interpersonal exchanges across group borders. The more the individual identifies with their 
ingroup in terms of relationships, rather than category, the more easily they may enter into 
such relationships. This gives them a chance to establish “weak ties” (Granovetter, 1973; 
Kadushin, 2012), pathways between groups which serve as mechanisms for exchanging 
ideas and goods between different networks of people. Since these exchanges are dyadic, 
they provide a relatively low-cost testing ground. The dilemma in each interaction impacts 
only the two individuals, not the outcomes of the whole group. These small exchanges in the 
face of limited risk may serve (given that the exchanges were mutually beneficial) as fertile 
ground for trust to be established between networked people, and later, between the groups 
these people belong to. Finally, such a process might lead to the emergence (or growing 
support for) a superordinate identity. Thus, stressing the ingroup as a relational construct, 
makes it easier to relate to outgroup members as well. If the intergroup exchanges are 
based solely on such person-to-person interactions, and providing a larger, superordinate 
group framework is available as a reference point, people might begin to interpret their 
interdependence with the outgroup in positive terms, suspending their bias on average. 
However, if the exchange happening in a heterogeneous, superordinate group puts 
forward the question of group-level interdependence without any chance for participants to 
create bridges between the subgroups, there is no trust between subgroups capable of 
negotiating the dilemma they encounter. Furthermore, since the dilemma occurs between 
subgroups, the cognition of the problem is necessarily related to the meta-cognition of the 
group, and thus to collective identification. This type of exchange neither supports the 
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understanding of groups as communities of related individuals, nor the perception of those 
communities as permeable. Thus, no weak ties can be established, and no trust tested. 
Rather, as in the current study, people have to scramble to manage a social dilemma with 
only the trust they implicitly share with subgroup members to fall back on. 
While social identity was measured in the current study, the instrument used was 
not sensitive enough to differentiate between collective and relational identities. However, 
it is possible that levels of collective identification would have accounted for the bias in 
predictions of contribution to the common good, and through them, to the size of the 
intergroup bias. Levels of relational identification as well as the perceived similarity and 
positivity of group members (the actual measure of social identity in this study), should not 
contribute to the explanation of the bias. 
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Summary of Empirical Data 
 I began this work by delimiting some of the problems faced by heterogeneous 
societies. Within-group heterogeneity, here defined as the emergence of distinct subgroups 
within the framework of a larger, superordinate group, has been shown to lead to internal 
conflict and a collapse of group resources (e.g. Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005). Minorities 
and majorities which should cooperate to maintain the resources they depend on, fail to 
contribute to their maintenance. Lacking the reassurance that the dilemma inherent in 
group-level interdependence will be successfully managed across subgroups (e.g. that the 
sanctioning system will reliably target freeriders in the minority and majority alike), 
participants in the dilemma withdraw support for the common resource. At the same time, 
the minority’s very presence is, a priori, construed as a threat by the majority group, 
anticipating a lack of cohesion and a loss of what Festinger called “group locomotion” i.e. 
the group’s abilities to achieve common goals (Festinger, 1957). For this reason, the 
minority is ostracized, distrusted, shut out, and even victimized by the majority. This 
treatment, unsurprisingly, damages the psychological and economic wellbeing of minority 
groups, stunting their ability (and willingness) to, in turn, cooperate with the majority.  
 My goal in this thesis was to explain these phenomena by linking the behaviours 
they engender to the structural characteristics of the interaction and the situation. For this, 
I have used an extended version of Structural Goal Expectation theory which relies on the 
analysis of human goals and expectations as catalysts of behaviour. This analysis takes into 
consideration not only the decision-makers’ biases, attitudes, and preferences, but also the 
context in which the decision is being made. Thus, what interested me most was: what 
minimal situational factors are needed in order to replicate, in a laboratory setting, the sort 
of problems with heterogeneity that we see in real-world societies? 
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Rather than merely the result of embedded or conflicting social identities, I argued 
these problems result from the mismatch between social identity and the interdependence 
structure of the group. As I have laid out in Chapter 2, social identity serves as an 
important cue for whom to trust and how to behave. Human psychology has equipped us 
with an emotional and cognitive relationship to our group membership in order to reduce 
the risk of “misbehaving” in intergroup situations. The error management strategy in this 
case is parochial, meaning that erring on the side of caution in intergroup situations always 
means sticking with one’s own. However, identification itself is not enough to endorse 
parochialism. Social identity does not operate in a vacuum, but in a structured social 
situation which humans are uniquely equipped to perceive, judge, and counter. Thus, 
asking questions of intergroup behaviour in a structured, incentivized context seems more 
likely to produce accurate predictions about human behaviour, rather than relying merely 
on identification levels.  
In this case, I was interested what common resource management, a standard social 
dilemma existing in all human groups, did for intergroup bias in three cases: 1) between 
groups of unequal size which share the management of the resource, 2) between groups of 
equal size which share the management of the resource, and 3) between groups which 
manage the resource independently. I had predictions only for the first case – that the 
majority’s expectation minority members will freeride on the public good will lead them to 
exhibit true outgroup hate. At the same time, this should not hold true for the minority, 
who should suspend intergroup bias given that they have no dilemma to solve. 
Indeed, the empirical data I had collected supports my propositions. In Chapter 3, I 
show how engaging the consciousness of a resource management dilemma between a 
minority and majority produces an asymmetrical negative bias. When independent 
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individual decision-makers were made aware of a Public Goods game being played by other 
(minority and majority) group members, the decision makers who belonged to the majority 
discriminated more frequently and more harshly than the minority. These results were not 
explained by levels of social identification, nor by the expectation of future reciprocity by 
other majority members, but by the majority’s prediction minority members will contribute 
less to the common good. The fact that this effect occurred in minimal groups, in the 
laboratory, and despite the fact the individual could not expect reciprocal treatment or 
reputation gains, is a powerful indicator that the behaviour constitutes a default strategy 
for dealing with heterogeneous groups. 
Despite the fact minority members have previously been shown to exhibit more 
discrimination than the majority (e.g. Leonardelli & Brewer, 2001), when managing 
common resources with the majority they showed low or non-significant levels of intergroup 
bias, both in terms of predicted contributions to the resource and in terms of allocations to 
different targets. In other words, they suspended bias when faced with a common resource 
management dilemma. As yet, it is unclear what the motivations for the lack of bias might 
be. We can speculate that reminding the minority of their interdependence with the 
majority, increases positive attitudes towards the majority, engages greater levels of 
identification with the superordinate group, and elicits more investment into the outcomes 
of the superordinate group rather than the minority subgroup. We might expect the 
minority to feel more included and powerful as a result.  
From a sGET and evolutionary perspective, suspending intergroup bias in the 
presence of group-level interdependence can be considered a sound long-term strategy for 
several reasons. The minority’s smaller size usually means fewer resources can be 
monopolized, generated and maintained. In addition, any defection is more costly. With the 
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majority in tow, the resource is increased, while the cost of individual defection is reduced. 
In addition, reliance on common resources can foster universalism simply by providing a 
framework for mutual cooperation which can only benefit the minority. In this way, it can 
bolster the superordinate identity by making it “real”, i.e. matching it with a functioning 
network of exchange. At the same time, group-level interdependence might also serve as a 
reminder of the possibility for negative reciprocity from majority members – again making 
discrimination a strategy less likely to maximize fitness. 
We can say that reliance on common resources in heterogeneous societies in and of 
itself incites outgroup hate from the side of the majority, answering my question about the 
minimal necessary situational factors which elicit conflict between minorities and 
majorities. On the other hand, we can give a more positive slant to my results and say that 
consciousness of common resource management in a heterogeneous society is an important 
component of peace-building between minorities and majorities, in the sense that it reduces 
discrimination on the part of the minority. However, the less optimistic effect of group-level 
interdependence seems to be the more basic, as seen from the results in the other two cases 
I had investigated: that of independent and interdependent groups of equal size. When 
people are conscious of a common resource management dilemma taking place, whether 
between or within the group, they exhibit outgroup hate. In other words, they behave like 
the majority, interpreting any sort of social dilemma as grounds to pre-emptively reduce the 
outcomes of the outgroup. 
In Chapter 4, I address these two cases in turn by having participants supervise a 
Public Goods game played either across group boundaries, or within them. My logic was 
that the asymmetry in the case of minorities and majorities could be the result of either 
group-level interdependence, or relative group size, or an interaction of both. These three 
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structural factors were confounded in the experimental design in Chapter 3. Thus, the goal 
was to eliminate relative group size as a factor, and look solely at the impact of group-level 
interdependence on intergroup bias, more precisely outgroup hate. In addition, I sought to 
replicate findings from BGR (Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 1999) which demonstrated that 
intergroup bias should not occur if there is no interdependence structure in place to impact 
the individual decision-makers’ outcomes. 
However, the results showed participants discriminated against the outgroup not 
only in the two conditions engendering a common resource dilemma, but also in the control 
condition, in which there was no group-level, or interpersonal interdependence. This failure 
of replication casts a shadow of doubt on all the results I have presented, since it can mean 
that the experimental design, or Yamagishi’s theory of interdependence (upon I have built 
my version of sGET) are faulty. Such an interpretation is possible, but there is good reason 
to reject it. 
Firstly, the results I have presented in Chapter 3, for the case of minority and 
majority management of common resources, use the same manipulation. Yet, they 
demonstrate an asymmetry which cannot be explained by Social Identity theory alone, nor 
by BGR alone. However, it was predicted correctly by sGET. Thus, even if the experimental 
design has not truly eliminated the interpersonal interdependence, the results are striking 
and specific. 
Secondly, while there was no difference in behaviour across the conditions of 
Chapter 4, there were differences in which variables explained that behaviour. In the 
control condition, the intergroup bias was indeed explained best by levels of identification 
with the ingroup. This was not true for the two conditions which introduced group-level 
interdependence where the reasons for discriminating against the outgroup were the result 
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of predicting they would cheat on the public good. This could be just a convenient 
justification (e.g. Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977) tacked on to decisions participants 
were anyways going to make. Nevertheless, the fact levels of identification could not 
account for the bias cannot be ignored. 
My interpretation of the problematic results from Chapter 4 is that group-level 
interdependence merely engaged the same parochial strategy for dealing with intergroup 
situations that humans seem to use across dilemma-prone situations. This can either be the 
result of perceived threat / competition, or the result of long-term thinking. Thus, common 
resources being managed in a heterogeneous group where the subgroups are of equal size, 
or in two homogeneous groups, can result in the common resource being perceived as a 
zero-sum game between groups. Alternatively, thinking about such a complex game as the 
Public Goods game, which has multiple steps and levels of impact (individual v. group) may 
engage long-term thinking. In intergroup situations, long-term thinking always means 
parochial thinking, since in the long run, the ingroup is more likely to impact the 
individual’s fitness. 
Interestingly, nowhere in my data have I found evidence that heterogeneous groups 
are necessarily destructive of the common resources. In Chapter 3, I have found no 
indication that minority members were going to contribute less money to the public good 
than majority members. While more research is needed, it would seem that minority 
freeriding (while it may occur under specific circumstances) is not to blame for the collapse 
of the public good we observe in real-life macro-level data. In Chapter 4, I have found no 
difference in intended contributions to the public good across the conditions. Whether the 
common resource was managed within (Matched condition) or between groups 
(Interdependent condition), the intended contributions as reported by the participants was 
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not significantly different. In fact, it was slightly higher in the Interdependent condition. 
The same (non) effect was reported by Hugh-Jones and Perroni (2014; 2017), strengthening 
my findings. However, this leaves the question open – what exactly is it that accounts for 
the loss of common resources when they are managed in diversity? 
To summarize, in this thesis, my goal was to present a novel theoretical framework 
which seeks to connect human behaviour to situational factors. I have demonstrated its 
voracity on the problem of minority and majority intergroup conflict. I have argued that the 
common resource dilemma and discrimination between minorities and majorities are 
connected in the sense that they share a structural impetus. Moreover, they loop back into 
each other creating a vicious circle of self-fulfilling prophecy. The need to maintain common 
resources in heterogeneous groups engenders in itself a dilemma which starts the cycle. The 
fear of the majority that the minority will not contribute to the common resource fuels 
discrimination. In response, the minority has no choice but to reciprocate, cluster closer 
together, and reject contact with the majority, thus making the boundaries between the 
subgroups even less permeable, and the conflict between them all the more rooted. 
Importantly, this wall-building also prevents the successful management of the public good. 
Since the boundaries between minorities and majorities are reinforced, any mechanism for 
solving the common resource management dilemma is doomed to fail, starting the cycle all 
over again. 
Limitations 
 In this section, I will discuss the limitation of the research presented in the thesis. 
This criticism will be divided into two parts. The first will deal with the limitations of 
experimental design, and the conclusions we can draw from the studies presented in the 
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thesis. The second will deal with the theoretical limitations of the sGET as I have proposed 
it here. 
 In this thesis, I have almost exclusively used experimental methods, more precisely, 
experimental economic games. These games are meant to simulate interpersonal exchanges 
in a paradigmatic way, meaning, they present participants with an unrecognizable version 
of a situation they are likely to face in different domains in their lives. By recording human 
behaviour under such abstracted circumstances, researchers hope to ascertain default 
responses to certain situational factors and setups. The strength of using experimental 
economic games to gather information about human behaviour in diverse situations is that 
they can model a decontextualized exchange between humans without the additional noise 
which appears in reality. Thus, an allocation game in which the allocator has no vested 
interest in behaving one way or another – such as the one I have used in the thesis to 
measure intergroup bias – can be likened to making decisions about who to hire, or where 
to direct one’s charitable donations. Situating such an exchange in an intergroup context 
allows the researcher to test whether people will, on average, engage a more or less 
parochial strategy to handle the interaction. 
 However, some weaknesses are inherent in this sort of experimental design. Firstly, 
the experiment often uses money or stand-ins for money to create a sense of reality and real 
consequence for the participants. Some research has suggested that this engages a more 
strategic, rational thinking (Smith & Walker, 1993), what is to say, they behave closer to 
the model of the self-interested, profit-maximizing Homo economicus. This might mean that 
in real life, participants from the majority might have engaged in more empathy and 
universalism, treating minority members equally, or even preferentially. On the other 
hand, minority members might have behaved in a more discriminatory way out of spite or 
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fear. There are several possible responses to this. Firstly, the issues with using money in 
economic games mostly have to do with games in which the participants’ payoffs are 
variable. In other words, if the individual’s rewards are interdependent with rewards of 
other participants, the individual will behave in a more profit-maximizing way than they 
might do in exchanges not involving money. However, in my design, the individual decision-
maker’s rewards were fixed in advance so this criticism applies only marginally.  
Furthermore, in my experience, using money in economic games is the simplest way 
to get participants to pay attention to the design, and take their decisions within it 
seriously. Monetary incentives for behaviour, if they are significant enough, are a universal 
cue that the impact one’s decisions have on others is real. In my experiments, it was 
important for the participants to realize they would have real impact on others.  
Another general criticism of the use of economic games to test human behaviour is 
that the games can be quite complex and confusing to the participants. The complexity of 
the experimental design was addressed in Study 1 after participants in the first three 
experimental sessions (not included in the final analysis) reported high levels of confusion 
during debriefing. Thus, the term “supervisor” was included in the experimental design to 
describe the decision-makers, and separate them from the participants supposedly taking 
part in a Public Goods game. The design was further streamlined in Study 2, where 
extraneous features like a subdivision of minimal groups into a minimal minority and 
majority using a second perception task were eliminated. However, as I have mentioned 
before, the games themselves are complex, it is uncommon for participants to have to keep 
two games in mind simultaneously, and most of the participants in both studies are 
unlikely to have encountered them before. While this naivety makes them “better” 
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participants, it may also have impacted their behaviour (although, again, this does not 
explain the presence of an asymmetry between minority and majority decision-makers).  
For this reason, I had introduced manipulations checks to make sure the 
participants understood the content and set up of the game. While the checks can 
sometimes be used as data to eliminate the participants who got the answers wrong, I 
attempted to conserve as many responses as possible. My manipulation checks were done 
as a TRUE or FALSE test in which participants were asked to evaluate the accuracy of 
statements pertaining to the experimental procedure or the way the games work. While 
some participants got the answers wrong, they were immediately corrected and offered to 
re-read the instructions (See Supplementary Materials). An additional manipulation check 
in the post-experimental questionnaire nevertheless revealed there was confusion about 
some aspects of the study. This was within expected levels. 
When it comes to the failure of the replication I had discussed at length in Chapter 
4, it is possible that the complexity of the design can account for the intergroup bias in the 
Control. In the case of the Control condition, the guarantee of a fixed reward and the 
separation of the participants online from the recipients supposedly engaging in another 
activity in the laboratory might have been too finicky and subtle a manipulation. This type 
of manipulation was successfully used in the 1993 paper by Karp, Jin, Yamagishi and 
Shinotsuka to break down the assumed interpersonal interdependence between ingroup 
members, which was why I had used it here. However, Yamagishi and Mifune (2015) have 
shown that the same can be achieved by the manipulation of commonality of knowledge of 
group membership. In other words, by unilaterally withholding information on who is a 
group member, Yamagishi and Mifune discontinued reputation concerns and expectations 
of future reciprocity as possible motivations for behaving in a parochial, ingroup-oriented 
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
196 
 
way. Apart from being more elegant, it seems to me that this experimental manipulation 
may be more easily understood by the participants. Thus, one of the future goals of this 
research is to redo the studies presented in the empirical chapters while manipulating 
community of knowledge. 
In addition, this complexity of design meant to discontinue interpersonal 
interdependence could have resulted in the lack of difference between the other two 
conditions from Chapter 4, the Interdependent (two groups share the management of 
common resources) and the Matched condition (two groups manage independent common 
resources separately). In the experimental design, the conditions differed from each other in 
only a few words, denoting whether the Public Goods game was taking part with all 
participants in the experiments irrespective of group membership, or with Green/Blue 
group members separately23. With everything else the participants had to keep track of, 
this detail might have fallen off by the wayside. In the future, it might be prudent to add a 
graphic depiction and reminder of the differences between conditions. Perhaps, in addition, 
it would be important to explicitly state that one group’s rewards in the Public Goods game 
does not, and cannot, impact the other group’s rewards in the Public Goods game, when it 
comes to the Matched condition. 
Unfortunately, none of the limitations inherent in the use of economic games can be 
addressed in this work. As with any research which uses a single method of data collection, 
we can only gain confidence in the results presented here once other methods allow for a 
triangulation. I will discuss some of these methods in the next section of the Conclusion. 
 The use of the Public Goods game as a model for the common resource management 
                                                          
23 While the manipulation distinguishing the Interdependent from the Matched condition was reaffirmed 
several times (see Supplementary Materials for more details), no check was performed to make sure whether 
this repetition alone was enough to achieve the desired effect. 
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dilemma can also be criticized. The give-some dilemma, exemplified in this thesis, relies on 
the tradeoff between actively participating in the generation of a public good, and passively 
consuming it. Meanwhile, the take-some dilemma relies on the tradeoff between preserving 
the common good for long-term use, and securing one’s maximum benefit immediately. It is 
entirely possible that the give-some dilemma has a different impact to the take-some 
dilemma rest on different psychological mechanisms, and thus would elicit a different 
response in my study. In addition, a take-some dilemma in which the resource itself will not 
replenish (standing in for such slow-replenishing resources as oil and natural gas, for 
example) can represent a case onto itself. Whatever the case, testing my findings on 
multiple configurations of the n-persona social dilemma will be a necessary future step. 
Finally, a criticism of the use of “supervisor” and “supervision” to describe the 
participants and their task in the experiment should be noted once more. While Allport’s 
(1954; 1958) theory of intergroup contact states that differences in status hinder reductions 
in intergroup hostilities, and even promote them (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2005), this applies to 
a status difference between groups, rather than between individuals. Here, the status 
difference between the “supervisor” and the “recipients” applied only to the individual 
decision-makers, as opposed to the recipients from both the decision-maker’s ingroup and 
outgroup. Even if the status difference between individuals in some way altered the results, 
this alone is again not enough to explain the asymmetry between minority versus majority 
members’ behaviour. 
Next, we can turn to the criticisms which can be levelled at my expanded version of 
sGET in terms of the theoretical model and predictions it makes. First and most obvious of 
those is the fact that sGET in its current form is tentative at best. Even though I have 
made an attempt to explain what the “structural” part of structural Goal/Expectation 
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theory is, the two steps in the analysis of structure are merely a starting point. While it 
would seem that discussing the structure of the interaction humans are presented with, 
and the structure of the situation in which they find themselves, are a sound spring board, 
my current model of sGET lacks any sort of general predictions. For example, I cannot say 
whether relative group size (a situational factor) will impact human behaviour differently 
in games with more interdependence (such as the Trust game, or the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game) as opposed to less interdependence (such as the allocation game I had used, or the 
Dictator game). Necessarily, these sort of more general predictions can only come after 
sGET has been tested on more differently structured situations, and different interactions. 
SGET makes no predictions about intergroup attitude formation. While this can be 
construed as a criticism of the theory, it should be noted that the way attitudes 
(particularly long lasting attitudes which get included into stereotypes) are formed about 
different groups are not where sGET is most useful. Rather, sGET is explicitly concerned 
only with the prediction of human behaviour. Nevertheless, the role of intergroup attitudes 
in intergroup behaviours within this framework should be clarified.  
The same is true for levels of social identification which, as we have seen, do not 
predict behaviour completely, and sometimes not at all. Nevertheless, social identity and 
identification are important cues for behaviour in intergroup situations. While Chapter 2 
discusses the evolutionary role of social identity formation and expression, its role in 
sGET’s idea of intergroup behaviour has yet to be investigated. Since in sGET, I talk about 
four different types of interdependence which is likely to occur in group contexts, I argue a 
more sensitive measurement of social identity should be applied. In particular, this 
measurement should distinguish between social identity as a connection to a group identity 
(the category of the group), as opposed to group members (the network contained within 
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that category). Put another way, this measurement should be sensitive to collective 
identification, as opposed to relational identification (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Prentice, 
Miller, & Lightdale, 1994). The idea here is that collective identification, based on the meta-
cognition of the group, might have a greater impact on behaviour in situations where such 
cognition is more readily available, specifically when it comes to group-level, between-group 
and socio-cultural interdependence. Meanwhile, relational identification, based on the 
cognition of the connection to other group members, may have a greater impact in 
intergroup situations in which interpersonal interdependence is stressed. Alternatively, 
different types of identification may support different strategies across situations. For 
example, collective identification could be related to more parochial strategies of behaviour 
in dilemma-engendering situations, since the cognitive and emotional connection it 
supports is related to the group category rather than the group members. Since relational 
identification is based on the cognitive and emotional connection to the ingroup network, it 
may reduce the intergroup bias and promote more universalist strategies if the individual’s 
actual, local ingroup network is not present.  
Future Directions 
 The present research has shown that minority and majority dynamics can shift 
depending on the situation which these groups have to solve. Activating the awareness of 
common resource management leads to majority showing more negative bias, while the 
minority suspends the bias under the same circumstances. In discussing future directions, I 
will outline a series of research topics along with a proposal on how to address each of 
them. These topics and projects build directly on the results presented in this thesis, 
addressing limitations or echoing ideas from previous chapters. I believe they constitute the 
next logical step in the investigation of problems we encounter in diverse societies, namely: 
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discrimination, the collapse of the public goods, and the cause-and-effect loop I propose 
exists between the two. While we have been discussing the impact of group-level 
interdependence on groups of equal size, minority/majority relations will be the main focus 
of the future work proposed here. Thus, the three major points of interest for future 
investigation should be, 
 Does heterogeneity in and of itself cause a decrease in the common resources, and if 
not, what attitudinal and structural factors would cause such a decrease? 
 What mechanisms promote the harsher, more frequent discrimination the majority 
displayed against minority members when common resources have to be managed between 
them? 
 What mechanisms promote the suspension of discriminatory behaviour the minority 
displayed towards the majority members when common resources have to be managed 
between them? 
 The proposed projects’ main purpose is to answer these basic points and provide 
more internal and external validity to the results presented in the thesis, as well as 
investigate how to manipulate the emergence of the troubling phenomena of asymmetrical 
discrimination in minority and majority contexts. In addition, the projects’ secondary 
purpose is theory-building, particularly when it comes to integrating social identity with 
sGET. The methods to be used will mainly be experimental, however, seeing how I have 
already argued for the need for triangulation, other methods will be explored, namely 
survey data and vignette studies.  
The different designs of the projects are tentative, although some of them are 
dictated by the design of the PhD project. The reason for this is to preserve the ability to 
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compare data from the present and the future project. In addition, as I have discussed 
before, I plan to redeem my word to participants who thought they were impacting others 
with their allocations in Study 2, thus continuing the trend to reduce the use of deception in 
psychological experiments. 
Impact of diversity and relative group size on common resource management 
Macro-level data I have discussed at length has found, with a considerable degree of 
consistency, that diversity has a negative impact on the management of group resources (cf. 
Santos, Santos, & Pacheco, 2008). This has been found in both the give-some (e.g. Public 
Goods game), and the take-some (e.g. Common resource dilemma) social dilemmas. Once 
more, sGET will be the main theoretical axis for this investigation. The central question 
posed by sGET is thus, under which conditions will diversity in society negatively impact 
the contributions to the common good? This research topic and the design attached to it will 
form the basis of future investigations into the dynamics of minority and majority conflict, 
and can be thought of as phase one of the proposed research projects, upon which all the 
other research designs presented in this section are built. 
While secondary results presented in this thesis, but also results from studies by 
Hugh-Jones and Perroni (2014; 2017), show that it is unlikely that diversity, represented in 
the lab by minimal minority/ majority divisions, will result in a loss of public goods, this is 
nevertheless a starting point. It is likely that additional situational factors will have to be 
manipulated before diversity results in lower contributions to the management of a 
common resource, as I will discuss below. The additional purpose of this project is to gather 
data which might point to what these factors might be, on an attitudinal as well as a 
structural level. 
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
202 
 
The minimal minority/majority division from Study 2 (Chapter 3) will be replicated 
as participants recruited on Jacobs University campus play a Public Goods game. In 
addition, a true Control condition will be added in which participants play the PGG with 
other group members, and with no knowledge of diversity within the group, or the existence 
of another group. Since I have used the give-some dilemma, modelled by the Public Goods 
game, in this thesis, I plan to continue using it in the follow-up project. 
The participants’ rewards for their participation will be decided by the winnings 
from the PGG, but also by randomly matching participants in each condition to one of the 
supervisors who had previously made their decisions under the same conditions. Thus, the 
participants’ payoffs will vary based on their own decisions, the decisions of all other 
players, and the decisions of the supervisors from the PhD project. 
The main comparison to be made will be in donation patterns between conditions. If 
diversity in and of itself is enough to elicit smaller giving to the public good, then a 
difference should be apparent between the Control conditions and the minority/majority 
conditions. In addition, we will test whether minority as opposed to majority members’ 
donations to the public good differ significantly. Since we can assume that neither of these 
will be the case, additional data dealing with possible attitudinal and structural factors 
which might induce 1) greater defection from one side, or 2) predictions of greater defection 
from the other side, will be gathered using vignettes.  The vignettes will describe slightly 
different experimental paradigms within which participants are invited to consider how 
they would behave under the same circumstances. This form of self-report has the obvious 
weakness that it asks participants to imagine an already abstract situation. However, it 
can serve as indication for which experimental paradigms are thought by the participants 
most likely to cause a shift in their behaviour. These will be discussed in more detail below.  
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
203 
 
Impact of attitudinal and situational factors on the relationship between diversity and 
common resource management 
As I have argued above, previous research has shown that it is unlikely diversity 
and relative group size alone will be enough to cause a collapse of the public good managed 
across group lines. Thus, the question becomes, what will be enough? In other words, what 
attitudinal and situational factors have to be present before the minority and majority 
become incapable of managing a public good together without significant loss when 
compared to a homogeneous group? Self-reported responses to different experimental 
situations, as well as general attitudes towards relevant concepts, will be related to actual 
behaviour in the PGG. 
When it comes to attitudinal factors which might induce defection or predictions of 
defection, these include general attitudes towards public goods, perception of the 
experimental situation as either more competitive or more cooperative, levels of 
relational/collective identification with the minimal group, ideas about the boundedness of 
group resources or interpersonal networks, etc. Importantly for the arguments I make in 
this thesis, the participant’s trait and situational tendencies to think in long-term outcomes 
will be tested for their impact on donations to the PGG. In addition, real-life attitudes 
towards public goods, different minority groups, opinions of them, and predictions of their 
behaviour, will be gathered and related to behaviour in the game. However, it is unlikely 
that a student sample will provide the variance needed to establish how these attitudes 
influence behaviour in the PGG and treatment of minority/majority members with group-
level interdependence in play. For that reason, these questions will be elaborated upon in 
the last of the projects I will describe in this section. 
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In terms of structural factors, the possibilities are numerous, but three will be 
investigated in particular: type of public good, reputation transparency within the 
superordinate group, and reward/punishment structures meant to enforce cooperation. 
Using vignettes to ask participants’ intended behaviour, and predictions’ of other 
participants’ behaviour in the face of different structural characteristics, the idea is to get a 
better grasp of how people would respond given a slightly different game paradigm. The 
setting of the vignettes will remain a laboratory setting, but different manipulations will be 
suggested to participants, whereupon they will be asked to predict their own, and others’ 
behaviour. Each participant will be presented with only one variable which differs from the 
original game in a between-subjects design. Since they will have already experienced the 
basic PGG, the participants should have little trouble imagining a modified version of it. 
The first vignette will have to do with the type of public good managed. The PGG, 
which I have used so far, encapsulates a give-some-dilemma in which participants have to 
actively contribute to the generation of a public good. Take-some dilemmas, however, 
represented by the Common Resource dilemma game, centre around the way a community 
will handle an existing resource. This resource will either replenish after each round, or it 
is finite, meaning that it is only a matter of time before it can no longer be exploited. A 
depleting resource, and particularly one which cannot be refilled, is likely to present a 
greater temptation to freeride, cause the majority to predict more cheating from the 
minority’s side, and thus a harsher response to (assumed) freeriders. In addition, it might 
be possible that the minority does indeed overexploit the resource under the take-some 
dilemma parameters. 
Monitoring is a basic prerequisite for managing a social dilemma. Thus, the 
permeability of group boundaries in terms of monitoring will be another target of the 
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vignettes. For example, the participants will be asked about their own and other’s projected 
behaviour in the PGG given that each player’s contributions are recorded and available for 
review by the entire group (global monitoring). In comparison, the player’s contributions 
may only be available for review to the members of their subgroup (local monitoring). If the 
monitoring is global and thus reputation is transparent to the whole group, as opposed to 
only the subgroup, concerns about reputation should likewise extend to the whole group, 
engaging a more inclusive network of interpersonal exchange. My prediction is that such 
transparency might ease the majority’s predictions of minority cheating, and by extension 
their negative attitudes towards them. At the same time,  
When it comes to reward and punishment, there have been discussions about the 
effectiveness of peer punishment (to be discussed more below), versus punishment by an 
appointed dictator, an elected dictator, or by an automatic institutional mechanism 
(Ambrus & Greiner, 2015; Decker, Stiehler, & Strobel, 2003; Hilbe, Traulsen, Roehl, & 
Milinski, 2013). In the case of minorities and majorities, it is possible their intended 
contributions to the public good might change if, for example, there is a system of 
punishment in place which hinges on decisions made by an elected representative who is a 
majority member, as opposed to minority member. Alternatively, the contributions might 
differ if peer punishment is the “law of the land” but it is either shared among all the group 
members, or only subgroup members. 
In addition, these reward and punishment systems can be just or unjust. Thus, we 
can introduce a system of automatic institutional punishment which targets minority or 
majority targets more often. Alternatively, we can introduce a system of institutional 
reward which accords greater added benefit of cooperation to minority or majority targets.  
The effect of unjust systems (or systems perceived to be unjust by one side or another) could 
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be detrimental not only to relations between interdependent groups, but also on the public 
good itself. 
Impact of diversity in common resource management on willingness to punish minority / 
majority freeriders 
From the studies presented in the thesis, I can at most say that the outgroup hate 
majority members demonstrated towards minority members was explained by predictions 
of the contributions to the common good. Yet the question remains whether the predictions 
elicited a need to punish the perceived freeriders, or were themselves the result of a priori 
fear that minority freeriders will eventually monopolize the group resource. To test the first 
of these possibilities, I propose to add a mock punishment stage to the PGG I have just 
discussed.  
After taking part in the PGG, the participants will be presented with low, medium, 
and high contributors to the common resource in a post-experimental questionnaire. These 
targets’ group membership will vary across the scenarios, meaning they will either be 
members of the ingroup (in the Control condition), the ingroup minority, or the ingroup 
majority (in the minority/majority condition). This strategy method of collecting data 
suffers from certain flaws. Since the PGG does not have a true punishment stage, the 
participants’ decisions recorded in the scenarios will not be followed through, and thus will 
not be costly to either the participant, or their targets. Nevertheless, it will give an 
indication whether greater punishment in diverse societies is reserved for ingroup rather 
than outgroup members. 
We can make opposing predictions about the outcomes of this test. On the one hand, 
we should expect greater sanctions reserved for ingroup rather than outgroup defectors, as 
Shinada and colleagues (Shinada, 2009; Shinada, Yamagishi, & Ohmura, 2009) showed 
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previously. Thus both minority and majority members, given that they are interested in 
maintaining a positive image of their group and maintaining the public good, should direct 
their harsher punishment at their own subgroup members. 
However, based on the evidence I had presented in this work, as well as on Hugh-
Jones’ and Perroni’s work on expropriation (2017), we would expect the majority to direct 
harsher punishment at minority members. By this I mean not only that low contributors in 
the minority will be targeted for harsher punishment than comparable majority defectors, 
but that medium and even high contributors from the minority will nevertheless be 
targeted. Minority members, however, might direct harsher punishment likewise at 
minority members, in an effort to manage “their own”. They are likely to target low 
contributors in the majority for equally harsh punishment, but not medium or high 
contributors. 
In addition, and as a follow up to this study, different methods of donning out 
rewards and punishment should be considered as possible contributors to more, or less 
defection from the minority / majority members. As I have already discussed above, systems 
which rely on individual peer punishment, democratic punishment, institutionalized 
punishment, or a single dictator-like punisher, should be discussed and tested for their 
impact on minority / majority behaviour in the PGG, but also on their levels of conflict. 
While this additional question cannot be forced into this projects’ strategy method as I have 
just described it, it can certainly build upon it at a later date. 
Impact of diversity in common resource management on defensive aggression 
As we have discussed above, one of the reasons for discrimination between 
minorities and majorities which share the management of a common resource is simply the 
idea majorities have that minorities will cheat. However, the connection of this prediction 
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to threat is less clear. If minorities are indeed targeted for harsher and more frequent 
punishment, it is possible that they are constructed as an a priori threat given the 
consciousness of group-level interdependence. Again, we may use the participants who have 
already participated in the PGG I proposed as the first phase of the follow-up research 
project. Participants who had already experienced common resource management in 
diverse groups will be assigned once more to the same minimal minority or majority. 
Thereafter they will be randomly paired with another participant and take part in a 
Preemptive Strike Game (PSG; Simunovic, Mifune, & Yamagishi, 2013). The participants 
will then play the PSG only once, paired with either ingroup or outgroup members. The 
game will be played for real stakes, without deception, which means that the participants’ 
payoffs will vary depending on their own, and their pair’s choices in the game. 
The PSG was created as a strong test to measure defensive aggression. As such, it is 
appropriate not only for answering the research question on the motivations behind 
minority/majority discrimination in the face of common resource management (by 
connecting it to either fear or spite). It will also to address the criticism that the measure of 
outgroup hate in this thesis did not include a personal cost to the decision-makers and thus, 
did not mimic true, aggressive outgroup hate. 
The PSG mimics a first strike situation in which each side has the opportunity to 
destroy the other’s ability to attack by pushing a red button. However, if neither player 
pushes the button during the time frame given in the game, they are both better off for it. 
Two rational, self-interested actors should wait the game ends and walk away with the 
highest possible payoff. However, the first participant to push the red button is safe from 
counterattack at a relatively small cost. The attacked player suffers a greater loss, and 
loses their ability to affect the first player’s outcomes. The two motivations for attacking in 
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the PSG are therefore spite and fear. Simunovic, Mifune and Yamagishi (2013) have shown 
that the dominant motive when playing the game between (independent) groups or 
strangers is fear. Thus, if common resource management in diversity automatically frames 
the situation as a competitive, zero-sum game in which one group is likely to take 
advantage of the other, we should observe a greater attack rate in the Minority / Majority 
condition, rather than in the Control condition. In addition, if this threat-perception is 
higher for majority members, as the current studies suggest, we should observe a greater 
attack rate by majority members directed at the minority. 
To distinguish between the fear and spite motives for pushing the red button in the 
PSG, an alternate version of the game will be included in the research design as a post-
experimental vignette. In this version, two buttons are available to the participant – the red 
button, which protects the aggressor at a cost to themselves and the victim, and a blue 
button, which eliminates the possibility of a counter attack at a cost to the aggressor, but 
not the victim. In other words, by pushing the blue button, participants can protect 
themselves without damaging the other participant, a key component in spite. This version 
of the game is often asked in a scenario after participants had already experienced the 
original version of the PSG. Importantly for this project, it can hold the key to whether 
attack rates in the PSG between minorities and majorities are due to fear or spite. We may 
expect the minority to attack the majority out of fear, but, given the option, should choose 
the blue button rather than the red one. Meanwhile, if the majority is interested in 
reducing minority outcomes as well as protecting themselves, they should choose the red 
button irrespective of whether the blue button is available. 
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Analysis of relationships between predictions of behaviour in group resource management, 
attitudes on group resource management, and attitudes towards diversity in one’s 
community / society 
 Based on what I have proposed here, members of majorities around the world should 
have a negative reaction to diversity in community the more they are invested in the 
management of common resources. In other words, the more an individual believes that 
group resources are crucial to the group’s survival, the more sensitive they will be to cues 
that others will under-contribute or overexploit them. Likely, this will lead to negative 
attitudes towards diversity, multiculturalism, and particular minority groups. 
The effect should be true only for those minority communities which represent a 
discernible body of interconnected people, particularly if they have (or seem to have) 
political influence. In other words, the minorities targeted are likely to be only the ones who 
have political and economic influence, and a recognizable, bounded network of exchange set 
up between them. Thus, for example, we can expect ethnic or sexual minorities to become 
targets, but not the deaf or blind communities.  
This negative relationship between importance ascribed to the public good and the 
response to diversity in the face of common resource management should be mediated by 
their level of collective, rather than relational, social identity, as I have argued in Chapter 
4. Furthermore, this should be particularly evident in the West. Yuki (2003) shows that 
Japanese see their ingroups as collectives of interconnected persons, while US Americans 
see them as more homogenous conglomerates. He further suggests that there might be a 
difference in how ingroup loyalty is constructed. Indeed, Hamamura (2017) has recently 
shown just that. He began by creating a measurement of collective versus relational social 
identity. Collective identification is measured by agreement to statements such as, “[My] 
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culture is an important reflection of who I am”, while example items for measuring 
relational identification state, “My happiness depends very much on the happiness of other 
[group members]”. He found that in both Japan and the US, collective identifications 
correlated negatively, while relational identification correlated positively with attitudes 
towards multiculturalism. However, even though Japanese participants stressed the 
importance of relational rather than collective social identity (again, as predicted from 
Brewer & Yuki, 2007; Yuki, 2003), this did not lead to more positive attitudes towards 
diversity on the country level. Replicating these findings would be one of the purposes of 
this test, as well as addressing other attitudinal factors I have mentioned in connection to 
the first proposed project, like the tendency for long-term versus short-term thinking. 
Secondly, I am interested in the connection between levels of collective and relational social 
identification, and the prediction of intergroup behaviours given different types of 
interdependence, particularly group-level interdependence. 
On a brighter note, if what I have reported in Chapter 3 is correct and applicable to 
real-world groups, then minorities should hold more positive attitudes towards majority 
members and their superordinate identity the more they are aware of, and invested in, the 
common resource management dilemma. As I have mentioned before, the motivations for 
the universalist behavioural patterns of the minority observed in the thesis are unclear. 
This is, again, an issue onto which distinguishing collective and relational social 
identification might be useful, seeing how minority members’ collective identification may 
have spread to include the superordinate identity, accounting for the proximate reason they 
would not discriminate against the majority. Likewise, predictions of minority/majority 
behaviour in the common resource management dilemma, as well as other contexts, would 
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provide a compass for future investigation into peace-building within heterogeneous 
communities. 
For this purpose, I propose an online survey based on a number of vignettes and 
questionnaires pertaining to predicted behaviour of different targets belonging to real-life 
minority / majority groups, the participants’ attitudes and intended behaviour towards 
them, and their general attitudes and levels of understanding of different public goods.  
Since all of these issues likely differ across culture, an ideal design would be cross-
cultural, with representative samples from various countries. The country-selection would 
pay particular attention to levels of ethnic and political fractionalization within different 
countries, their scores on measures of cultural dimensions (particularly, individualism / 
collectivism, and relational mobility; Schug, Yuki, & Maddox, 2010; Yuki & Schug, 2012), 
and their public good policies (roughly speaking, the degree of leaning towards socialism in 
common goods management). 
How Can We Live Together? 
 Human societies are characterized by heterogeneity, whether in terms of ethnic and 
cultural background, political opinion, sexual orientation, or religious belief. Far from being 
a contemporary phenomenon, heterogeneity seems to have been a constant feature of our 
communities throughout history. Even in Neolithic times, smaller human groups, probably 
extended family units, shared resources with other such groups (Goncalves, Grania, Alves-
Cardoso, & Carvalho, 2016). They travelled over large distances, visiting habitual shelters, 
exchanging goods, and occasionally building larger communities and identities (Brewer & 
Campbell, 1976). Even long after the hunter-gatherers settled into cities, and those cities 
into states, ethnic and religious diversity would be found and recognized in them (Janusek, 
2004; Lightfoot, 2015; Ovesiku, 2005; Sutton, 1981). If anything, the establishment of large 
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urban centres of commerce, education, and business opportunity has increased ethnic, 
cultural, religious, and political heterogeneity of the population (Attarian, 2013; Garnsey, 
1983). 
In other words, groups should be used to living with other groups. After all, there 
was hardly a time in our history when this was not the case. Yet it would seem that our 
psychology is stubbornly parochial. “When in doubt, stick to your own”, remained a sound 
strategy for human beings despite the fact there was ample opportunity to explore a more 
universalist default intergroup behaviour. As our society grows, both in number, mobility, 
and interconnectedness, the pitfalls of parochialism are becoming increasingly obvious, and 
a solution for living together peacefully, ever more urgently needed. 
 My research indicates that certain structural characteristics of the interaction 
between groups can be contributors in engaging default, parochial strategies. By mapping 
those out, we can have a better understanding not only of how humans (on the aggregate 
level) are likely to behave in certain situations, but also why they behave that way. Even 
though the central research questions in this thesis were exclusively concerned with the 
emergence of conflict between minorities and majorities, I would be remiss not to address 
how these findings can be used to help us live together in a more cohesive yet diverse 
society, or at least how they point to issues we have to solve before we can create such a 
society. 
The main finding of the thesis is that structural characteristics of the situation, and 
their salience, can have a profound impact on human intergroup behaviour. More 
concretely, I found that minority and majority dynamics can shift depending on the type of 
interdependence which the communities face. From previous research, we have seen that 
when minorities are faced with interpersonal interdependence as the only type of 
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interdependence functioning, they show ingroup favouritism and, by extension, intergroup 
bias. Majorities show less ingroup favouritism and intergroup bias in comparison. This 
changes, however, once the type of interdependence is moved to the level of the 
superordinate group. Thus, the consciousness of common resource management has an 
asymmetrical effect on the minority’s, as opposed to the majority’s, attitude towards the 
ingroup “other”. While it creates motivations to discriminate for the majority, it seems to 
have the opposite effect on the minority, which suspends the intergroup bias. In other 
words, minorities begin behaving in a more universalist, less parochial way, when faced 
with the common resource management dilemma.  
The first, and obvious, recommendation we can draw from these findings is that 
promoting the importance of common resource management among minority members can 
have a positive effect on the minority’s treatment of the majority, and possibly also their 
general attitudes towards public goods, the majority, and the superordinate group they 
inhabit. This makes all discussions of the public goods and how they are managed a 
welcome part of intervention programs and media outlets. However, this holds true only for 
the minority. The majority’s attitude to the minority seems to revert to a defensive position 
if they are reminded of group-level interdependence which exits between. This discrepancy 
means that integration policies and programs will encounter problems from the majority’s 
side every time public goods are discussed in the media or brought up in the context of 
ethnic, political, religious, or cultural diversity. That is, until the trust assumed to exist 
within the group, and the system of bounded generalized reciprocity (interpersonal 
interdependence) supporting it, can spill over the subgroup borders to be shared among all 
member of the superordinate group. Thus, the question becomes how to introduce 
depersonalized trust into a heterogeneous society where the trust is delimited by subgroup 
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membership, rather than by the superordinate group membership. What follows is a brief, 
preliminary discussion on how this can be achieved.  
Of course, this is a topic for a book, not a paragraph. Many such were written to 
exalt the importance of trust in creating a cohesive, civil society (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 
1995). More often than not, they suggest more mutual monitoring, better institutions to 
ensure cooperation, and a mutually agreed upon system of reward and punishment as the 
solutions. Indeed, we can posit that solving the group resource management dilemma 
through strong institutions would promote the superordinate identity as a relevant and real 
category, allowing the trust reserved for group members to spill over into it. In addition, 
they would alleviate specific concerns the majority seems to have about minorities, namely, 
their assumption minority members will cheat on common resource management. 
However, there is evidence that such systems can also be detrimental to the 
establishment of trust (Seligman, 1997; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). Rather, 
institutional solutions create security, while making it harder for trust to let down roots. In 
a system of security, the decision-maker does not have to use any information on their 
interaction partner’s trustworthiness. Instead, they can rely on the interaction partner’s 
rationality. If the institutions set up a system of reward and punishment for certain 
behaviours, the decision-maker is secure in the belief that the interaction partner will know 
what is good for them. This interaction does not promote trust since the establishment of 
trust must engender the possibility of profit-driven and tempting betrayal. In a 
heterogeneous society it is, therefore, not enough to make sure minority and majority 
members are equally complying with the requirements of the superordinate goal, but that 
they are all doing it willingly, without external incentives. The risk that they do not comply 
must be present so that trustworthiness could be proven. 
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Rather than trying to establish trust in high-risk situations which can explicitly 
impact the whole group, like common resource management, it makes much more sense to 
do so in (relatively) low-risk situations, and let the effects spill over into other arenas. 
Stolle, Soroka and Johnston (2008) argue that trust in heterogeneous societies can be 
promoted by individual social ties – the weak ties Granovetter (1973) found to be so crucial 
to the exchange of diverse ideas, or the globalization which Buchan and colleagues (2009) 
showed was instrumental in reducing intergroup bias. If this is the case, than the 
establishment of trust across group boundaries has to begin by the promotion of 
interpersonal contact between group members (as per the Contact theory of reduction of 
intergroup prejudice; Allport, 1954), which includes the possibility of either party taking 
advantage of the other. 
Structural incentives to enter into risky, interpersonal exchanges can help here – for 
example, monetary or procedural incentives for small, local businesses which collaborate 
across ethnic and cultural borders. Reports and discussions of such endeavours are likewise 
useful to normalize the idea of risky contact between minority and majority members. 
Thus, integrated schools, curriculums, and classes are absolutely crucial to promote 
intergroup friendships (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Kawakami, 2003; Paolini, Cairns, & Voci, 
2004), as are opportunities for intergroup contact in public spaces (Priest, Paradies, 
Ferdinand, Rouhani, & Kelaher, 2014). Part of this process must include an increase in 
relational mobility, i.e. the ability of any individual in a society to change group 
membership laterally and vertically (Schug, Yuki, & Maddox, 2010). These things are 
already being done with more or less consistency in a good number of multicultural 
contexts. This not only establishes a network which is blind to traditional group 
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membership, but is also breaks down the old identities in favour of a reinvented, 
superordinate identity which is no longer monopolized by the majority. 
In short, there is no magic bullet which can be used to induce trust between groups. 
Trust has to be established through mutual cooperation, and this, necessarily, includes 
mutual risk. Having said that, institutional solutions can be useful. Firstly, they can 
promote the establishment of sustainable interpersonal networks which bridge group 
boundaries. Secondly, they can promote solutions to the common resource dilemmas which 
are mutually agreed upon, and transparent enough to support rather than inhibit 
interpersonal trust. 
However, supporting the establishment of weak ties between groups engenders 
problems of its own. As I have discussed, weak ties might be seen as endangering the 
ingroup-specific culture. Influx of new ideas and norms threaten the individual’s ability to 
predict and appropriately respond to different situations, as well as their prototypicality 
within the group. From the literature on symbolic threat as a contributor to intergroup bias 
(Stephan & Stephan, 2000), we know that this can lead to conflict between the groups. I 
would argue that it can lead more specifically to outgroup hate, possibly even intergroup 
aggression, and as such cannot be put aside.  Threatening the behavioural strategies 
shared within the group is a true threat indeed, because it can leave a part of the 
population unable to appropriately handle social situations. This, in turn, can lead to them 
withdrawing or coming into conflict with their own greater community. We are seeing just 
such a process now, in which alt-right religious and political groups made up (usually) of 
the ethnic and cultural majorities rally against any notion of multiculturalism and any 
group they see as promoting it. 
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Currently, the various minorities are often the ones clashing with the strategies for 
behaviour in the groups within which they exist, and losing out in this clash. A global and 
definitive recognition is needed that the inclusion of the minorities into the superordinate 
group must include one or both sides changing their behavioural strategies. These 
strategies can have to do with any number of contexts, from the way business is performed, 
to the way people construct morality. Modern politics of inclusion have trouble expressing 
who should change what, and in accordance to which principles. In the long run, this 
concern over making unjust, blanket demands of whole groups of people, which can at times 
challenge their cultural heritage, only causes more damage and coordination problems 
(Fraser, 1998). Unfortunately, to my knowledge, there is very little to be done to alleviate 
the fear that one’s social environment is changing. To cite the anthropologist Colombijn 
(1994; p.18), “the least expensive decision is consensual, but attaining such a consensus is a 
long process”. Simply, the shift has to happen over generations.  
This brings me to my final point. In the discussion of how much conflict we see in 
the world today, we often forget how far we have come already. Intergroup conflict, along 
with all types of violence, has been on a decline since prehistoric times (Pinker, 2011), as 
has warfare between nation-states in modern times (but not between non-nation-states; 
Human Security Report, 2013). Superordinate identities are being refashioned to include a 
diversity of people and present them as prototypical (Painter, 2010; Waldzus & 
Mummendey, 2004). At this point, such efforts are occasionally nothing more than pretence. 
However, normalization of the idea that different minority groups are part of the social 
landscape, there to be engaged with and not feared, is slowly bearing fruit. While much 
more needs to be done in some parts of the world, we can say that sexual minorities, in 
particular, experienced a fundamental shift in acceptance over the last century, 
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
219 
 
particularly in Western democracies where they had been vilified only fifty years ago 
(United Nations Human Rights Council report, 2011). In addition, the shift from 
collectivism towards a more individualist society means that people are taught to treat 
others as individuals first, and members of groups second. This allows for interpersonal 
relationships to establish themselves with more ease, making traditional group barriers 
more permeable. Finally, the gradual victory of secular humanism over traditional concepts 
of morality and law is providing a rational rather than ideological basis for society 
formation (Engelhardt, 2011; Washington, 1988). This means that empathy combined with 
rationality are becoming guiding principles in decision-making, both supportive of less 
intergroup conflict and more communication, coordination, and planning. 
Humans are cooperative animals deeply involved with each other’s outcomes. This 
makes them sensitive to structural characteristics of social situations, particularly in terms 
of interdependence. While in intergroup contexts, a great number of social situations are 
interpreted as threatening or dangerous, and thus met with default, parochial strategies, 
there is nothing to suggest that this has to be the case. While we may expect more conflict 
as divisive ideas such as ethno-nationalism, fundamentalism of religion or political views, 
bipolarity and dogmatism of social preferences continue to be a centre of our collective 
attention in social discourse, they are the birthing pains of the world we hope to see. 
Addressing those structural characteristics which prompt our psychology to vilify one group 
or another, can help us address them before the conflict escalates. Humans are continually 
refashioning the boundaries of groups, as well as the concepts of social justice, resource 
management systems, and culturally acceptable behaviour. In the end, dealing with 
diversity is not a choice – it is a necessity, and cultural evolution will force us to a 
sustainable long-term solution. With each passing generation, we can expect our cultural 
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
220 
 
ideas and ideals to respond to this need to manage heterogeneity more and more effectively, 
rather than heterogeneity being stomped out in favour of the familiar security of the 
parochial.  
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Study 1 
In this section, I will lay out the materials used in Study 1. This equates to Study 1 
from both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, since the data for both empirical chapters was collected 
simultaneously. 
This study was conducted in the Jacobs University’s Laboratory for Behavioural and 
Social Sciences (Lab III). More precisely, it was conducted in the computer labs, a series of 
small rooms with a single table and chair, as well as a computer. Most of the experiment 
was conducted on the computer. However, some additional data was gathered with pen-
and-paper questionnaires. 
The software used in the experiment was programmed by my father, Damir 
Šimunović. He received no monetary compensation for this work. 
I will first give a summary of the experimental procedure for Study 1. Next, I will 
post each of the materials as the participants encountered them, starting with the Consent 
form, through the screenshot of the main experimental protocol, and ending with the pen-
and-paper questionnaires. Some of the data collected using the following materials was not 
included into the analyses in the empirical chapters, since the findings were either 
extraneous, or the data itself was collected for other research projects. 
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Procedure 
Participants 
Eighty-seven participants (43 female) were recruited from Jacobs University, an 
international, English-language university situated in Bremen, Germany, which number 
about 1,300 students. The mean age of participants was 20. Their cultural, ethnic and 
national backgrounds were varied, with Germans as the largest national group (16.05%, n = 
13), followed by China, Georgia and Romania. 
The experiment was conducted on campus, in the Social and Behavioural 
Laboratory. The lab sports several different areas meant for various types of psychological 
research. One wing is dedicated to the computer lab, which consists of a series of private 
rooms, about 2 x 4 meters in size (although this varies from room to room). The furnishings 
typically consist of a single chair, table and computer. The computers are connected to the 
Internet, although access was disabled for the duration of the experiment. 
The computer rooms are not sound-proofed, meaning the participants could hear 
(but not understand) conversations. This was used to the benefit of the experimental design 
to make sure the participants heard everybody was getting the same instructions during 
the first half of the experiment. 
Procedure 
Participants were welcomed to the laboratory by an assistant. This way, the 
experimenter (who would be performing the analysis of the data) would not have direct 
contact with the participants, and thus would be unable to connect any particular 
participant’s name or appearance to their data. The assistant was always female. This 
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decision was made to limit the possible cues for aggression which male assistants can 
sometimes elicit in other males.  
Upon arriving, the participants selected an ID number at random, which they were 
told not to share with either the experimental assistant or any other participant. The 
purpose of this step was to reassure participants their subsequent roles in the experiment 
were not assigned to them in advance, based on their ID numbers. After this step, the 
participants were led to individual computer booths where a consent form and a pen waited 
for them. Once all the participants assembled in the laboratory, the assistant announced 
the beginning of the study. The participants were instructed to input their ID numbers and 
gender into the computer. 
Importantly, the experiment was always referred to as the “study” to avoid the 
connotations of the word “experiment”, which may prime participants to look for deception. 
A maximum of ten participants were invited to the laboratory per session. If some 
participants failed to show up, no confederates were used in their place, seeing how the 
number of participants per session did not impact the experimental design. However, if 
fewer than 6 people showed up for any experimental session, the experimental assistant 
pretended they were there, by addressing the empty rooms.  
Embedded minimal group categorizations 
The first portion of the experiment dealt with the group membership manipulation. 
As a result of this manipulation, the participants would be divided into a minimal minority 
and majority embedded into a larger, superordinate group. Two separate tasks were used 
for this purpose. The first task (Dot Estimation Task) categorized participants into a Blue 
and Green group. In this task, the participants were told to estimate the number of blue or 
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green dots appearing on the screen for 5 seconds. The available answers were offered below 
in increments of 10 (e.g. 1 – 10, 11 – 20…). In order to continue to the next picture, the 
participants had to give their answers. They did this by clicking on one of the options 
offered underneath the picture. After thy have completed the whole task, the participants 
were given feedback about their (superordinate) group membership. All participants were 
categorized into the Green group. The feedback about group membership was displayed in a 
header for the remained of the experiment. The participants were told that their 
categorization was based on whether they were more accurate when quickly estimating 
green or blue dots. In addition, they were told that this division has a basis in previous 
research and indicates difference in cognitive and behavioural tendencies. 
After the initial categorization, the participants were given a questionnaire (adapted 
from Grieve & Hogg, 1999) to determine to what degree they identified with the Green and 
Blue groups. The questionnaire was displayed on the computer. During the time it took the 
participants to answer the questionnaire, the assistant distributed green and blue flags, 
asking the participants to indicate their group membership before handing them the 
appropriate flag. The flag was then given to the participants, to be kept for the remainder 
of the experiment. The purpose of this step was to reinforce the membership in the 
superordinate group, and to insert a physical reminder of it into the computer booth (some 
participants found a place to display the flag prominently). No participant identified 
themselves as a member of the Blue group.  
Thereupon, the second task (Embedded Figures Task) categorized the participants 
into a minority (20%) and majority (80%). This task faced participants with a series of 
images which consisted of a single, more complex figure on the left, and four, less complex 
figures on the right. The participants were told to match the less complex figure, to the 
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more complex one. In other words, they were told to indicate which of the four less complex 
figures is embedded into the more complex one. They were asked to finish as many such 
matchings as they can, during a set time period. The duration of this period was unknown 
to the participants. The task was discontinued after 2 minutes. 
The participants’ feedback on the Embedded Figures Task was announced after the 
2 minutes were up, and added to the same header which proclaimed the participants’ Green 
group membership. In the effort to avoid attaching particular values to being assigned to 
the majority or minority conditions, this division was expressed only numerically, as total 
percentage of the population. To prevent suspicion, it was implied that the division is based 
on accumulated previous research, instead of only the scores of people in this particular 
experimental session. In reality, the categorization was determined by the order of 
registering the ID number at the beginning of the study. 
Individual outcome independence 
After the participants were categorized as minority and majority Green group 
members (MIN and MAJ conditions), the assistant presented them with a gambling task. 
The assistant explained that the current study seeks to test a large number of variables. 
For this reason, the study may be different for each participant from this point on. The 
wording, particularly the use of “may be different”, was chosen carefully to allow for the fact 
that the study was actually the same for all participants. 
Participants chose a folder which supposedly contained a code determining which 
task they will perform. Once the participants entered the code into the computer, they were 
given the instructions to the rest of the experiment. First, they were told that they would be 
paid EUR 10 for their participation. Furthermore, they were assured that their own reward 
will be independent of their decisions in this task, as well as the decisions of all other 
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participants. Thus, irrespective of what happens in the experiment from this point on, the 
participants would always receive EUR 10. All of these manipulations served to break down 
the naive expectation of reciprocity from other group members (Yamagishi, Jin, & Kiyonari, 
1999), and separate the fate of the group from the fate of the individual making the 
decision. 
Group-level Interdependence Manipulation 
The participants were told they would supervise a “Public Exchange Task” in which 
all the remaining participants (hereafter referred to as recipients) in the session would be 
contributing to a common good for their own group (the Green or the Blue group). In fact, 
there were no recipients – all the participants performed the allocation to non-existent 
others. Likewise, there was no common resource management occurring within the Green 
and Blue groups. 
The participants were told that, since they would be supervising the behaviour in 
the “Public Exchange Task”, they should be familiarized with its content. The “Public 
Exchange Task” was modelled on a traditional Public Goods Game (PGG; Ledyard, 1995). 
The recipients supposedly had EUR 3 available for the Public Exchange task. They could 
choose to contribute any portion of that reward to the common pot in increments of 10 
cents. What they did not contribute, they would get to keep for themselves. Once all the 
contributions to the common pot were made, the amount would be doubled and 
redistributed equally to all recipients, irrespective of how much they had contributed. It 
was made clear to the participants that each recipient can profit from not contributing and 
keeping the full EUR 3 for themselves, but that the best outcome all around is if everybody 
contributed the full amount. 
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In order to make sure the participants have read the instructions, they were given a 
short questionnaire to check their understanding, as well as two questions pertaining to 
their predictions about a) how much they would contribute to the common pot were they 
taking part in the PGG, and b) how much they think most members of the Green group 
would contribute to the common pot.  
Having explained what the recipients would be doing, the participants were shown a 
decision-making interface which would load three randomly chosen recipients and list their 
group membership, minority or majority status, and ID number. The supervisors would 
then be given EUR 5 per recipient, and could give allocate any amount from EUR 0.1 to 
EUR 5 in increments of 10 cents. The participants were instructed to give at least EUR 0.1 
to each recipients. Whatever they choose to allocate to the recipients would supposedly be 
added to the recipients’ gains from the Public Exchange task. The participants were not 
able to keep any portion of the endowment for themselves.  
Each supervisor was presented with three dummy recipients: one from the Blue 
group, one from the Green group minority, and one from the Green group majority. Each 
recipient’s profile contained their group membership (Blue or Green), and their minority 
(20%) or majority (80%) membership (only for Green group members). Every participant 
thus allocated to three different targets: a Green group minority members, a Green group 
majority members, and Blue group member. The different recipients appeared in 
randomized order. 
After all three allocations were completed, the participants were asked their 
opinions of the recipients’ trustworthiness and prosociality (e.g. likelihood that they would 
“follow the rules, help group members, or sacrifice for the good of the group”). The 
participants were also asked for their predictions on how much each particular recipient 
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contributed in the PGG, and how much they might have contribute to the supervisor had 
the roles been reversed. After this, the participants were asked to fill in an attitude 
questionnaire containing a variety of different questions. None of these were used in this 
thesis since the questions either did not assist in the understanding of the central questions 
posed in the text, or they were part of a different project.  
Once they have completed the attitude questionnaire, participants were paid. They 
filled in a receipt form after which the experimental assistant led them individually out of 
the laboratory. During this time, participants had the opportunity to ask for a debriefing. 
Very few participants expressed interest in being debriefed. However, those few who did 
were told about the full experimental design as well as (if requested) the theoretical 
background and central questions explored in the study. They were then asked to sign a 
non-disclosure agreement, since Jacobs University is a relatively small university with a 
body of students who mostly live on campus and, thus, any word about the purpose of the 
experiment could have poisoned the well. 
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Materials 
Consent form 
Screenshots from the experiment I 
 ID registration 
 Dot Estimation Task 
 Social Identity Questionnaire 
Gambling task code 
Screenshots from the experiment II 
 Embedded Figures Task 
 Public Exchange Task Instructions 
 Supervision Task Instructions 
Supervision Task 
Post Experimental Questionnaire 
Attitude Questionnaire 
 Perception of Group Membership Management (long version) 
 Social Value Orientation (ring measure) 
 Social Dominance Orientation 
 Religiosity scale 
 Concept of the Divine 
  
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
235 
 
Consent form for Experiment in Perception and Sociality 
Thank you for choosing to take part in today’s experiment. This experiment is done as a series of 
experiments run by BIGSSS doctoral fellow, Dora Simunovic, under the patronage of the German 
Excellence Initiative. 
The purpose of today’s experiment is to test the relationship between the human perceptual 
characteristics and their decision making patterns. For this, you may be asked to perform perception 
tasks, fill in questionnaires and make decisions under different conditions. This experiment will not 
include anything that may be harmful, painful or hurtful to you.  
For your time and effort, you will be awarded a monetary compensation. The maximum amount a 
participant may receive in the experiment is EUR 15. However, because of the nature of the experiment, 
the compensation may vary in amount. Some participants may receive less than others, depending on 
the decisions made in the experiment. The actual procedure involved in this will be explained during the 
experiment. 
Please keep in mind that the decisions you make and the answers you give during the experiment will be 
kept strictly anonymous. This means that neither your fellow participants, nor the experimenters will 
be able to match your decisions and answers to you personally. Furthermore, the data from all the 
participants in today’s experiments will not be used for commercial or promotional purposes but 
exclusively for scientific purposes. We ask you, therefore, that you give honest answers without fear of 
being judged for them later on. 
Nevertheless, if you feel you do not want to take part in this experiment, or any part of it, you may call 
on the experimenters, and the experiment will be stopped immediately. However, in this case, it is up to 
the experimenter to decide whether you should be awarded any type of compensation for your 
participation. 
If you feel unclear about any part of the experiment, either now or during the experiment itself, please 
feel free to call on the experimenter, and they will help you however they can. 
If you are willing to take part in today’s experiment, please sign your name on the line below, and write 
today’s date. Then fold this paper twice, and insert it into the envelope the experimenter will bring to 
you. This envelope will contain all the consent forms from all the participants in this experiment, and will 
not be emptied until the experiment is over. Therefore, the experimenter will be unable to tell who 
participated in this session, and who made what decision. 
I have read an understood the text above and I consent to participating in today’s decision making 
experiment. 
Year           Month         Day         
Signed,_____________________ 
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[At this point, the participants were given the lottery task. Upon choosing a folder, the 
participants received this message:] 
 
 
Because of the large number of variables we would like to test in this experiment, 
the procedure for each participant will be different from this point on. In the 
interest of fairness, we have decided to let you choose which task you will 
participate in through this lottery. 
 
You have drawn number    8   .  
 
Please input this number into the computer to receive further instructions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
243 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
244 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
245 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
246 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
247 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
248 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
249 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
250 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
251 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
252 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
253 
 
 
 
 
 
Attitude Questionnaire  
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Please enter your ID number. 
 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  
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In this questionnaire, we would like to ask you about your attitudes about a 
variety of different topics. Please take your time to read each question 
thoroughly, and answer them in the order they are presented. 
 
Keep in mind that there are no right and wrong answers, and that your 
answers will be kept anonymous, so please be honest and as precise as you 
can be. Nevertheless, if you feel a certain question is too intimate, feel free to 
skip it. 
 
If you have any questions, please call the experiementer. 
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In the following section of the questionnaire, we are interested in learningyour 
opinions about people’s behaviours when interacting with members of their 
own group, or members of other groups. We will ask you separately about what 
you believe the REALITY of these interactions are (how people actually behave), 
and what you believe the IDEAL state of these interactions should be (how people 
should behave). 
 
We will present you with a number of statements. Please evaluate to what degree 
you agree with how REALISTIC each of these statements is, and then how IDEAL it 
is. Do this by circling the number which reflects your opinion most accurately. 
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In the first part of this questionnaire, we will ask you about your opinions on how 
people actually behave, and how they should behave, towards members of their 
own group. 
Please take a moment to think about all the different groups, classes and social 
categories you belong to in everyday life (for example, your sex, your gender, 
your nationality, your ethnicity,your school, your sport’s club, your class, etc.). 
Take a moment to think of as many such groups as you can. Try to recall specific 
interactions and situations in which group membership was important.  
Keeping this in mind, please indicate to which degree you agree with the 
statements below. We ask you to indicate how REALISTIC each statement is, and 
then how IDEAL it is. Circle the number which reflects your opinion most 
accurately. 
 
 REALITY IDEAL 
People help members of their own 
group. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People scold members of their own 
group who did not do well in group 
tasks. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People scrutinize the behaviour of 
other members of their own group. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People return favours to other 
members of their own group. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People do not like it when members 
of their own groups share with other 
groups. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People get along well with members 
of their own group. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
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completely                      completely completely                      completely 
People cooperate with members of 
their own group. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
 REALITY IDEAL 
People will punish those members of 
their own group who do not return 
favours. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People will punish those members of 
their own groups who have different 
opinions. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People never betray members of their 
own group. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People do not like it when members 
of their own group differentiate 
themselves. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People do not like it when members 
of their own group fraternize with 
other groups. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People rely on members of their own 
group. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People will distrust those members of 
their own groups who try to 
differentiate themselves. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People punish members of their own 
group who stand out. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People in the same group depend on 
each other. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People do favours for members of 
their group. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
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In the second part of this questionnaire, we will ask you about your opinions on 
how people actually behave, and how they should behave, towards members ofa 
group to which they do not belong. 
Please take a moment to think about all the different groups, classes and social 
categories you do not belong to yet encounter often in everyday life (for 
example, the opposite sex, another gender, a neighbour’s nationality, a 
neighbour’s ethnicity,a different school, a different sport’s club, a different class, 
etc.). Take a moment to think of as many such groups as you can. Try to recall 
specific interactions and situations in which group membership was important. 
Keeping this in mind, please indicate to which degree you agree with the 
statements below. We ask you to indicate how REALISTIC each statement is, and 
then how IDEAL it is. Circle the number which reflects your opinion most 
accurately. 
 
 REALITY IDEAL 
People learn from members of groups 
other than their own. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People do not expect members of 
groups other than their own will treat 
them fairly. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People do not expect members of 
groups other than their own will 
return favours. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People cooperate well with members 
of groups other than their own. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People like to emulate members of 
groups other than their own. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People distrust members of groups 12345 12345 
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other than their own. Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People find ways in which they can 
work together with members of 
groups other than their own. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
 REALITY IDEAL 
People will not show gratitude to 
members of groups other than their 
own. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People believe that members of 
groups other than their own are 
deceitful. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People treat members of groups other 
than their own with kindness. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People will rarely get along well with 
members of groups other than their 
own. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People often discriminate against 
members of groups other than their 
own. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People are interested in the habits 
and customs of members of groups 
other than their own. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People will rarely cooperate with 
members of groups other than their 
own. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People believe members of groups 
other than their own will trick them. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
People always try to find common 
ground with members of groups other 
than their own. 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
12345 
Disagree         Neither            Agree 
completely                      completely 
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What would you do? 
In this part of the questionnaire, you will be presented with a number of slightly 
different situations in which you may choose two different outcomes, [A] and [B]. 
All of these situations depict an economic exchange between you and another 
person. In some exchanges you stand to gain a certain amount, while in others 
you stand to lose a certain amount. 
Your task will be to choose which outcome you would prefer for each of these 
hypothetical exchange situations. Carefully compare [A] and [B] before circling 
the choice you would most likely make in real life. 
 
Example: 
 
Example exchange: 
 
If you could choose only one of the following outcomes, which would it be? 
(Please circle either [A] or [B].? 
A?You would gain EUR1450, while another person loses EUR 390. 
B?You would gain EUR1300, while another person loses EUR 750. 
 
 
You will choose either [A] or [B] in a number of similar hypothetical situations. 
 
??If you are unclear about any part of the instructions for this part of the 
questionnaire, please do not hesitate to call the experimenter, and they will 
answer your questions. 
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Exchange 1  
If you could choose only one of the following outcomes, which would it be? 
(Please circle either [A] or [B].) 
 A?You would gain EUR 390 , while another person loses EUR  1450 . 
 B?You would gain EUR 0 , while another person loses EUR 1500 . 
 
 
 
Exchange 2  
If you could choose only one of the following outcomes, which would it be? 
(Please circle either [A] or [B].) 
 A?You would lose EUR1450, while another person gains EUR390? 
 B?You would lose EUR1500, while another person gains EUR0? 
 
 
 
Exchange 3  
If you could choose only one of the following outcomes, which would it be? 
(Please circle either [A] or [B].) 
 A?You would lose EUR1500, while another person gains EUR0? 
 B?You would lose EUR1450, while another person loses EUR390? 
 
 
 
Exchange 4  
If you could choose only one of the following outcomes, which would it be? 
(Please circle either [A] or [B].) 
 A?You would lose EUR1450, while another person gains EUR390? 
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 B?You would lose EUR1300, while another person gains EUR750? 
 
 
 
Exchange 5  
If you could choose only one of the following outcomes, which would it be? 
(Please circle either [A] or [B].) 
 A?You would lose EUR390, while another person loses EUR1450? 
 B?You would lose EUR750, while another person loses EUR1300? 
 
 
 
Exchange 6  
If you could choose only one of the following outcomes, which would it be? 
(Please circle either [A] or [B].) 
 A?You would gain EUR750, while another person gains EUR1300? 
 B?You would gain EUR1060, while another person gains EUR1060? 
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Exchange 7  
If you could choose only one of the following outcomes, which would it be? 
(Please circle either [A] or [B].) 
 A?You would gain EUR750, while another person loses EUR1300? 
 B?You would gain EUR1060, while another person loses EUR1060? 
 
 
 
Exchange 8  
If you could choose only one of the following outcomes, which would it be? 
(Please circle either [A] or [B].) 
 A?You would lose EUR1300, while another person gains EUR750? 
 B?You would lose EUR1060, while another person gains EUR1060? 
 
 
 
Exchange 9  
If you could choose only one of the following outcomes, which would it be? 
(Please circle either [A] or [B].) 
 A?You would gain EUR1300, while another person gains EUR750? 
 B?You would gain EUR1060, while another person gains EUR1060. 
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Exchange 10  
If you could choose only one of the following outcomes, which would it be? 
(Please circle either [A] or [B].) 
 A?You would lose EUR1060, while another person loses EUR1060? 
 B?You would lose EUR750, while another person loses EUR1300? 
 
 
 
Exchange 11  
If you could choose only one of the following outcomes, which would it be? 
(Please circle either [A] or [B].) 
 A?You would lose EUR1300, while another person loses EUR750? 
 B?You would lose EUR1450, while another person loses EUR390? 
 
 
 
Exchange 12  
If you could choose only one of the following outcomes, which would it be? 
(Please circle either [A] or [B].) 
 A?You would lose EUR1060, while another person gains EUR1060? 
 B?You would lose EUR750, while another person gains EUR1300? 
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Exchange 13  
If you could choose only one of the following outcomes, which would it be? 
(Please circle either [A] or [B].) 
 A?You would gain EUR1450, while another person loses EUR390? 
 B?You would gain EUR1500, while another person gains EUR0? 
 
 
 
Exchange 14  
If you could choose only one of the following outcomes, which would it be? 
(Please circle either [A] or [B].) 
 A?You would lose EUR390, while another person gains EUR1450? 
 B?You would lose EUR750, while another person gains EUR1300? 
 
 
 
Exchange 15  
If you could choose only one of the following outcomes, which would it be? 
(Please circle either [A] or [B].) 
 A?You would gain EUR1300, while another person loses EUR750? 
 B?You would gain EUR1060, while another person loses EUR1060? 
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Exchange 16  
If you could choose only one of the following outcomes, which would it be? 
(Please circle either [A] or [B].) 
 A?You would lose EUR390, while another person gains EUR1450? 
 B?You would gain EUR0, while another person gains EUR1500? 
 
 
 
Exchange 17  
If you could choose only one of the following outcomes, which would it be? 
(Please circle either [A] or [B].) 
 A?You would gain EUR1450, while another person loses EUR390? 
 B?You would gain EUR1300, while another person loses EUR750? 
 
 
 
Exchange 18  
If you could choose only one of the following outcomes, which would it be? 
(Please circle either [A] or [B].) 
 A?You would gain EUR1450, while another persongains EUR390? 
 B?You would gain EUR1300, while another persongains EUR750? 
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Exchange 19  
If you could choose only one of the following outcomes, which would it be? 
(Please circle either [A] or [B].) 
 A?You would gain EUR390, while another personloses EUR1450? 
 B?You would gain EUR750, while another personloses EUR1300? 
 
 
 
Exchange 20  
If you could choose only one of the following outcomes, which would it be? 
(Please circle either [A] or [B].) 
 A?You would gain EUR1450, while another persongains EUR390? 
 B?You would gain EUR1500, while another persongains EUR0? 
 
 
 
Exchange 21  
If you could choose only one of the following outcomes, which would it be? 
(Please circle either [A] or [B].) 
 A?You would gain EUR390, while another persongains EUR1450? 
 B?You would gain EUR750, while another persongains EUR1300? 
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Exchange 22  
If you could choose only one of the following outcomes, which would it be? 
(Please circle either [A] or [B].) 
 A?You would lose EUR390, while another personloses EUR1450? 
 B?You would gain EUR0, while another personloses EUR1500? 
 
 
 
Exchange 23  
If you could choose only one of the following outcomes, which would it be? 
(Please circle either [A] or [B].) 
 A?You would lose EUR1300, while another personloses EUR750? 
 B?You would lose EUR1060, while another personloses EUR1060? 
 
 
 
Exchange 24  
If you could choose only one of the following outcomes, which would it be? 
(Please circle either [A] or [B].) 
 A?You would gain EUR390, while another persongains EUR1450? 
 B?You would gain EUR0, while another persongains EUR1500? 
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Read the following statements and indicate to what degree do you agree or approve each of 
them by circling the appropriate number from 1 to 7. Please do not think too hard about the 
statements. Instead, give the first answer that pops into your head. 
 
1 .  
Hav ing  som e groups  on top rea l ly  
benef i t s  everybody .  
Strongly disagree/? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?                            Strongly agree/ 
disapprove? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?    approve 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
2 .  
No  one  group should  dom inate  in  
soc iety .  
Strongly disagree/? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?                            Strongly agree/ 
disapprove? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?    approve 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
3 .  
We shouldn’t  t ry  to  guarantee  
that  every  group has  the  sam e 
qua l i ty  o f  l i fe .  
Strongly disagree/? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?                            Strongly agree/ 
disapprove? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?    approve 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
4 .  
I t ’ s  probably  a  good th ing  that  
certa in  groups  are  at  the  top and 
other  groups  are  at  the  bottom .  
Strongly disagree/? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?                            Strongly agree/ 
disapprove? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?    approve 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
5 .  
We should  work  to  g ive  a l l  groups  
an equal  chance  to  succeed.  
Strongly disagree/? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?                            Strongly agree/ 
disapprove? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?    approve 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
6 .  
We should  do  what  we  can to  
equal i ze  condi t ions  for  d i f ferent  
groups .  
Strongly disagree/? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?                            Strongly agree/ 
disapprove? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?    approve 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
7 .  
Groups  at  the  bottom should  not  
have  to  s tay  in  the i r  p lace .  
Strongly disagree/? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?                            Strongly agree/ 
disapprove? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?    approve 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
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8 .  
An idea l  soc iety  requires  some 
groups  to  be  on top and others  to  
be  on the  bottom .  
Strongly disagree/? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?                            Strongly agree/ 
disapprove? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?    approve 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
9 .  
I t  i s  unjust  to  t ry  to  m ake  groups  
equal .  
Strongly disagree/? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?                            Strongly agree/ 
disapprove? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?    approve 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
10 .  
Group equal i ty  should  be  our  
idea l .  
Strongly disagree/? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?                            Strongly agree/ 
disapprove? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?    approve 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
11 .  
Some groups  o f  people  are  s im ply  
infer ior  to  other  groups .  
Strongly disagree/? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?                            Strongly agree/ 
disapprove? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?    approve 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
12 .  
No  m atter  how m uch ef fort  i t  
takes ,  we ought  to  s tr ive  to  
ensure  that  a l l  groups  have the  
sam e chance in  l i fe .  
Strongly disagree/? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?                            Strongly agree/ 
disapprove? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?    approve 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
13 .  
Group equal i ty  should  not  be our  
pr im ary  goa l .  
Strongly disagree/? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?                            Strongly agree/ 
disapprove? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?    approve 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
14 .  
We should  not  push for  group 
equal i ty .  
Strongly disagree/? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?                            Strongly agree/ 
disapprove? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?    approve 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
15 .  
Groups  at  the  bottom are  just  as  
deserv ing  as  groups  at  the  top.  
Strongly disagree/? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?                            Strongly agree/ 
disapprove? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?    approve 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
16 .  
Group dom inance i s  a  poor 
pr inc ip le .  
Strongly disagree/? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?                            Strongly agree/ 
disapprove? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?    approve 
1      2      3      4      5      6      7 
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In this part of the questionnaire, we would like to ask you about your religion, faith, 
and beliefs. Even if you do not consider yourself religious, please read each question 
carefully and answer them in the order they are presented. 
Since different religions suppose different Divine influences on human life, such as 
God, or Gods, or Buddha, or Bodhisattva, etc. it would be very difficult to include them 
all in each question. Instead, we have decided to use “the Divine” as an alternative 
umbrella term. 
If you find a question offensive or too intimate, feel free to skip it. 
 
Would you consider yourself religious? 
 
Yes Sometimes No 
 
 
How often do you attend religious meetings (including religious services, rituals, fellowship 
meetings etc.)? 
1. Never 
2. Once a year or less 
3. A few times a year 
4. A few times a month 
5. Once a week 
6. More than once a week 
How often do you spend time in private religious activities, such as prayer, meditation, or the 
study of religious texts? 
1. Rarely or never 
2. A few times a month 
3. Once a week 
4. Two or more times a week 
5. Daily 
6. More than once a day 
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The following section contains a number of statements about religious belief or experiences. 
Please mark the extent to which each statement is true or not true for you. 
1. In my life, I experience the presence of the Divine. 
1          2         3          4          5         6          7 
Definitely not       Tends not to         Unsure       Tends to be        Definitely true 
  true for me                    true                                        true                     for me 
2. My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life. 
1          2         3          4          5         6          7 
Definitely not       Tends not to         Unsure       Tends to be        Definitely true 
  true for me                    true                                        true                     for me 
3. I try hard to carry my religion over into all other dealings in life. 
1          2         3          4          5         6          7 
Definitely not       Tends not to         Unsure       Tends to be        Definitely true 
  true for me                    true                                        true                     for me 
4. My faith involves all of my life.  
1          2         3          4          5         6          7 
Definitely not       Tends not to         Unsure       Tends to be        Definitely true 
  true for me                    true                                        true                     for me 
5. I refuse to let religious considerations influence my everyday affairs.  
1          2         3          4          5         6          7 
Definitely not       Tends not to         Unsure       Tends to be        Definitely true 
  true for me                    true                                        true                     for me 
6. Nothing is as important to me as serving the Divine as best as I know.  
1          2         3          4          5         6          7 
Definitely not       Tends not to         Unsure       Tends to be        Definitely true 
  true for me                    true                                        true                     for me 
7. My faith sometimes restricts my actions.  
1          2         3          4          5         6          7 
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Definitely not       Tends not to         Unsure       Tends to be        Definitely true 
  true for me                    true                                        true                     for me 
8. I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life.  
1          2         3          4          5         6          7 
Definitely not       Tends not to         Unsure       Tends to be        Definitely true 
  true for me                    true                                        true                     for me 
9. One should seek guidance from the Divine when making every important decision. 
1          2         3          4          5         6          7 
Definitely not       Tends not to         Unsure       Tends to be        Definitely true 
  true for me                    true                                        true                     for me 
10. I believe there are more important things in life than religious belief.  
1          2         3          4          5         6          7 
Definitely not       Tends not to         Unsure       Tends to be        Definitely true 
  true for me                    true                                        true                     for me 
11. It doesn’t matter so much what I believe as long as I lead a moral life.  
1          2         3          4          5         6          7 
Definitely not       Tends not to         Unsure       Tends to be        Definitely true 
  true for me                    true                                        true                     for me 
12. My faith serves to comfort me but I do not allow it to influence my relationships and life 
decisions. 
1          2         3          4          5         6          7 
Definitely not       Tends not to         Unsure       Tends to be        Definitely true 
  true for me                    true                                        true                     for me 
13. My religion is an important part of my identity.  
1          2         3          4          5         6          7 
Definitely not       Tends not to         Unsure       Tends to be        Definitely true 
  true for me                    true                                        true                     for me 
14. My religion means little to me.  
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1          2         3          4          5         6          7 
Definitely not       Tends not to         Unsure       Tends to be        Definitely true 
  true for me                    true                                        true                     for me 
15. I believe I can be a good person even without religion.  
1          2         3          4          5         6          7 
Definitely not       Tends not to         Unsure       Tends to be        Definitely true 
  true for me                    true                                        true                     for me 
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Please read the following adjectives and indicate how much each trait applies to your 
conception of the Divine. If you consider yourself an atheist, please indicate how 
much you think each trait applies to the concept of the Divine in your culture. 
Forgiving 1         2        3         4         5        6         7 
Does not                             I cannot say                             Applies  
apply at all                                                                         very much 
Loving 1         2        3         4         5        6         7 
Does not                             I cannot say                               Applies  
apply at all                                                                         very much 
Angry 1         2        3         4         5        6         7 
Does not                             I cannot say                               Applies  
apply at all                                                                         very much 
Jealous 1         2        3         4         5        6         7 
Does not                             I cannot say                               Applies  
apply at all                                                                         very much 
Suffering 1         2        3         4         5        6         7 
Does not                             I cannot say                               Applies  
apply at all                                                                         very much 
Unconditional 1         2        3         4         5        6         7 
Does not                             I cannot say                               Applies  
apply at all                                                                         very much 
Gentle 1         2        3         4         5        6         7 
Does not                             I cannot say                               Applies  
apply at all                                                                         very much 
Fearsome 1         2        3         4         5        6         7 
Does not                             I cannot say                               Applies  
apply at all                                                                         very much 
Noble 1         2        3         4         5        6         7 
Does not                             I cannot say                               Applies  
apply at all                                                                         very much 
Self-sacrificing 1         2        3         4         5        6         7 
Does not                             I cannot say                               Applies  
apply at all                                                                         very much 
Vengeful 1         2        3         4         5        6         7 
Does not                             I cannot say                               Applies  
apply at all                                                                         very much 
Kind 1         2        3         4         5        6         7 
Does not                             I cannot say                               Applies  
apply at all                                                                         very much 
Generous 1         2        3         4         5        6         7 
Does not                             I cannot say                               Applies  
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apply at all                                                                         very much 
Selfless 1         2        3         4         5        6         7 
Does not                             I cannot say                               Applies  
apply at all                                                                         very much 
Terrifying 1         2        3         4         5        6         7 
Does not                             I cannot say                               Applies  
apply at all                                                                         very much 
Harsh 1         2        3         4         5        6         7 
Does not                             I cannot say                               Applies  
apply at all                                                                         very much 
Compassionate 1         2        3         4         5        6         7 
Does not                             I cannot say                               Applies  
apply at all                                                                         very much 
Charitable 1         2        3         4         5        6         7 
Does not                             I cannot say                               Applies  
apply at all                                                                         very much 
Punishing 1         2        3         4         5        6         7 
Does not                             I cannot say                               Applies  
apply at all                                                                         very much 
Altruistic 1         2        3         4         5        6         7 
Does not                             I cannot say                               Applies  
apply at all                                                                         very much 
Comforting 1         2        3         4         5        6         7 
Does not                             I cannot say                               Applies  
apply at all                                                                         very much 
Purifying 1         2        3         4         5        6         7 
Does not                             I cannot say                               Applies  
apply at all                                                                         very much 
Peaceful 1         2        3         4         5        6         7 
Does not                             I cannot say                               Applies  
apply at all                                                                         very much 
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Age: _______                           Sex:         F          M 
Nationality: ________________________ 
Field of study / research: ____________________ 
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This concludes the Attitude Questionnaire. Please place 
the questionnaire into the envelope and call the 
experimenter to come collect it. 
Thank you very much! 
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Study 2 
 In this section, I will lay out the materials used in Study 2. This equates to 
Study 2 from both Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, since the data for both empirical chapters was 
collected simultaneously.  
This study was conducted online, hosted by a free server (eu5.org). The website, as 
well as the entire software used in the experiment was set up, programmed, and managed 
by my father, Damir Šimunović. He received no monetary compensation for this work. The 
link to the study was distributed to participants via Academic Prolific’s internal messaging 
system, where the participants were recruited. 
I will post each of the materials as the participants encountered them. Some of the 
data collected using the following materials was not included into the analyses in the 
empirical chapters, since the findings were either extraneous, or the data itself was 
collected for other research projects. 
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Procedure 
Participants 
Two hundred and fifty three participants (132 female) were recruited via Academic 
Prolific, a database of over 50,000 potential participants. Prolific has been launched in 2014 
by a group of graduate students who began by recruiting other university attendees. For 
this reason, the sample has a higher average level of education than the general population. 
Researchers can screen the participants by previous approval rate or different demographic 
indicators, including sex, which is how the roughly equal numbers of male and female 
participants were recruited for this study. 
Average age of the participants in the study was 30. Ages ranged from 16 to 64. 
Procedure 
The study was announced to the participants on the Academic Prolific website. The 
participants could then respond to the advertisement by registering for the study via their 
Prolific accounts. Once they registered, the link to the study was sent to them 
automatically. The link led to a website hosted by a free server, where the entire 
experiment was hosted (http://dsimun.eu5.org/test1/welcome.php). Most participants 
completed the study within the next two or three days. 
After they input their Prolific ID and sex, the participants took part in a Dot 
Estimation task which split them into the Green group minority and Green group majority 
(in the Minority and Majority conditions, N=97), or the Green group and the Blue group (in 
the Interdependent, Matched, and Control conditions, N=153) (see Table 1 for an overview 
of all experimental conditions). The Dot Estimation task functioned as in Study 1, with the 
exception that the feedback in the Minority and Majority conditions contained the 
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additional information for minority / majority membership. In other words, in the equal-
size group conditions, the feedback from the Dot Estimation task contained only the  
This feedback was permanently displayed at the top of the page. After the minimal 
group categorization, the participants’ level of identification with the Green and Blue 
groups was ascertained using the same questionnaire as in Study 1. 
Table 1. Overview of all experimental conditions from Study 2. The Minority and Majority conditions are 
discussed in Chapter 3, while the Interdependent, Matched, and Control conditions are discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
CONDITION 
Relative group 
size 
Group-level 
interdependence 
Interpersonal 
interdependence 
Sample size 
Minority 20% of the Green 
group YES NO 48 
Majority 80% of the Green 
group YES NO 49 
Interdependent No information YES NO 52 
Matched No information YES (matched to group boundaries) NO 51 
Control No information NO NO 50 
     
Behavioural Measure 
The participants were told their task was to supervise a “Public Exchange task” 
which 6 international students (hereafter referred to as recipients) are performing as part 
of a series of studies hosted by Jacobs University. This statement constitutes deception, 
however, a study which would indeed run a Public Exchange task as described in the 
experiment, is planned.  
Doctoral Dissertation: Minority versus Majority   
284 
 
For their participation, the participants would receive a fixed reward of GBP 7.524. It 
was made clear to them that neither the experimenters, nor the other participants, nor the 
participant’s own actions would impact this reward.  
Thereafter, the participants who were not taking part in the Control condition were 
told they would first be familiarized with the Public Exchange task25, i.e. the Public Goods 
Game. In it, recipients would be given GBP 2 by the experimenters, and asked to donate 
any portion of that money to a common pot. The sum of all contributions to the common pot 
would then be doubled and redistributed to all 6 recipients equally. The instructions make 
it clear that it is in the interest of each person taking part in the PGG to contribute 
nothing, and reap the benefits of others’ contributions. 
In the Minority and Majority conditions, as well as in the Matched condition, it was 
made clear that the PGG would be taking part within the Green group. In the 
Interdependent condition, it was made clear tha the PGG would be taking part with 
members of both the Green and the Blue group. 
The participants were given a manipulation check to capture their understanding of 
the instructions. They were also asked to 1) predict the amount of money most people would 
contribute to the common pot, 2) indicate how much they themselves would contribute to 
the common pot if they were taking part in the PGG. 
After this point, the Control condition and the other conditions (containing the PGG) 
reunite. The participants were familiarized with the decision-making interface and their 
                                                          
24GBP 7.5 is not equivalent to the EUR 10 our student participants received in Study 1. The currency 
and amount were dictated by Academic Prolific. 
25 Since the author is planning to perform the PGG under just the conditions described, the 
allocations made by the supervisors will eventually be matched to real participants. Thus, no 
deception was used in this design, apart from the claim that the Dot Estimation task was indicative 
of psychological tendencies. 
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supervision task. The task consisted of two steps. First, the participants were asked to 
predict each recipients’ contributions to the common pot (unless they were in the Control 
condition). Secondly, they were asked to allocate up to GBP 3 to each of the recipients. As in 
Study 2, they were asked to allocate at least 10 pence to each recipient. The participants 
could keep none of this money for themselves. After making their decisions, the 
participants were given a post-experimental questionnaire dealing with their 
understanding of the supervision task, the conceptualization of intergroup relationships, 
the tendency to identify with social categories, and their social dominance orientation. 
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Materials 
Screenshots from the experiment 
 ID registration 
Dot Estimation Task 
Social Identity Questionnaire 
Public Exchange Task Instructions 
Supervision Task Instructions 
Supervision Task 
Perception of group membership management (short version) 
Collective Self-Esteem Scale 
Social Dominance Orientation 
Demographic Information 
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Economic Games: A Quick Guide 
 What follows is a list of economic games mentioned or used in the thesis. Each game 
is described in short, simple terms, based on what actions cause which outcomes for the 
players in the game. This guide is meant for clarification of some of the claims made, or 
examples given in the thesis. Thus, it is geared towards readers interested in human 
behaviour and psychology. Descriptions of the games in terms of their game theoretical 
classifications (e.g. cooperativeness or symmetry, etc.), stabile strategies or mathematical 
equilibria are almost entirely left out. Instead, more time is be spent on discussing what 
sort of interactions the games model, which motivations for different behaviours they 
entail, and why they are interesting from a psychological perspective. 
Nevertheless, some of the language used might be unfamiliar to scholars not involved with 
game theory. For the purpose, a small glossary is included below. This glossary is not a 
generally accepted one – for example, a debate could be had on the use of repeated versus 
iterated games. However, since the glossary was meant only for this text, those debates 
should be put aside. The below words and concepts are listed because of their proposed 
psychological significance on the players encountering the game. 
  
One-shot  Each participant plays the game only once, with the same partner(s). 
Repeated Each participants plays the game several times, with different 
partners. Thus repeated games are a series of one-shot games. 
Iterated Each participant plays the game several times with the same 
partner(s). 
Finite Participants are aware how many rounds of the game they will be 
playing. 
Infinite  Participants are unaware when the game will end. 
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Simultaneous  Participants make their choices at the same time. 
Sequential  Participants make their choices one after another. 
Discrete Participants can only choose between absolute actions, like “cooperate” 
or “defect”. 
Continuous Participants can choose to what degree they wish to cooperate or 
defect within the games. 
Dyadic  The game has only two players. 
N-person   The game has more than two players. 
Cooperative A game in which the rational strategy is to cooperate, regardless of 
what the partner(s) does/do. 
Non-cooperative A game in which the rational strategy is to defect, regardless of what 
the partner(s) does/do. 
Symmetrical Both players in the game face the same outcomes for the same 
behaviour. 
Asymmetrical Players face different outcomes for the same behaviour. 
 
 
  
 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game (PDG) 
 The Prisoner’s Dilemma game is a two-player economic game in which each 
participants has to decide whether to cooperate or defect in an exchange. As with most 
economic games, these choices are usually (but not always) done simultaneously, in a 
communication vacuum. While some PDGs are discrete, there is a trend towards making 
them continuous, thereby allowing for more variance in the data. 
If both players cooperate, they achieve the most beneficial mutual outcome, 
sometimes referred to as Reward, or R. However, the player who defects while the other 
cooperates can receive an even higher prize, called Temptation (T). The player who had 
cooperated while the other defected end up with the worst possible outcome, called Sucker 
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(S). Finally, the Punishment, or P, outcome is one arising if both players choose to defect. In 
this case, both players receive a payoff smaller than R, but not as bad as S. This complex 
relationship between payoffs is the fundamental condition for the establishment of the 
PDG. We can express it as, 
T > R > P > S 
In other words, the reward for defection is the highest, while the punishment for 
being taken advantage of is the harshest. Thus, psychologically speaking, the PDG is a 
mixed-motive game. Participants can choose to defect out of greed (chasing after T), or out 
of fear (trying to avoid S). Unsurprisingly, therefore, the “best thing to do” in a one-shot 
PDG is to defect: this way, the player is sure to avoid the disastrous Sucker outcome, and 
stands the chance of getting the best one, Temptation. 
However, if the PDG is iterated, the best strategy is to cooperate until the last 
round. This was most memorably shown during Robert Axelrod’s 1981 computer 
tournament. Enthusiasts (academics as well as non-academics) from around the world were 
invited to submit their strategy for solving the iterated PDG. The algorithms they wrote 
and submitted to Axelrod’s lab were faced off against each other in 200 rounds. Out of the 
numerous profit-maximizing or retaliatory strategies submitted, the unlikely “winner” was 
the Tit-for-Tat strategy, written by Dr. Anatol Rapoport. The Tit-for-Tat was one of the 
simplest strategies, perhaps surpassed in simplicity only by the three control algorithms 
implemented by Axelrod himself: All-C (always cooperate), All-D (always defect), and 
Random. In essence, Tit-for-Tat was a benevolent but reciprocating strategy. It cooperated 
on the first try. After the first round, Tit-for-Tat did what the partner did on the previous 
trial, and thus until the end. Notably, Tit-for-Tat never made a greater profit than its 
partner. Yet, while all the other, flashier strategies fluctuated in winnings depending on 
their partner, Tit-for-Tat was consistent. In fact, the only strategy to ever outperform Tit-
for-Tat was Tit-for-Two-Tats, which reciprocated the partner’s behaviour only after two 
rounds. Axelrod’s findings and the story of lowly Tit-for-Tat revolutionized the way we 
thought about the evolution of cooperation, even if its implications never reached the ears of  
the majority of neoliberal economists. 
While, arguably, the one-shot PDG is a rare occurrence, the iterated PDG resembles 
any long-term partnership between organisms which is based on exchange. The moment 
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one partner stands to gain by letting the other cooperate without cooperating themselves – 
they are facing a Prisoner’s Dilemma game. This very basic set-up puts the PDG at the core 
of all other social dilemma games, a lot of which have been designed with the PDG in mind. 
Public Goods Game (PGG) 
 The Public Goods game is an n-person social dilemma game in which each 
participant has to choose between behaving selfishly and contributing to a common pool. It 
can be described as an n-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game since the dilemma individuals 
face is the temptation of letting everybody else cooperate while failing to cooperate 
themselves. Again, it can be discrete or continuous, usually done anonymously, 
simultaneously, and in a communication vacuum. The PGG is played as either a one-shot 
or, more commonly, as a repeated game. 
Each individual taking part in the game is given an initial endowment. They are 
free to either cooperate (contribute to the common pot), or defect (keep the endowment for 
themselves). The contributions of all participants are gathered into a common pot which is 
then multiplied by a factor r. This increase in the total amount contained in the common 
pot is meant to model the greater value of resources which are gathered in this way, and 
made more available to the entire community. 
After the multiplication, the common pot is redistributed equally to all participants 
in the PGG, irrespective of how much any single participant contributed to the common pot. 
In this way, it makes sense for each participant to contribute nothing to the common pot, 
and take advantage of the fact others are contributing. However, such selfish thinking 
would lead to a collapse of the public good. In addition, the presence of defectors or 
freeriders (participants who fail to contribute, or contribute less than others) causes more 
and more defection in the subsequent rounds. 
The repeated Public Goods game is characterized by mid-range initial cooperation 
levels which typically fall over the following rounds to very low levels of cooperation. There 
are at least three prominent methods for increasing cooperation levels in the PGG, and 
keeping it high: communication between participants, a system of reward, and a system of 
punishment.  
Intergroup Prisoner’s Dilemma – Maximizing Difference Game (IPD-MD) 
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 The IPD-MD is a complex, n-person game in which each individual has to choose 
between pursuing a selfish goal, contributing to the ingroup common pot, or a between-
group common pot. Importantly, it is played between two distinct groups of people. These 
groups can be real or minimal.  
While the IPD-MD can be played as a one-shot game, it is more often a repeated, 
anonymous, and simultaneous game. Since the players’ rewards are calculated by taking 
into consideration the choices of all the players in the game, the choices are usually 
discreet. This way the calculation is kept simple, making it more likely that the 
participants will understand it.  
As in the PGG, the participants are given an initial endowment. They can they 
choose to either keep the endowment for themselves, contribute it to an ingroup common 
pot (as in the PGG), or to a between-group common pot (which behaves like the common pot 
for the PGG while at the same time decreasing outgroup rewards). The selfish choice means 
the participant will keep their initial endowment for themselves. The pro-social choice can 
be contributing either to the ingroup common pot, or the between-group common pot. The 
latter is also considered an act of outgroup derogation. 
The purpose of the IPD-MD is to test whether people will, under different 
circumstances, choose to benefit their own group, or simultaneously benefit the ingroup 
while damaging the outgroup. Typically, people will prefer to leave outgroup outcomes 
alone, and contribute only to the ingroup common pot. 
Allocation Game 
 The Allocation game is a simple economic game in which a single participant 
allocates to one, two or more other participants. Thus, the allocation game can be an n-
person game which is made up of repeated dyadic interaction between the allocator and his 
or her targets. It is asymmetrical, since the allocators’ rewards are independent of their 
recipients’ actions, while the recipients’ rewards are (sometimes entirely) dependent on the 
allocator’s choices. The choices are most commonly continuous. This makes the Allocation 
game similar to the Dictator game. However, the allocators (unlike the dictators) do not get 
to keep the money they do not allocate to the target(s). 
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 The Allocation game can take two main forms which can change the game 
fundamentally – either the allocations are done independently for each target, or the 
allocation to one target depends on how much was previously given to another target. In the 
first case, the allocator receives a separate amount of money for each target. The allocator 
may choose to give the entirety of the money to a single target without impacting their 
ability to give to other targets. In the second case, however, the allocator receives a single 
endowment from the experimenter which they have to distribute between the targets. For 
example, it is common to present the allocator with two targets at the same time, and ask 
them to distribute the money between them. Thus, the amount of money that the allocators 
decides to give to one target impacts the amount of money they are able to give to the other 
target. 
Gift-Giving Game 
 The Gift-Giving game is an n-person, circular Dictator game. It can also be 
interpreted as a Public Goods game, however, there is no stable common pot available. 
Rather, the common good is the willingness of every individual participant to behave 
generously. The game is symmetrical, and the choices within it usually continuous. It is 
most often played between anonymous participants. 
At the beginning of the game, all participants receive an initial endowment. They 
choose whether and how much to pass on to the next participant in the chain. This 
participant does the same for the next, and so on until the final person in the chain, who 
allocates money back to the first participant, closing the circle. 
The money participants chose to give to the next participant in the chain is 
multiplied by a factor r. This represents the increase in value which stems from availability 
of the gift. Thus, it is in the interest of each player to contribute nothing to the next person 
in the chain, while receiving as much as possible from the previous player. However, if all 
participants behaved this way, there would be no increase in the value of their endowments 
through the act of giving. 
The Gift-Giving game is appropriate to measure altruism, generosity, and general 
prosociality. The idea is that the more positive people feel about their circle of co-
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dependents, the more likely to 1) forego immediate self-interest to allocate to another 
person, and 2) risk being cheated by the participant preceding them in the chain. 
Dictator Game (DG) 
 The Dictator game is a dyadic, asymmetrical game in which one person is assigned 
the role of dictator while the other is assigned the role of recipient. However, the dictator 
has all the power in this game while the recipient is passive. They are given an initial 
endowment by the experimenter and told to choose how much of it to give to the recipient, 
and how much to keep for themselves. 
Obviously, the selfish, profit-maximizing choice in the DG is for the dictator to keep 
the entire endowment for themselves, and leave the recipient with nothing. For this reason, 
the DG is used to test generosity and other-regarding preferences. However, most people 
behave in a fair, or near-fair way, allocating between one third and one half of the initial 
endowment.  
Trust Game (TG) 
 The Trust game, as the name suggests, is an economic game meant to model trust. It 
is a dyadic, asymmetrical game in which one person is assigned the role of truster, while 
the other is assigned the role of trustee. These roles are often assigned randomly, or 
seemingly randomly. The truster always has the first move, making the TG a sequential 
game. Frequently, the trust game is played as a repeated game, so that all participants can 
experience both roles with different partners. Alternatively, data about the participants’ 
behaviour as either the truster or the trustee can be gathered via the strategy method, i.e. 
by giving participants all the possible options and asking them to indicate their responses 
to each of the options. 
 From the truster’s perspective, the TG looks as follows: the trusters are given an 
initial endowment by the experimenter. They are then given the choice to either donate the 
endowment to another person (the game is often discreet), or keep it for themselves. In 
other words, they can either trust / invest in another person, or refuse to enter into the 
exchange. If they refuse the exchange, they keep the initial endowment, and an equivalent 
amount of money is usually paid to the trustee (often without telling them they were not 
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chosen to be trusted). If they choose to donate the endowment to the trustee, this amount of 
money is multiplied by a factor r. This factor is usually 4, thus the money is quadrupled 
before it reaches the trustee. 
 By giving their endowment to the trustee, the truster effectively surrenders their 
power. From this point on, the trustee is solely responsible for both their, and the truster’s 
outcomes. The trustee, having received the quadrupled amount of money, now behaves like 
a dictator in the Dictator game. In other words, they distribute the money between 
themselves and the truster. 
 Every decision in the TG can be made in a continuous way, but it is more often 
presented as a discreet choice. Thus the truster can either stop the game (take the initial 
endowment) or transfer it to the trustee, where it will be quadrupled. If the latter is the 
case, the trustee can either keep the entire amount for themselves, or distribute it equally. 
 The TG is considered a measure of trust. Indeed, people will show greater levels of 
trust for ingroups members rather than outgroup members, as well as for people with 
whom they have had previous contact, rather than strangers. 
Ultimatum Game (UG) 
 The Ultimatum game is a dyadic, asymmetrical economic game very similar to the 
DG. The main difference is that the recipient is not powerless. Rather, they are able to 
reject the offer made to them by the dictator. This rejection has dramatic consequences – a 
rejection in the UG means that neither the dictator nor the recipient get paid. Since these 
choices have to be made one after the other, the UG is necessarily a sequential game. As 
with the TG, however, the participants are sometimes repeatedly paired with different 
people to experience both roles. Alternatively, they answer a questionnaire in which their 
responses to different possible offers in the UG are recorded using a strategy method. 
 The first person to make a choice is the dictator who performs a distribution of an 
initial endowment. This distribution is, in effect, an offer that is communicated to the 
recipient. At this point, all the power is transferred to the recipient who can either accept or 
reject the offer. If the offer is accepted, both the dictator and the recipient are paid as the 
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dictator initially suggested. If the offer is rejected, neither the dictator nor the recipient is 
paid. 
 There are no real selfish options in the UG – the dictator cannot be sure that a 
selfish offer will be accepted, while the recipient cannot dictate the initial offer at all. For 
the recipient, the rational, profit-maximizing choice is to accept any offer because the 
alternative is to be paid nothing. However, participants often reject offers which dip below 
one third of the initial endowment. Rejection of unfair offers in the UG is considered a 
punishment. Rather than motivated by an abstract sense of justice, rejections are more 
closely related to retaliation. The psychology behind rejections in the UG has to do with an 
unwillingness to be taken advantage of in an interpersonal exchange. 
Third Party Punishment Game (TPP) 
 The Third Party Punishment game is a dyadic, asymmetrical game, but it is played 
in an n-person setting. A PGG, Gift-Giving game or the DG are usually the backdrop for the 
TPP. Participants who have not themselves taken part in these games (thus, they are third 
parties) are invited to evaluate and sanction other players, given information about their 
choices from the games. The participant – the punisher – has all the power in this 
interaction. The TPP can be played as a one-shot, or as a repeated game. 
Punishers in the TPP are given a certain initial endowment by the experimenter. 
Thereafter they are introduced to the game (e.g. PGG or DG) whose players they would be 
evaluating and impacting by their decisions. Sometimes, the punishers had previously 
taken part in such games themselves.  However, if this is the case, the punisher had not 
interacted with the people they are now judging. 
Punishers may keep the entire endowment for themselves. Alternatively, they can 
expend a part of it to punish a participant, or a series of participants, of their choice. This 
amount is multiplied by a factor r, and the equivalent is reduced from the targeted player’s 
rewards. In this way, the participant is investing in punishment of a target about whom 
they have limited information, usually information on previous behaviour and (sometimes) 
group membership. 
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The predecessor of the TPP is a Second Party Punishment game, in which the 
punisher is part of the group they are invited to sanction. This technique is used to 
introduce peer punishment in the PGG, where it has been shown to increase cooperation 
levels and keep them high. However, in the TPP, the punisher has no vested interest in 
donning out punishment, since they are not part of the original interaction. This makes the 
TPP a potential measure of abstract justice, as well as biases in the distribution of 
sanctioning systems between groups. 
An alternative to punishment is reward, which likewise may be donned out by a 
third party at a cost to themselves. This game has no particular name, but it is equivalent 
to the TPP, except that the cost the participant chose to incur to provide the reward is 
multiplied and added to the target player’s outcomes. 
Preemptive Strike Game (PSG) 
 The Preemptive Strike game (PSG) is a dyadic symmetrical game played in real 
time. This means that there is a time frame during which both participants have to make 
their choices. The choices given to either participant is either to push a red button, or to do 
nothing. However, the first participant to push the red button is the only one whose action 
will have meaning in the game. It is a one-shot game, offering two discrete choices. 
 Participants in the PSG are given an initial endowment. Both players stand to gain 
the highest possible payoff if they do nothing, meaning if nobody pushes the red button. 
Usually, they have no opportunity to communicate their intentions or coordinate their 
actions. They are given a set time frame within which they have to make up their minds. 
This time frame can (but does not have to be) communicated to the participants and made 
salient. 
If one of the participants presses the red button, part of their reward is reduced by a 
x. At the same time, the other participant’s reward is reduced by y > x. In addition, they 
lose the ability to lose the button effectively – meaning, they cannot retaliate. A pair of 
rational players should see that it is not in the interest of either player to push the red 
button. However, if one player believes their partner to be spiteful, fearful, confused, or for 
any other reason likely to push the red button, they are better off doing it first. 
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In this way, the PSG is meant to capture defensive aggression, i.e. the willingness of 
attack another party for the sole reason that they are able to attack you. The PSG’s setup 
allows researchers to control the cost of pushing the button (attacking) and the cost of doing 
nothing while the partner pushes the button (being victimized), as well as other variables 
that may impact the willingness to strike pre-emptively, such as group membership, 
depletion of self-control, or trait psychopathy. 
The PSG confounds two main motivations for attack: fear and spite. To discern one 
from the other, researchers sometimes add a scenario at the end of the PSG which faces 
participants with the same experimental set up, but with two buttons: a red and a blue one. 
While the red button performs the same function as it does in the original game, the blue 
button will defend the participant from attack at a cost to themselves, but at no cost to the 
other player. In other words, by pushing the blue button, participants can eliminate the 
other player’s ability to attack them without damaging their outcomes. The choice of red 
button when the blue one is available is considered spiteful. 
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